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A b s t r a c t
This thesis considers the linkages between the age composition of the population and the 
incidence of unemployment. The first two chapters investigate the macro implications of 
demographic change, the second two focus on the age-variation in experience of 
unemployment at the micro level.
It is well known both that the probability of being unemployed varies with age and that, 
thanks to large fluctuations in the birth rate over the last half century, the age composition 
of the labour force has undergone profound change. We employ a shift-share analysis to 
identify the role played by shifts in the composition of the labour force in determining the 
behaviour of the unemployment rate. If workers acquire human capital as they age, 
demographic change implies a shift in the distribution of skills across the workforce. 
Drawing on an established theoretical model, we re-examine the evolving mismatch 
between the demand for, and the supply of, different skills in the labour market, and the 
role it played in determining the aggregate unemployment rate over the recent past.
If we want to understand the extent to which it is the same individuals who are 
unemployed through time, we have to look beyond the aggregate unemployment rate. We 
therefore focus on the distribution of unemployment across individuals -  and in particular 
across age groups -  when we aggregate across their separate spells, and the implications 
a concentration of unemployment on a small number of individuals might have for wage 
setting behaviour. If past experiences of unemployment scar individuals -  increasing their 
probability of being unemployed in the future -  this might explain the persistence in 
experiences of unemployment we observe. Drawing upon the survival analysis literature, 
we investigate a particular variant of the scarring hypothesis -  that past experiences of 
unemployment significantly reduce the conditional probability of escaping current spells.
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C h a p t e r  1 
I n t r o d u c t io n
This research was motivated by two observations. First, that experiences of 
unemployment vary significantly by age, and in particular, that youths suffer higher 
unemployment rates than older members of the working age population. Second, that 
large fluctuations in the birth rate in the first few decades of the post-war era ensured that 
the age composition of the working age population of the United Kingdom has undergone 
profound change in recent decades. Taken together our facts suggest that demographic 
change might have the potential to offer new insights into the behaviour of the UK labour 
market -  and in particular the unemployment rate -  over the recent past. This thesis 
explores the links between the age composition of the working age population and 
various features of the labour market.
Youths always suffer higher unemployment rates than adults. It is argued that this 
unemployment differential reflects the fact that youths have a higher probability of 
flowing into unemployment than adults -  either because they are more likely to be 
employed in unstable, low quality job matches, or because firms are more likely to lay off 
younger members of their workforce in the face of a negative demand shock. From the 
mid 1980s onwards the youth share of the labour force fell almost monotonically as the 
baby bust generation entered the labour market while the larger cohorts of baby boomers 
entered adulthood. Chapter 2 of this thesis investigates what part of the behaviour of the 
aggregate unemployment rate between 1984 and 1998 can be explained by this shift in 
the age composition of the working age population towards those groups who always 
suffer lower unemployment rates. Following Shimer (1998) we employ a shift-share 
analysis which decomposes the change in the aggregate unemployment rate over the 
period into that part which can be explained by changes in the age-specific 
unemployment rates at a given age-composition of the labour force, and that part which 
can be explained by a shift in the age composition of the labour force for a given set of 
age-specific unemployment rates. We find that between 1984 and 1998 demographic
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change can explain just over half a percentage point of the five and a half percentage 
point fall in the aggregate unemployment rate over that period.
However, there is another channel through which demographic change can have an 
impact upon the aggregate unemployment rate, over and above changing the age 
composition of the workforce. That is, the age specific unemployment rates themselves 
may not be entirely independent of the these shifts in the relative supply of different age 
groups in the labour force. In particular, we might expect that the unemployment rate of a 
given group will increase in response to a rise in that groups relative share of the labour 
force -  an effect commonly referred to as ‘generational crowding’. In order to identify 
these effects precisely you need to observe the counterfactual -  i.e., other things equal 
what would have happened to the age-specific unemployment rates in the absence of 
demographic change -  but of course the counterfactual is unobservable. In fact, the raw 
correlations in the data do not suggest that were any significant generational crowding 
effects over the period in question (or at least not in the direction theory would suggest). 
Nevertheless, in order to quantify the potential impact of any generational crowding 
effects, we draw on existing estimates of the elasticity of the age-specific unemployment 
rates with respect to their population shares to produce a quantitative estimate of the 
indirect impact of demographic change on the aggregate unemployment rate.
Of course, demographic factors are not the only forces which can shift the age 
composition of the labour force. For example, rising participation in post-compulsory 
education over the period will have almost certainly led to a decline in the fraction of the 
youth population who are either employed or seeking work. In order to control for these 
non-demographic shifts in participation we apply two alternative modifications of our 
approach as follows. First, we correct the time series profiles of the labour force shares of 
each group by applying a constant activity rate to the populations of each age group. 
Given the observed unemployment rates of each group, our decomposition proceeds as 
before, to give the hypothetical impact of the shift in the age composition of the 
population on the aggregate unemployment rate. Second, we integrate the inactive into 
our analysis directly by performing a shift-share decomposition of the change in the
14
fraction of the working-age population who are unemployed into changes in the age- 
composition of the population and changes in the fraction of each cohort who are 
unemployed.
One atypical feature of demographic shocks to the working age population is that they are 
eminently predictable -  huge migratory flows and catastrophic surges in the death rate 
aside -  future shifts in the age composition of the working age population can be 
observed in data on birth rates available today. In the final section of Chapter 2 we use 
current projections o f the future age composition of the population to construct a forecast 
of the future impact of demographic change on the aggregate unemployment rate. In fact, 
on that basis, demographic change can be expected to have a negligible impact on the 
unemployment rate until 2011.
As they age workers typically add to their stock of human capital through formal training 
programmes and more generally, informal exposure to the workplace. The age 
composition of the working age population is therefore one factor which can help explain 
the distribution of skills across the workforce. The mismatch literature has established 
that under certain conditions (when the wage setting function is convex or when wages 
are set throughout the labour market according to conditions in the market for the most 
skilled members of the workforce) the evolution of the demand for, and the supply of, 
different skills in the labour market can help explain the behaviour of the aggregate 
unemployment rate. The consensus in the literature is that any net shift in the relative 
demand for different skills over recent decades can explain little of the movement in 
aggregate unemployment. However, previous research has typically focused on only a 
narrow definition of an individual’s skill based on their highest level of educational 
attainment. Chapter 3 of this thesis draws upon this mismatch literature to investigate 
whether an appreciation of the relationship between an individual’s age and the stock of 
human capital they hold can offer any new perspective on the role that shifts in the net 
demand for different skills have played in shaping the performance of the UK labour 
market. It is well understood that the rise in participation in post compulsory education in 
the UK may have partially offset the impact of the infamous skill biased shift in labour
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demand which permeated through the labour markets of the developed world in recent 
decades. It is our contention that population ageing provided a second potentially benign 
supply shock -  over the period, the share of the experienced, highly trained (older) 
workers rose , while the share of inexperienced, untrained (young) workers fell.
Throughout this chapter we follow standard practice in the literature and divide the 
workforce into a small number of discrete groups, within which all individuals are 
assumed to be identically skilled, although here we classify individuals according to their 
age as well as their highest level of educational attainment. Using data from the Labour 
Force survey on individual’s labour market status, and data from the General Household 
Survey on individual’s wages we are able to calculate the unemployment rate and 
average wage for the members of each of our constructed skill groups. This data reveals 
the stark variation by age in the average wages and unemployment rates of those who 
share a common level of educational attainment which must reflect in part our stylised 
fact -  that an individual’s age is an important determinant of his, or her, level of skill.
In some sense a natural place to look for the impact of skill biased supply and demand 
shocks in the labour market is in the outcomes of each of these groups. Using standard 
dispersion measures from the literature we illustrate the divergence in outcomes in the 
labour market since 1979; it does indeed appear that there has been increased dispersion 
of wages across skill groups, although the evidence is less clear cut in terms of the skill 
specific unemployment rates. However, in order to quantify the impact of any net shift in 
the demand for different skills on the unemployment rate we require a measure of skill 
measure and a model which articulates the link between the behaviour of that measure 
and the unemployment rate. Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) consider a model in which 
heterogeneous labour is the only input in production and the technology is Cobb Douglas. 
Equilibrium for each group is then determined by the intersection of the implied labour 
demand curves (under perfect competition) and double logarithmic (or convex) wage 
setting functions. A natural measure of skill mismatch in this framework is the ratio of 
the wage bill shares of a given pair of groups divided by the ratio of their labour force 
shares, so that a skill neutral demand shock leaves the relative wages and employment
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rates o f the two groups unchanged. Algebraic manipulation then allows us to identify the 
role played by the evolution of these mismatch measures in determining the behaviour of 
the aggregate unemployment rate.
Aside from our more inclusive definition of skill, we generalise this model in two ways. 
First, we relax the restrictive assumption on the elasticity of substitution between 
different skill inputs in the production function by assuming a C.E.S. technology. Second, 
we allow for the possibility that wages may be set by a ‘leading’ (i.e. the highest) skill 
sector of the labour market. Our model therefore has two unknowns -  the elasticities of 
the production and wage setting functions -  and given parameter values for each, we can 
identify the impact of rising skill mismatch on the aggregate unemployment rate.
Our results are as follows. Mismatch between the demand for and supply of different 
skills in the labour market did increase over the 1980s but remained broadly unchanged 
over the early 1990s. Contrary to previous research in the literature, we find that for 
reasonable parameter values our model implies that this increase in skill mismatch can 
explain a significant proportion of the behaviour of the aggregate unemployment rate 
over the period.
Between 1983 and 1996 an average of 45,000 men flowed into claimant unemployment 
each week. However, the experiences of those men differed sharply -  some left the 
claimant count within days, while others remained for months, even years. This 
observation has led academics and policy makers alike to focus on the duration of 
unemployment spells -  and in particular long term spells -  as a key indicator of distress 
in the labour market. However, it is also true that many of those who leave the claimant 
count will flow back within a relatively short space of time. Therefore in the long run it is 
not necessarily the case that unemployment is concentrated solely upon those trapped in 
long term spells. Only by aggregating across spells can we get a true perspective of which 
individuals are chronically unemployed, and how much unemployment they suffer in the 
long run, and this is the observation that motivates Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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One of the key research agendas in the macro-labour literature has been to find a 
convincing explanation for the woeful performance of the European labour market over 
the 1980s and much of the 1990s -  in particular the extremely high rates of 
unemployment suffered by most European countries throughout that period. Blanchard 
(2000) argues that the favoured explanation for this 'Eurosclerosis' -  that the incidence 
of long term unemployment failed to restrain wage pressure -  is insufficient both on 
empirical and perhaps more decisively on theoretical grounds. He argues that insiders (or 
wage setters) know there is always a chance that they may become unemployed and 
given the low outflow rate from unemployment they may ultimately become long term 
unemployed; therefore the plight of the long term unemployed should moderate their 
behaviour. Blanchard argues that it is the heterogeneity in individual’s probability of 
becoming and remaining unemployed that is crucial -  insiders should be concerned with 
their own risk of being unemployed, which may not be reflected by the aggregate 
unemployment rate. If the distribution of unemployment is heavily concentrated on a few 
unfortunate individuals, then even if the aggregate unemployment rate is high, insiders 
probability of being unemployed for any length of time may be low and wages will not 
respond. Blanchard proposes a particular demographic variant of this hypothesis -  if 
increases in unemployment are heavily concentrated on the youngest members of the 
workforce then increases in aggregate unemployment will not restrain wage setting by 
adults whose probability of being unemployed will not have changed.
Chapter 4 has two core elements. First, we establish the stylised facts of the distribution 
of the total number of days of unemployment experienced by working age men across all 
the spells they suffer in a given period using the JUVOS cohort dataset, which contains 
entire spell histories of a random 5% sample of the claimant unemployed. We evaluate 
the extent to which unemployment is heavily concentrated on a relatively small number 
of men, and in particular the evidence to support Blanchard’s hypothesis these 
unfortunate few are overwhelmingly youths. Second, we illustrate how this distribution 
varies across and between the economic cycles to give an insight into the pressure exerted 
on wages by the claimant unemployed.
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We define the distribution of unemployment in terms of the fraction of a given period 
each male in our panel is claimant unemployed, which we compare against the natural 
benchmark of the distribution of spell lengths in that period. We identify the following 
stylised facts. Between two to four million men have some experience of claimant 
unemployment each year over the course of three to five million spells; over a four year 
period, about five million men claim unemployment benefits over the course of ten 
million spells. In any given year recurrent unemployment is quite rare -  about three 
quarters of a million men will make more than one claim for benefit each year -  but over 
a longer period of time it becomes a more pervasive phenomenon. Experiences of 
unemployment are quite polarised -  one in ten of all claimant spend less than four weeks 
of a given year unemployed, while about one in five are permanently unemployed 
throughout the year. Per head of population youths are indeed more likely to suffer an 
experience of unemployment, but on an individual basis they suffer less days of 
unemployment than older members of the workforce. Finally, while the change in the 
claimant count each week is relatively small, the gross flows into and out of claimant 
count are relatively large -  so the distribution of unemployment across individuals is far 
from static. If we define the chronically unemployed as those who spend the majority of a 
given period unemployed, then over a year they typically explain about three quarters of 
all days lost to unemployment. Per head of population, youths are also over represented 
among the chronically unemployed, however they are under represented compared to the 
number of youths who make any claim for unemployment benefit. We therefore argue 
that while there is considerable evidence to suggest unemployment is concentrated on 
relatively few individuals which may well have implications for wage setting, it is not the 
case that those individuals are overwhelmingly youths as Blanchard contends.
There is good reason to believe that for a given aggregate unemployment rate, a more 
concentrated distribution of unemployment might impose less restraint on wage setting 
than we would otherwise expect. However, given our ignorance of the actual features of 
the distribution of unemployment which wage setters respond to, if  we want to make 
qualitative statements about the pressure exerted on wages by unemployment at different 
points in time, we require a conceptual framework which ranks different distributions in a
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plausible manner. In the latter half of Chapter 4 we use two such approaches: the first 
focuses on the degree of inequality in the distribution, the second on the degree of 
polarisation, drawing on the work of Esteban and Ray (1992). These two approaches rank 
distributions in different ways -  it is quite conceivable for a distribution to be unequal yet 
unpolarised (for example, a uniform distribution) or equal yet polarised (for example, a 
discrete distribution with only two point masses) -  and we therefore look for points of 
consensus between these two approaches when drawing conclusions about the pressure 
exerted on wages by the distribution of unemployment. Our key results are as follows. 
Over the cycle the distribution is most polarised during a slump and yet most unequal in a 
boom reflecting the fact that in a boom the gap between those suffering the most and the 
least unemployment narrows in absolute terms, but widens in proportionate terms. 
However, both conceptual approaches deliver a consistent interpretation of the 
concentration of unemployment over time - the degree of both inequality and polarisation 
in the distribution of unemployment has fallen and so other things equal, we might expect 
greater restraint on the part of wage setters who can now expect to suffer a greater (if not 
equal) share of the burden of unemployment.
That in the aggregate data the instantaneous exit rate, or hazard, from unemployment 
declines with the duration of the spell is well known. Some argue that this observation 
reflects the a sorting effect at the individual level -  those who have the highest 
probability of escaping unemployment do so first, and therefore the average probability 
of escape of those who remain will decline. Others suspect that the declining hazard is 
more than just a mirage in the aggregate data -  the experience of unemployment has a 
corrosive effect on the individual, slowing reducing their probability o f escape. The 
damage to an individual may be either direct -  eroding their stock of human capital or 
psychological well being making them less attractive to potential employers, or indirect -  
where there is a stigma attached to being unemployed as firms who lack information on 
job applicants use the duration of an individual’s spell as a signal of their potential 
productivity.
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A recent body of research has focused on a potential implication of this hypothesis -  
upon exiting the spell the slate might not be wiped clean: the erosion of human capital, 
psychological damage or stigma may not be undone. The experience of unemployment 
then leaves a scar -  those who have an experience of unemployment may suffer a wage 
penalty on re-employment, and/or they may be more likely to become or remain 
unemployed in the future.
Chapter 5 of this thesis contributes to this nascent literature by testing for the presence of 
a particular variant of the scarring hypothesis -  lagged duration dependence effects -  
where controlling for differences between individuals and the labour markets in which 
they search, the duration of past experiences of unemployment significantly depress the 
hazard. Moreover, given the results found elsewhere in the literature, and the potential 
implications for policy, we also test whether these scarring effects differ significantly by 
age.
Our econometric approach to identification draws on the established survival analysis 
methodology. In order to plausibly identify any lagged duration dependence effects we 
require a comprehensive set of controls for all other factors which might affect the 
conditional probability of escape from unemployment, and an econometric model of how 
the hazard is affected by these variables. Our set of controls includes both local labour 
market data specific to the individual, information on their wage and other employment 
conditions when they were last employed taken from the NES dataset and an individual 
specific random effect to control for other unobservable differences between individuals. 
Given our uncertainty over the form of the hazard function, we adopt a non-parametric 
functional forms to minimise any potential mis-specification bias in our results.
Finally, our results are as follows. There is indeed evidence that, controlling for 
differences between individuals and the labour markets in which they search, the longer 
the spells of unemployment an individual has suffered in the past then the lower their 
conditional probability of escaping a current spell of unemployment. These lagged 
duration dependence effects are clearly significant in the JUVOS panel. However, we can
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find no robust evidence to suggest that these lagged duration dependence effects intensify 
with age. Indeed, we find the opposite to be the case -  that the young are more seriously 
affected by an experience of unemployment in the past.
22
C h a p t e r  2  
T h e  A g g r e g a t e  I m p a c t  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  
C h a n g e  o n  t h e  U K  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e
1. In t r o d u c t io n
Most models of the labour market take it as given that inflationary pressures develop 
when unemployment falls below its natural or equilibrium rate—this assumption is at the 
heart of the Phillips curve relationship, and the expectations-augmented models that 
followed it. So recent developments in the labour market have puzzled economists: in 
August 1999, for example, the number of people out of work and claiming benefit fell to 
a 19-year low and yet the RPIX inflation rate was at its lowest level for more than five 
years.
One explanation of this puzzle is that the natural or equilibrium unemployment rate may 
have fallen, enabling the actual unemployment rate to fall substantially without 
generating a pick-up in inflation. Mainstream explanations for such a fall in the natural 
rate have tended to focus on the decline in union bargaining power, reduced generosity of 
unemployment benefits and increased deregulation in the labour market. This chapter 
examines another supply-side explanation, which has received less attention in the United 
Kingdom: that the natural rate has fallen because of changes in the age composition of 
the labour force. Youths always have higher unemployment rates than adults, and 
presumably have higher natural rates as well. The proportion of youths in the labour force 
almost halved over the past decade, so we would expect the aggregate unemployment rate 
and the natural rate to have fallen as a result.
Most of the existing literature investigating the impact o f demographic change on the 
unemployment rate has focused on the US labour market. In a recent paper, Shimer
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(1998) daims that demographic factors can explain the bulk of ‘low-ffequency 
fluctuations’ in US unemployment since World War II, raising the aggregate 
unemployment rate by about 2 percentage points over the 1960s and 1970s, and then 
reducing it by about 1 Vi percentage points thereafter. This chapter provides a comparable 
quantitative estimate of the fall in the UK unemployment rate that can be accounted for 
by the decline in the youth share of the labour force.
Section 2 of this Chapter presents two key stylised facts, which together suggest that 
demographic change could indeed have played a significant role in explaining recent 
developments in the UK labour market. First, that the proportion of youths in the UK 
labour force has fallen dramatically over the past decade. Second, that youths always 
have higher unemployment rates than adults, and that this can be attributed to the fact that 
they have higher inflow rates into unemployment. In Section 3 we briefly review the 
literature to explain why youths suffer higher unemployment rates than adults, 
irrespective of their relative shares of the labour force. We argue that the youth 
unemployment problem is caused either by high quit rates among younger workers, or by 
firms discriminating against their younger employees when they lay off workers. This is 
consistent with youths having high unemployment rates because they have high inflow 
rates into unemployment.
In Section 4 we survey the ‘shift-share’ methodology developed in the literature, and use 
it to provide a range of estimates of the impact on the unemployment rate of demographic 
change in the labour force. We conclude that the decline in the youth share o f the UK 
labour force can explain approximately 55 basis points of the fall in the aggregate 
unemployment rate between 1984 and 1998.
Demographic change can have a further indirect impact on the aggregate unemployment 
rate if  the group-specific unemployment rates depend on the composition of the labour 
force -  through so called generational crowding effects. In Section 5 we assess whether 
shifts in the composition of the labour force over the period did indeed have a material 
impact on the youth and adult unemployment rates. We find little robust evidence for
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these generational crowding effects; however, we illustrate how demographic change 
could explain a far greater proportion o f the change in the aggregate unemployment rate 
under fairly reasonable assumptions on the size of these generational crowding effects.
The proportion of the population in each age group that is economically active (either 
employed or actively searching for work) can and does vary over time, and this will lead 
to further changes in the composition of the labour force. Section 6 discusses two 
alternative approaches that seek to control for these changes in the labour force 
participation rates of each age group, in order to isolate the impact of demographic 
change. Qualitatively, the results are the same as before. Demographic change explains 
only a relatively small fraction of the overall change in the unemployment rate between 
1984 and 1998, but appears to be the principal determinant of the changes in the 
composition of the labour force.
Finally, in Section 7, we use current projections of the future size and composition of the 
labour force (based on data on fertility rates, and forecasts of future patterns of migration, 
mortality and activity rates) to project the implications for the unemployment rate in the 
near future. We conclude that shifts in the composition of the labour force are unlikely to 
have a significant impact on the unemployment rate over the next decade.
2 . S t y l is e d  f a c t s
2.1  D e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e
The United Kingdom, like most of the developed world, has experienced a sustained 
period of significant demographic change in the postwar period. The crude birth rate^ 
increased rapidly through the late 1950s and early 1960s, from 15 in 1955 to 18.5 in 
1964, then collapsed to a low of 11.5 in 1977. It has since stabilised (see Figure 2.1). 
These changes were echoed 16 years later in the size of the youth cohort entering the
^The total number o f births each year, multiplied by a thousand and divided by the population.
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labour market (see Figure 2.2): the proportion of 16-19 year olds in the labour force 
peaked at 9.9% in 1981, but by 1994 had fallen back to 5.8%.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the dramatic fall in the youth share of the labour force between the 
late 1970s and the mid-1990s. Although the huge fall in the birth rate that occurred once 
the baby boom had ended will certainly have reduced the number of youths in the 
working-age population, there are a number of other factors that might have affected the 
youth share o f the labour force. Principal among these is the proportion of each youth 
cohort that remains within the education system. Over the past two decades the United 
Kingdom has experienced a period of sustained expansion in the post-compulsory 
education system, with the number of youths attending further and higher education 
colleges more than doubling between 1980 and 1995 (see Figure 2.3). Of course, 
although some fraction of these students will also seek part-time employment to 
supplement their income, increased participation in the education system is almost certain 
to have reduced the rate of economic activity among youths.
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For those aged 16 to 17 the activity rate fell by more than 4 percentage points, and for 
those aged between 18 and 24 it fell by 7 percentage points. This had a significant impact 
on the number of youths in the labour force—if activity rates had remained at their 1984 
levels there would have been approximately 400,000 more youths in the labour force 
(approximately half the increase in the number of youths entering further and higher 
education, reflecting the fact that a number of students are also classified as economically 
active).
F ig u r e  2 .3 : N u m b e r s  o f  S t u d e n t s  in F u r t h e r  a n d  H ig h e r  E d u c a t io n
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To put this in context, in 1984 there were 6% million youths aged between 16 and 24 in 
the labour force, but by 1998 there were less than 416 million. In other words, 
approximately a quarter of the total fall in the number of youths in the labour force over
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the period was a result purely of changes in the proportion of the youth population either 
employed or actively searching for work. However, changes in youth activity rates will 
not necessarily have affected the composition of the labour force over the period to the 
same extent as they have the number of youths in the labour force. We know that there 
have been large changes in the rates of economic activity across all age groups in the 
working age population -  although not all in the same direction (see Figure 6.1 later and 
Gregg and Wadsworth (1999)). To a first approximation, only differential changes in the 
participation rate of a specific age group will have an impact on the aggregate 
unemployment rate.
2.2  T h e  y o u t h  u n e m p l o y m e n t  g a p
Youths always have a higher unemployment rate than adults (see Figure 2.4). This 
differential is persistent, but varies across the cycle. The unemployment rate is identically 
equal to the product of the inflow rate into unemployment and the average duration of 
unemployment. So if U is the stock of unemployment, S  is the inflow into 
unemployment, and N  is the size of the labour force, then in steady state:
^  = [2.1]
N  N  S
In steady state, the number of people entering unemployment must equal the number 
leaving it. Letting H  denote the total outflow from unemployment, we get:
L  = [2.2]
N  N  H
The final term of this expression is the reciprocal of the outflow rate, so the 
unemployment rate in steady state can be expressed as the inflow rate into unemployment 
rate divided by the outflow rate from it:
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i j n t [2.3]
The UK data show that youths have higher unemployment rates because they have a 
higher propensity to become unemployed. Once unemployed, however, their outflow 
rates from unemployment appear, if anything, to be marginally higher than those of 
adults; as a result, at any given point in time, a far smaller proportion of unemployed 
youths have been unemployed for an extended period (see Figure 2.5)^. Put another way, 
although large numbers of young people flow into unemployment each period, very few 
end up becoming long-term unemployed.
F ig u r e  2 .4  : U n e m p l o y m e n t  by  A g e  G r o u p
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Figure 2.4 also reveals that, relative to all other age groups in the labour force, youths 
have had increasingly higher unemployment rates over the period. When the labour 
market began to recover in the mid-1990s, the unemployment rate of the youngest 
members of the labour force was the most sluggish to react—between 1993 and 1996 the 
unemployment rate of 16-17 year olds actually increased, while the rates of all other 
groups fell. By 1998, while the unemployment rate of most other age groups had fallen 
by about a third, the unemployment rate of 16-17 year olds was still at its 1993 level.
■ For further details see Appendix Table A .2.2, and Chapter 4 o f  this thesis.
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This may well be a consequence of increased participation in post-compulsory 
education—if, as seems likely, those members of each cohort with the best employment 
prospects enter further and higher education, then over time the average employability of 
those youths who enter the labour force aged 16 will fall.
F ig u r e  2 .5  : P e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  U n e m p l o y e d  w it h  D u r a t io n s  g r e a t e r
THAN A YEAR BY AGE GROUP
60 - 
50 - 
40 -
10 -
84 88 90 92 9486 96 98
16-17 18-24 •25-49 •50+
So our two stylised facts are that the proportion of youths in the labour force has fallen 
substantially over the past 15 years; and that youths always have higher rates of 
unemployment than adults because they have higher inflow rates into unemployment. 
Given the orders of magnitude of the relevant variables, demographic change in the 
labour force could have been large enough to have had a significant effect on aggregate 
unemployment.
3. T he  A ge  U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a te  D if f e r e n t ia l
In the following section we shall give a brief overview of the reasons why youths suffer 
higher unemployment rates than adults. It should be noted that it is not our intention to 
use the available data to distinguish between these competing (or indeed complementary 
hypotheses). Instead, we simply aim to underline why it is that we believe that the age 
unemployment differential is a persistent feature of the labour market, outline the existing 
explanations of why youths suffer higher unemployment rates than adults. Of course, it is
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plausible that as the composition of the labour force changes the differential between the 
youth and adult unemployment rates may vary. However, irrespective of the shifts in the 
composition of the labour force we have discussed, theory and evidence suggest that our 
stylised fact -  that youths have higher unemployment rates than adults -  will always be 
true (Topel (1998)). Our discussion begins with the simple observation that turnover in 
the labour market appears to be greatest for younger workers. Indeed, Gregg and 
Wadsworth (1995) estimate that more than half of all the job changes during the course 
of a working lifetime occur before the age of 30, and a quarter before the age of 20. It 
appears that these higher job separation rates (and thus the age unemployment differential 
itself) can be explained either by discrimination against youths when firms are forced to 
lay-off staff, or by the greater propensity of young workers to quit their jobs.
3.1  F ir m s ’ l a y -o f f  p o l ic ie s
Firms are periodically forced to lay-off some of their employees, both in response to 
transitory and permanent shifts in demand, and as a result o f periodic restructuring of the 
workplace to increase efficiency or profitability. If firms disproportionately concentrate 
lay-offs among their youngest employees, this might help to explain the higher youth 
inflows into unemployment. There are two main reasons why lay-offs may be 
concentrated among younger workers. First, that firms are constrained in who will be laid 
off -  by prior agreement to ‘last in, first out’ (LIFO) rules, which disproportionately 
target younger workers; and second, that firms choose to lay off their youngest 
employees.
3 .1 .1  N e g o t ia t e d  L IF O  r u l e s
In their survey of ‘Pay and Employment Determination in Britain’, Oswald and Turnbull 
(1985) find that LIFO is the most widely used method for choosing who will be made 
compulsorily redundant in a slump. The LIFO rule, which will typically be introduced at
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the behest of unions^, discriminates against those most recent entrants to the workforce, 
when the firm is forced to lay off staff. Youths are, almost by definition, recent entrants 
to any firm. Of the 350 establishments surveyed by Oswald and Turnbull, 64% used 
LIFO as their criterion to decide enforced redundancies. Although the recent decline in 
the coverage of trade union bargaining may well have reduced the use of LIFO rules in 
deciding who is laid off, it is likely to remain important wherever unions have retained 
significant bargaining strength.
3 .1 .2  F ir m s  c h o o s in g  t o  l a y  o f f  y o u n g e r  w o r k e r s
Firms may choose to lay off their younger employees in the face of a negative demand 
shock. Older workers will have acquired a considerable amount of valuable workplace­
relevant human capital during their time in the labour market. These skills will be costly 
for the firm to replace, both in terms of the financial cost of hiring and training 
replacements, but also because it will take a new entrant a certain amount of time to 
acquire familiarity with the workplace. If the firm chooses to lay off skilled incumbents it 
may be difficult to replace them when demand recovers. Conversely, young new entrants 
have little general or firm-specific workplace human capital and will still be in plentiful 
supply when demand recovers. For this reason, the firm may decide to preserve the 
skilled core members of its workforce and to concentrate lay-offs where possible amongst 
the least-skilled new entrants.
The incentive to lay off younger less-skilled workers may be counterbalanced by the fact 
that they will almost certainly be paid substantially less than older members of the 
workforce, so the simplest way to cut labour costs significantly would be to lay off the 
more expensive older workers. However, there are sunk costs in hiring and/or training 
staff to replace skilled employees, and firms may not be able to continue to operate 
effectively without their skilled core workers. So lay-offs might still be concentrated 
amongst the least skilled, despite the fact that they are cheaper to employ. In the Oswald-
 ^ Public choice arguments suggest that LIFO rules, which give increased job security to the majority of 
employees, are likely to be adopted by union representatives and will continue to be so.
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Turnbull survey, 47% of firms reported deciding enforced redundancies according to the 
criterion of those who were ‘least skilled or competent’. In addition, if  firms believe that 
youths are more likely to quit than adults they may delay training younger employees, 
which will prolong the period for which young entrants to the firm will be viewed as low- 
skill workers (Farber (1994)).
3.2  Y o u t h s ’ h ig h e r  p r o p e n s it y  t o  q u it
Young people quit their jobs more frequently. There are two main reasons why they may 
do so: they may be employed in types of jobs that encourage them to quit more often, or 
they may behave differently from adults in the labour market.
3.2 .1  L o w -w a g e / s e c o n d a r y  s e c t o r  j o b s
The probability that an individual will quit a job is generally taken to be inversely 
proportional to the wage offered, so low-wage industries are generally high-tumover 
industries. The labour market is often characterised as comprising two sectors: a primary 
sector of high-wage jobs, for which there are job queues and for which voluntary quits 
(into unemployment) are rare; and a secondary sector of low-skill jobs, characterised by 
low pay, poor working conditions and limited prospects for training or future wage 
growth.
Low pay is in fact remarkably concentrated in a very small number of industries—half of 
all the low paid work in just six occupations (see Metcalf (1999a)). As younger workers 
are concentrated in the secondary sector (two fifths of those aged 18-20, and more than 
half of those aged 16-17 work in the retailing and hospitality industries, both of which 
are classic low-pay employers (see Metcalf (1999b)), they will be more likely to quit 
their jobs than older workers. This might also explain their higher inflow rates into 
unemployment. So, on this explanation, it is not that young people necessarily have an 
intrinsically higher probability of quitting their jobs than adults, but simply that they 
happen to work in the high-tumover secondary sector in disproportionate numbers.
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But why are youths more likely to be employed in the secondary sector? If youths have 
lower reservation wages, they will be willing to accept low-wage jobs that adults will 
reject; and their reservation wages may be lower either because they have only limited 
access to government benefit when unemployed'^, or because their wages may be 
supplemented by contributions from their parents.
Adult workers may also be at a distinct advantage when applying for vacancies in the 
primary sector—they will be more productive (having acquired work-related human 
capital through ‘on the job’ training programmes), and can provide references from 
previous employers that signal their ability and work ethic (i.e. that they don’t shirk). 
With insufficient experience in the labour market to have obtained such workplace 
training or to have developed a reputation for good working attitudes, youths will be at a 
distinct disadvantage to an adult with otherwise identical observable productivity 
characteristics. So young workers are likely to be forced initially to accept vacancies in 
the secondary sector.
3 .2 .2  ‘J o b  s h o p p in g ’
An individual may be unable to assess how productive, and hence how well paid, he will 
be in a particular job until he accepts it .^ Consequently Jovanvic (1979) argues that 
individuals may sample a number of jobs, many of which they will quit when the match 
is revealed as unproductive—a process known as ‘job shopping’.
In effect, high job mobility is the mechanism by which the young progress towards a 
‘lifetime’ job. Youths do not have higher inflows because they have less work experience 
per se, but the fact that they have been searching in the labour market for such a short 
time makes it more likely that they are still employed in a relatively low-quality, low-
^ Those aged 18 to 24 received £40.70 Jobseeker’s Allowance per week while those aged 25 and above 
received £51.40, under both the contribution-based and income-based schemes (Benefits Agency (1999)).
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wage job, and are therefore more likely to quit. It may also be that, because of their 
inexperience in the labour market, youths are more reliant on sampling jobs in order to 
discover their productivity; adults, on the other hand, may be better able to assess a 
vacancy’s worth on inspection. So youths may accept, and then rapidly quit, jobs that 
adults would not have accepted in the first place.
Manning (1998) argues that the eamings-experience profile of both men and women can 
largely be explained by this model of job search. In particular, he argues that the fact that 
displaced workers suffer a loss in earnings when they re-enter employment, even after 
controlling for tenure (and hence acquired firm-specific capital in their former jobs) is 
indicative of the fact that search capital has been destroyed, and the individual will have 
to resume shopping for a lifetime job. The employment hazard (the conditional 
probability that a job match will end, given that it has survived to that date) actually 
appears to increase in the first few months of a job’s life — a finding that is consistent 
with workers disregarding any initial information about the quality of the match, instead 
waiting for sufficient information to make an informed decision about the prospects of 
the current job (Farber (1994)). However, after about three months, the employment 
hazard begins to decline—the job has been revealed as either of high or low quality and 
the majority of unproductive matches will be destroyed.
This theory of ‘job shopping’ implies that new entrants to the labour market suffer a 
temporary unemployment penalty since they have to search for a productive job match— 
and so a fall in the number of youths in the labour market may reduce the unemployment 
rate because there are less of these new entrants to the labour market. However, in 
Section 2.1 we discussed how part of the fall in the youth share of the labour force over 
the period can be explained by increased participation in post-compulsory education, 
which involves no real fall in the number of new entrants to the labour market, only an 
increase in their average age upon arrival. If graduate entrants into the labour force also 
suffer an unemployment penalty due to job shopping, then a fall in the youth share o f the
 ^ Following Nelson (1970), jobs are then said to be ‘experience goods’; conversely, if  an individuals 
productivity in a vacancy can be observed on inspection, without actually accepting and sampling the
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labour force caused by increased participation in the education system might be expected 
to have no effect on the aggregate unemployment rate.
However, there could be a number of reasons why, when graduates enter the labour 
market, they may be at less of a disadvantage than non-graduates. They may, for 
example, have a clearer idea of the sort of industry and firm in which they want to work, 
based on the specialisation of their education and the availability of free college careers 
advisory services. So they will require a shorter period of job shopping. They may be 
inherently more attractive to employers, either because they will have acquired more 
human capital (or at least are able to more effectively signal their innate productivity) or 
because employers believe that they are more mature and less likely to shirk; so they may 
be better able to apply directly for primary sector jobs. Finally, older entrants to the 
labour market may have higher reservation wages, either because they enjoy less parental 
financial support or because they have increased access to adult levels of government 
benefit. If any of these factors applies, then although all individuals must temporarily 
suffer high inflow rates into unemployment when they enter the labour market, the size 
and duration of this ‘unemployment penalty’ will fall with the age (or amount of human 
capital) of the entrant.
Over time the unemployment rate of those aged 18 to 24, an increasing proportion of 
whom will have recently entered the labour market, has fallen relative to other age groups 
in the labour force (see Figure 2.4). So it appears that any ‘inflow penalty’ incurred by 
graduates entering the labour force is more than offset by the increase in human capital 
that they acquired by staying longer in the education system. So changes in the 
composition of the labour force caused by increased participation in further and higher 
education can still affect the aggregate unemployment rate—since by increasing the 
duration of education and the age at which they arrive in the labour market, new entrants 
can reduce the unemployment penalty that they suffer on entry.
match then jobs are said to be ‘pure search goods’.
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3 .3  G e n e r a t io n a l  c r o w d in g  a n d  t h e  y o u t h  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e
The youth unemployment rate cannot necessarily be taken as being independent of 
demography, as it is possible that the youth unemployment rate itself might be sensitive 
to the proportion of youths in the labour force. The empirical evidence (Freeman and 
Bloom (1986)) suggests that the unemployment rate of a group, and in particular of 
youths, may be increasing in its share of the labour force. A number of factors will affect 
the size of these ‘generational crowding’ effects: the existence, level and coverage of any 
youth minimum wage legislation; the degree of substitutability and/or complementarity 
with other groups in the labour force; and the elasticity of demand for youth labour 
(Freeman and Bloom (1986)).
So the shift in the composition of the labour force away from the young may have led to a 
fall in the youth unemployment rate, irrespective of any cyclical effects. However, as 
long as youth unemployment rates remain above those of adults (which they always do) 
then shifts in the labour force away from youths will still reduce the aggregate 
unemployment rate.
4 . T h e  q u a n t it a t iv e  im p o r t a n c e  o f  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e
So youths have (significantly) higher unemployment rates than prime-age adults, and 
since the early 1980s the demographic composition of the labour force has undergone 
significant change. In order to quantify the importance of these facts for measured 
unemployment, we can decompose changes in the aggregate unemployment over time 
into two parts: the part accounted for by changes in the unemployment rates of the 
separate age groups in the labour force; and that accounted for by changes in the 
composition of the labour force itself. This so called ‘shift-share’ approach has its origins
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in the work of Perry (1970), but can also be found in Summers (1986), Shimer (1998), 
Katz and Krueger (1999) and Horn and Heap (1999), among others.
4 .1 . S h if t  -  S h a r e  A n a l y s is  : A  T e c h n ic a l  In t r o d u c t io n .
In order to explain how some of the measures used in this analysis are derived we provide 
a brief overview of shift share analysis. Consider a variable Z defined as the product of 
two component variables x a n d y . We wish to decompose the change in z between time
[0] and time [T] into that explained by the change in X over the period, and that explained 
by the change in y  :
Az — Zj — Zq — XjYj  — XqYq — XyYj — XqYj + XqYj — XqYq
= yT(xT-x„)+x„(yT-yJ
= Y j X A x  +  XoXAy [4.1]
We can interpret the products : y  ^ x Ax , Xq x A y as the change in z due to the 
change in x  and y respectively. However, our decomposition is completely arbitrary -  
we could equally have added and subtracted the product X^yo which yields:
A z  = Yq X A x  +  Xy X A y  [4.2]
Alternatively, we could use the product : x  ^x A y , where [t] is some time period in the 
interval (0,T), and decompose the change in Z accordingly :
A z  = x^ X A y  + ( A z - ( x j X A y ) )  [4.3]
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Of course, to the extent that X and y  vary over the period, the proportion of the change 
in Z we attribute to the change in X and y  will differ according to the arbitrary choice 
of base year [t] we use for our decomposition.
We can of course perform the exact same form of decomposition as that shown in [4.1] -  
[4.3] on a summation. Consider the sum Z  o f W separate terms: Z - , where each term is
defined as the product: x.  x y . . The change in Z between time [0] and time [T] can be
decomposed into that explained by the change in the x^' s  and that explained by the
change in the y  j ’s over that interval as follows:
N
A Z  = ^ y j T x A X j  + ^ X j , x A y ,  [4.4]
or alternatively:
^ Z  =  £ y , o x A X i + £ x „ x A y i  [4.5]
and finally, for some period [t] in the interval (0,T) :
N /  ^  N V
'^Z = ^ y i ,x A X | + A Z -  £ y „ x A X i
i V V i J J
[4.6]
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Again, if the X-  and y. ’s vary over the period, then the separate decompositions we have 
described will not give equivalent explanations of the proportion of the change in Z  
‘caused’ by changes in the X-  ’s , and that ‘caused’ by changes in the y - ’s.
Finally, returning to the initial example, let us assume that X and the y  are not exogenous,
so that a change in one of the variables might cause a change in the other. Specifically, let 
us assume a uni-directional causality in that X is assumed to affect y  but not the reverse.
Now the decomposition :
A z ^ y ^ x A x  + Xy X A y  [4.7]
will underestimate the importance of changes in x  in explaining the observed change in 
Z , since some firaction of the change in y  is also caused by the change in x . Therefore
if we decompose the change in y  as follows:
A y = A y ( x )  +  A y (f )  [4.8]
where A y (x ) reflects changes in y  caused by the change in x , and A y (g ) reflects that 
residual part of the change in y  not caused by the change in X . Then we have that:
A z =  y^ X A x  + Xy X A y (x )+  x^ x Ay(6") [4.9]
where the sum of the first two terms should now be interpreted as the change in z
explained by the change in x .
4 .2  A c c o u n t in g  f o r  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e
We can directly apply the shift -  share methodology outlined above to decompose the 
change in the aggregate unemployment rate into changes in the group specific labour
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force shares and unemployment rates. The aggregate unemployment rate at time t can be 
defined as the weighted average of the unemployment rates of all the separate age groups 
in the labour force, where the weights are simply the respective group’s share of the 
labour force:
Uj u^(i) [4.10]
i
where defines the share of the labour force who are members of group (i) and 
U^(i) captures the group-specific unemployment rate at time t. So a fall in aggregate
unemployment must by definition originate from either a change in the composition of 
the labour force towards groups with lower unemployment rates, a fall in the 
unemployment rates of some or all groups, or some combination of the two.
Following the terminology used by Katz and Krueger (1999), we define the age-constant 
unemployment rate^ as the weighted average of the age-specific unemployment rates, 
where the weights are now the shares of the labour force of each group in a certain base 
year
1
where 6^^(i) is the benchmark share of group (i) in the labour force at time /q. It captures
what would have happened to aggregate unemployment, given the observed changes in 
group unemployment rates, if  there had been no age-related demographic change (i.e. if 
the labour force shares had remained at their levels in /q).
 ^In Shimer's terminology this is the genuine unemployment rate.
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Katz and Krueger suggest the use of the difference between the aggregate unemployment 
rate and this age-constant unemployment rate at time t—or the age adjustment to the 
unemployment rate (AAU)—as a measure of the impact of demographic change, which 
will take the form:
1
This residual captures the part of the evolution of aggregate unemployment that cannot be 
explained by shifts in the age-specific unemployment rates alone, and which must 
therefore be caused by shifts in the composition of the labour force. However, given the 
shifts in participation across different age groups in the population, it may well be the 
case that some part of the change in the aggregate rate which appears to be explained by 
changes in the age-specific rates is actually a result of shifts in the composition of the 
labour force; in other words, the age specific rates are not exogenous to the composition 
of the labour force. We shall go on to discuss this issue in greater depth in Section 6.
The other extreme is to measure what would have happened to the unemployment rate 
had all the age-specific unemployment rates remained constant (i.e. abstracting from all 
the economic factors determining unemployment), and instead only the composition of 
the labour force had changed. The unemployment rate as it would have been if  driven 
purely by demographic change, or as Katz and Krueger term it the age-driven 
unemployment rate'^ is thus:
1
where: is the benchmark unemployment rate of group (i) at time o^. The numerical
level of this rate is (by construction) dependent on the levels of unemployment in the
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base year, and so it does not in any sense measure the unemployment ‘caused’ by 
demographic factors. But we can interpret the difference between the age-driven rate at 
time t\ and unemployment in the base year îq as the implied change in the aggregate 
unemployment rate due to demographic pressures—which we call the 
age-driven change in the unemployment rate (ADCU):
u AD 
t i , t o  ""to to to' [4.14]
Shimer also suggests using a chain-weighted measure (CWM) to identify the change in 
unemployment attributable to demographics (Shimer (1998)), defined as:
t l -1
= s
t = tO
[4.15]
Since by definition, =  0, we can decompose our chain-weighted measure as
follows:
[4.16]
So if each individual term—the change in his chain-weighted measure between years t 
and r+1—is thought of as capturing the demographic change between these two years, 
then the overall measure describes the cumulative effect of demographic change over the 
period, which is not as sensitive to the choice of base year, because of the implicit
 ^In Shimer’s terminology this is the demographic unemployment rate.
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averaging involved in the calculation of the chain-weighted measure. However, this 
measure of demographic change is itself still sensitive to economic factors—if youth 
activity rates vary more than those of adults over the cycle, for example, any 
demographic shift towards the young will be exaggerated during a boom as more youths 
are drawn into the labour force (Shimer (1998)).
4 .3  E m p ir ic a l  e v id e n c e
Consistent data on unemployment rates by age group are available only from 1984, so we 
cannot examine the direct effect of the entry of the baby boomers into the labour market 
(the majority of those bom at the peak of the baby boom, in 1964, would have entered the 
labour market some four years before the data start). We can, however, explore the 
impact of the large fall in the birth rate between 1964 and 1977. Using data from the 
Labour Force Survey, we initially divide the labour force into two groups—youths (aged 
less than 25) and adults—but for comparison we also repeat the calculations for a finer 
disaggregation of the labour force into five different age groups. An examination of how 
sensitive our results are to changing the base year o f our calculations is deferred to 
Section 4.4.
Using a simple two-part decomposition into youths and adults, the age-constant 
unemployment rate (shown in Figure 4.1) tracks the actual unemployment rate quite 
closely for most of the period, and the two series are virtually indistinguishable up until 
1989. However, the shift in the youth composition of the labour force is not captured by 
the age-constant rate and for this reason the actual unemployment rate declines further 
than the age-constant rate. The path of the age-driven unemployment rate captures this 
shift away from the young in the labour force and therefore also falls over the period. 
However, because it is benchmarked on 1984 unemployment rates, it is unaffected by the 
large fall in all the age-specific unemployment rates as the economy recovered from the 
severe slump in the early 1980s.
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The relevant factor for present purposes is the changes in these series. In quantitative 
terms, the age-driven unemployment rate fell by almost 77 basis points over the period, 
while the aggregate unemployment rate declined by 566 basis points; so demographic 
change explains approximately 14% of the fall in the unemployment rate on this measure. 
On the other hand, the age-constant unemployment rate fell by some 511 basis points, 
and so explains 90% of the fall in the aggregate rate; so the age adjustment to the 
unemployment rate implies that demographic change explains about 10% of the fall in 
the aggregate rate.
F ig u r e  4.1 : T im e  Pa th  o f  A c t u a l , A g e  D r iv e n  a n d  A g e  C o n s t a n t  
U n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s  (% ) -  2 g r o u p s .
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The chain-weighted measure (not shown in Figure 4.1) fell by about 50 basis points, and 
so accounts for about 9% of the fall in aggregate unemployment over the period. It would 
appear, then, that demographic change in the labour force explains about 50 to 75 basis 
points, or 9% to 14%, of the fall in the aggregate unemployment rate between 1984 and 
1998 (see Figure 4.2).
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F ig u r e  4.2 : M ea su r es  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  P r e ssu r e
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F ig u r e  4.3 : M ea su r e s  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  P r e ssu r e
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These results may of course be sensitive to the way in which we have divided the labour 
force. So we repeat the analysis, sub-dividing the labour force further into five separate 
age groups: 16-17, 18-24, 25-34, 35^9 , and 50 and over. The pattern that emerges is 
qualitatively very similar to that obtained by dividing the labour force into just youths 
and adults. In quantitative terms, the age-driven unemployment rate now falls by some 69
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basis points between 1984 and 1998, explaining almost an eighth of the fall in aggregate 
unemployment over that period. The age-constant unemployment rate falls by some 514 
basis points, explaining 91% of the fall in the aggregate unemployment rate (therefore the 
age adjustment to unemployment explains the remaining 9% of the fall in the aggregate 
rate). Finally, the chain-weighted measure falls by about 40 basis points, explaining about 
7% of the decline in the aggregate rate. So on this disaggregated basis, the percentage of 
the fall in aggregate unemployment that can be explained by demographic change lies 
between 7% and 12%, or about 40 to 70 basis points (see Figure 4.3). The role of 
demographic change is in fact marginally reduced compared with the simple 
youths/adults decomposition.
4 .4  C h a n g in g  t h e  b a s e  y e a r
These results take unemployment rates and labour force composition in 1984 as the base 
for calculating the age-constant and age-driven unemployment rates over the period. But 
this is arbitrary and we can test whether the results are qualitatively or quantitatively 
sensitive to this choice, repeating the analysis using each year in the sample in turn as the 
anchor. Of course, our calculations of the age-constant and age-driven unemployment 
rates are now in part retrospective, and we must amend our definitions of the age 
adjustment to the unemployment rate and the age-driven change in the unemployment 
rate accordingly. The age adjustment to unemployment, given age-constant 
unemployment calculated using base year (x), is now defined as the difference between 
the change in the unemployment rate and the change in the age-constant unemployment 
rate over the period:
1^98 ^ 8 4 ^  ^ 84(0) [4.17]
i
The age-driven change in the unemployment rate is now defined as the difference 
between what the unemployment rate would have been in 1998 and 1984, had group- 
specific unemployment rates remained at their values in the base year (x):
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I u ^ ( iX « 9 8 (0 - ‘^84(')) [4.18]
The chain-weighted measure of demographic unemployment is of course unaffected, as it 
is based on the actual composition of the labour force and group unemployment rates in 
each year (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5). It turns out that the choice of base year has a 
significant effect on our other measures of the impact of demographics on the 
unemployment rate -  in the figure below we graph the estimated impact of demographic 
change for each of our three measures using each year of the period as a base year (see 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5). The mean estimates of the change in actual unemployment 
explained by each of our measures across all available base years (1984 to 1998) are 
shown in Table 4.A.
F ig u r e  4 .4  : V a r ia t io n  in  M ea su r e s  ok t h e  im p a c t  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e  by
BASE YEAR (BASIS POINTS)
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The fact that our results are sensitive to the base year is no surprise, as each base 
represents a different set of values for the composition of the labour force and group 
unemployment rates on which our calculations are based. The variation in our estimates 
of the impact of demographic change by base year can therefore be explained in terms of
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the variation across years in the dispersion of the age specific unemployment rates and 
the composition of the labour force.
While the actual composition of the labour force in each period used to calculate the age- 
driven unemployment rate is common to all base years, the group-specific unemployment 
rates that they modify are not. If all the group-specific unemployment rates were higher 
in 1984 than 1998, then the age-driven unemployment rate will be higher across the 
period if we use 1984 as a base year rather than 1998. The age-driven change in the 
unemployment rate over the period will be unaffected by such differences, but will still 
be sensitive to differences in the dispersion of the unemployment rates between base 
years: the greater the difference between the unemployment rates, the more that changes 
in the composition of the labour force will matter. The variation in the change in the age- 
driven unemployment rate [ADCU] by base year can (see the pink and red lines in 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5) thus be explained by base year variations in the age-related 
unemployment rate differentials (see Figure 4.6).
F ig u r e  4 .5  : V a r ia t io n  in M ea su r e s  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e  by
BASE YEAR (PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT EXPLAINED)
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T able  4.1 : S u m m a r y  o f  estim ates of the  im pa c t  of  d em o g r a ph ic  c h a n c e  on
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Basis points Percentage explained
Index o f  demographic pressure : 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
Average age adjustment to unemployment -65 -56.5 11.5 10
Average age-driven change in unemployment -54.1 -49.8 9.6 8.8
Average chain-weighted measure -48.5 -40.5 8.6 7.2
The age adjustment to the unemployment rate, on the other hand, holds the lal30ur force
composition constant at its base year level. Between 1984 and 1998, the youth 
unemployment rate fell further than the adult rate in absolute terms (see Figure 2.4) and 
the youth share of the labour force was almost monotone decreasing over the period, only 
increasing (marginally) between 1984 and 1985. So the later our base year, the lower the 
weight we will place on the group unemployment rate which changes the most, and the 
smaller our estimate of the change in the age-constant unemployment rate will be.
F ig u r e  4 .6  : Y o u t h  S h a r e  o f  th e  L a b o u r  F o r c e  a n d  t h e  Y o u t h -A d u l t  
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As a result, demographic change as measured by the age adjustment to the unemployment 
rate will explain more of the change in unemployment, the later our choice of base year. 
The increase in the age adjustment to the unemployment rate [AAU] over this period (see 
the blue lines in Figures 4.4 and 4.5) can therefore be explained by the near-monotone 
fall in the youth share of the labour force (see Figure 4.6).
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5 . ‘G e n e r a t io n a l  c r o w d in g ’ : c o h o r t  s iz e  a n d  u n e m p l o y m e n t
RATE INTERACTIONS
The above analysis implicitly assumes that age-specific unemployment rates are 
unaffected by the size of each age-group as a proportion of the labour force. Any 
interactions between the size of a group and its unemployment rate will not be attributed 
to demographic change on the measures we have used, since they capture only the direct 
compositional effect. If, for example, the increase in the youth unemployment rate in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (as the baby boomers entered the labour force) was partly 
caused by the rapid expansion of that cohort through so-called ‘generational crowding’ 
effects, then the reverse effect might be observed as the proportion of young people in the 
labour force declined. Both the youth share of the labour force and the youth 
unemployment rate would have declined as a result of demographic change. Shimer 
(1998) finds that these generational crowding effects have a significant role in explaining 
changes in the aggregate unemployment rate. By themselves, the changes in the age- 
specific unemployment rates caused by shifts in the composition of the labour force 
implied about a 1 percentage point increase in the US aggregate unemployment rate 
between 1954 and 1980 (almost exactly a half of the total impact that he estimates 
demographic change had over the period). However, other factors might also lead to a 
relative improvement in youth unemployment rates, coincidental with the fall in the 
youth share of the labour force. For example, there could be a change in firms’ 
preferences towards youth labour, or a shift in demand by consumers towards companies 
that disproportionately employ youths (Freeman and Bloom (1986)).
Shimer offers a useful illustrative measure of these generational crowding effects, which 
he defines as follows:
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p  =
^tl ^to
[ - 1,1] [5.1]
^ t l “ ^ 0
where are the vectors of labour market shares and unemployment rates
respectively in each time period. The numerator o f Shimer’s measure is the scalar product 
of the change in the vector of labour market shares, and the change in the vector o f the 
unemployment rates—which effectively captures the degree of correlation between them. 
This correlation coefficient is then normalised by the absolute size of the change in the 
two vectors captured by the denominator. If this measure -  ‘analogous to a correlation’ -  
is positive then in a period of demographic change, those groups whose share of the 
labour force changes will experience relative changes in their unemployment rates in the 
same direction, which would support the notion of generational crowding. Conversely, if 
the measure is negative, then those groups whose share of the labour force increases 
would enjoy a relative fall in their unemployment rates.
Taking the whole sample, if  we divide the labour force into youths and adults, p takes the 
value 0.24; if  we divide it into five separate groups, the measure falls to 0.17. The 
underlying message remains the same: there appears to be clear evidence of generational 
crowding of the kind that, when the youth share of the labour force declined, the youth 
unemployment rate also fell relative to other groups in the labour force.
But this result is not robust. Choosing any year between 1987 and 1991 as the starting 
point, the evidence is of perverse generational crowding effects (i.e. a negative 
correlation coefficient), with youths experiencing relatively higher unemployment rates 
as their share of the labour force fell (see Figure 5.1).
Given that the youth share of the labour force was steadily decreasing across the entire 
period, the sign of the correlation coefficient will depend crucially on the direction of 
change of the youth/adult unemployment differential. We know that this gap increased
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after 1989, despite the falling youth share of the labour force, which is why the Shimer 
statistic suggests perverse generational crowding effects. A neutral assumption, on the 
available evidence, might be that the UK group-specific unemployment rates have been 
independent of the composition of the labour force, and that the statistics computed 
earlier are indeed appropriate measures of the effect of demographic change on 
unemployment^.
F ig u r e  5.1 : V a r ia t io n  in S h im e r ’s C o r r e l a t io n  C o e f f ic ie n t  B y  B a se  Y e a r
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Of course, if this assumption is incorrect, then we will only capture the direct effect of 
demographic change on the aggregate unemployment rate; the indirect effect, through 
changes in the group specific unemployment rates caused by changes in the composition 
of the labour force, will be lost. To illustrate the sensitivity of our results to this 
assumption of no generational crowding effects we carry out the following back of the 
envelope calculation. Using the results of Korenman and Neumark (2000), who find that 
across a sample of 15 OECD countries over the period 1970-1994, the elasticity of youth 
unemployment rates (relative to adults) with respect to relative cohort size (defined as the 
ratio of the youth to adult population) is of the order of 0.5, we can estimate the impact of
* It could be the case that generational crowding effects depend on the cyclical position o f the economy. 
The correlation coefficient appears to be positive in the mid 1980s and early 1990s when the economy was 
in recession, and negative in the late 1980s when the economy entered recovery. We do not investigate this 
hypothesis in this paper.
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changes in the age specific unemployment rates caused by demographic change Au^{p )  
on the unemployment rate. The following decomposition illustrates our approach:
Au =  X ^ ^  A«,.(ffl)x Û),. ,8 +%|[Aw,. -  AM,(ffl)]x [5.2]
where the first term captures the direct effect of demographic change on the aggregate 
unemployment rate, the second the indirect effect due to generational crowding, and the 
final term is the residual. Now in order for this decomposition to be operational we need 
to know the precise impact of demographic change on the age specific unemployment 
rates. Korenman and Neumark find that a 2 % increase in the relative youth cohort size 
(the population aged 16-24 divided by the population aged 25-54) leads to an increase in 
the relative youth unemployment rate (the youth rate divided by the adult rate) of 1 %. 
Therefore, if we ignore any other factors which might have affected the youth adult 
unemployment differential over the period, we can calculate the relative youth 
unemployment rate in 1998 as follows:
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where P^  ^ is the number of people in the population in age group (i) in year (t). If we 
assume that generational crowding effects work solely through the youth unemployment 
rate, i.e. : then we can estimate what the youth unemployment rate
would have been under these circumstances :
( \  ^y,84 1
0,84
p  /  V f},98
0,98
y,84.
W
+ 1
0,84 y
[5.4]
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On the basis of these calculations we estimate that, ceteris paribus, given the adult 
unemployment rate in 1998, the shift in the composition of the labour force should have 
reduced the youth unemployment rate to approximately 8.6%; whereas the actual youth 
rate 12.3% in 1998. The youth unemployment rate in 1998 is thus several percentage 
points higher than we would have otherwise expected given the adult unemployment rate 
at that time, and the shift in the composition of the population away from youths that 
occurred.
If we assume that this deterioration in the youth labour market would have been even 
more extreme in the absence of demographic change (i.e. the generational crowding 
effects will have partially offset the increase in the youth unemployment rate) then we 
will have underestimated the impact of demographic change on the aggregate rate. Using 
our standard decomposition above, we find that the indirect effect of demographic change 
through the age specific unemployment rates is over twice as large as the direct effect we 
have concentrated on up to now. On the basis of Korenman and Neumark’s estimate of 
the elasticity of the relative youth unemployment rate, we find that demographic change 
can explain almost a half of the total fall in the aggregate unemployment rate.
T a b l e  5.1 : S u m m a r y  o f  e s t im a t e s  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e  o n
THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CONTROLLING FOR GENERATIONAL CROWDING
Basis points Percentage explained
Direct Effect of Demographic Change -77 13.66
Indirect Effect of Demographic Change -170 29.98
Age Driven Change in Unemployment -247 43.64
Residual -319 56.36
However, we need to be cautious in interpreting these results. As Korenman and 
Neumark note, when the baby bust cohort entered the labour market, the relative fall in 
the youth unemployment rate implied by their results failed to materialise -  in fact, their
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position continued to deteriorate, rather than improve. Their explanation for this 
apparently contradictory result is that changes in the demand for youths caused by other 
factors (downturns in the business cycle, technological change, international trade) 
swamped the beneficial effects of the fall in the relative supply of youths in the labour 
market (Korenman and Neumark (2000) p.2). If however, the deterioration in the youth 
labour market was in some way caused by the decline in the youth share of the labour 
force then our estimates above will seriously exaggerate the role of demographic change 
in explaining the fall in the aggregate unemployment rate.
One plausible explanation for just such a link lies in the fact that over time the average 
level of human capital of youths in the labour force may be falling, since year-on-year an 
increasing fraction of each cohort stays on in further and higher education. Shimer (2000) 
offers an another alternative explanation, based on the efficiency of job search. He argues 
that across the states and regions of the United States an increase in the youth share of the 
labour market causes the youth unemployment rate to fa ll (with an elasticity of about -  
1.5) and the adult unemployment to fall even further (with an elasticity in excess of -2). 
He then goes on to present a theoretical model which explains these results, incorporating 
on-the-job search into the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search model. The presence of a 
trading externality -  that it is easier for agents to match, when few are currently in good 
matches -  ensures that the efficiency of the matching process increases with the number 
of agents actively searching for work. Young workers are assumed to be more mobile 
(more likely to partake of on-the-job search) than adults, and therefore there is a greater 
incentive for firms to post vacancies for a younger workforce, raising job creation -  
which will reduce the unemployment rates of both youths and adults. When Shimer turns 
to apply his methodology to the Korenman and Neumark dataset he finds: “no significant 
correlation between unemployment rates and the youth share of the population, which 
supports neither the cohort crowding hypothesis nor mine (Shimer (2000) p.4)”
It appears then that if we are willing to accept that through generational crowding effects 
a decline in the youth share of the labour force will lead to a fall in the relative youth 
unemployment rate, then demographic change can explain a far greater proportion of the
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change in the aggregate unemployment rate over the period. However, there remains little 
convincing evidence that a decline in the youth share of the labour force does in fact 
deliver significant reductions in the relative youth unemployment rate. We therefore 
retain those estimates based on the neutral assumption of no generational crowding 
effects as our central, if also conservative, estimates of the effect of demographic change.
6 . C o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  c h a n g e s  in  a c t i v i t y  b y  a g e  g r o u p
In the previous section we estimated how much of the change in the aggregate 
unemployment rate can be accounted for by changes in the composition of the labour 
force. However, as we discussed in Section 2,1, changes in the composition of the labour 
force are not driven exclusively by demographic forces, but also by changes in the 
proportion of the population actively engaged in the labour force, and so our results 
should not be interpreted as capturing only the impact of the change in the composition of 
the population on the unemployment rate, which is the motivation of this chapter.
F ig u r e  6.1 : A c t i v i t v  R a t e s  b y  A g e  (% )
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As Figure 6.1 illustrates, the most striking change in the rate of activity in the population 
over the period occurred among the young—between 1984 and 1998 the activity rate of 
16 to 24 year olds fell by more than 6!6 percentage points—which was almost certainly
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due to the growth in participation in post-compulsory education. However, changes in 
activity have not been confined to youths—in 1998, approximately 5% more of the 25 to 
34 year olds in the population were either employed or actively searching for work than 
in 1984. Clearly, changes of this magnitude have the capacity to affect the size and 
composition of the labour force, and so they also have the potential to affect the 
unemployment rate. If we wish to measure accurately the proportion of the total change 
in the unemployment rate that can be explained purely by demographic change in the 
population then we need to control for these changes in labour force participation by age 
group.
In order to isolate the effect of demographic change on the aggregate labour market we 
pursue two separate modifications of the shift-share methodology outlined in the previous 
section. The first essentially holds activity rates constant and calculates the hypothetical 
impact on the unemployment rate of changes in the composition of the labour force 
consistent with changes in the composition of the underlying population, given the 
observed behaviour of the group-specific unemployment rates. The second focuses 
instead on the impact of changes in the composition of the working-age population on the 
fraction of the population that is unemployed.
6.1 T h e  im p a c t  o f  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  p o p u l a t io n  s h a r e s  o n  t h e  u n e m p l o y m e n t
RATE
We have argued that the shift-share decomposition employed in the previous section will 
not measure precisely the impact of demographic change on the unemployment rate, 
because our estimates will also incorporate the effect of changes in the group-specific 
activity rates on the composition of the labour force. Given information on the proportion 
of each age group in the population that is economically active in a given year, rj^ ( i ) ,
and the aggregate activity rate in that year, , it is straightforward to calculate what the
composition of the labour force would have been in that year given the changes in the 
composition of the population, had activity rates remained at their levels in year to
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throughout the period. If for each year t we define as the (hypothetical) aggregate
activity rate, given the actual composition of the population in that year, but assuming 
that the age-specific activity rates remained at their levels in year (/o), then the labour 
force share of group (/) of whom there were (i) individuals out o f a total population
in year t, would have been:
[6.1]
where is group (/)’s actual share of the labour force in year t. However, our
modification is not trivial. In Section 3.3 we discussed the possibility that the 
unemployment rate of a specific group may depend upon the relative size of that group in 
the labour force—generational crowding effects. So whenever the hypothetical labour 
force shares diverge from those we observe, there is the possibility that the group 
unemployment rates will also differ from those we observe, which will affect the 
accuracy of our shift-share decomposition. However, given the lack of any robust 
evidence to support the existence of significant generational crowding effects (see 
Section 4.5), we assume that the group-specific unemployment rates are entirely 
independent o f the composition of the labour force, and so use the observed pattern of 
unemployment for our alternative shift-share decomposition. There is one further 
complication with this approach. Had the composition of the labour force and the group 
unemployment rates followed the hypothetical path we have assumed, then the time path 
of aggregate unemployment would also have differed from what we observe. So, when 
calculating the importance of demographic change in explaining changes in the aggregate
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unemployment rate, we need to modify our estimate of the change in the unemployment 
rate accordingly:
U g g (i) -  a,gO(i)x [6.2]
We can repeat this approach for each year in the sample, in each case holding activity 
rates constant and using the observed composition of the labour force and pattern of 
unemployment rates in that year to calculate our standard estimates of the impact of 
demographic change on the unemployment rate. Our results are shown in Table 6.1.
T a b l e  6.1 : S u m m a r y ’  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e  o n  t h e
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, CONTROLLING FOR CHANGES IN ACTIVITY 
RATES BY AGE GROUP
Basis points Percentage explained
Index of demographic pressure: 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
Average age adjustment to 
unemployment
-51.9 -46.7 9.4 8.5
Average age-driven change in 
unemployment
-42.8 -41.2 7.8 7.5
Average chain-weighted 
measure
-39.8 -36.9 7.2 6.7
It appears that once we control for changes in the activity rates of each group over the 
period, demographic change caused a smaller fall in the aggregate unemployment rate 
than that estimated in the previous section. This result is not that surprising since we are 
now controlling for the shift in the composition of the labour force towards low 
unemployment groups that followed increased participation in post-compulsory
’ A comprehensive set o f our results can be found in Appendix Tables A.6.1.1 and A.6.1.2.
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education. Similarly, falling inactivity among those aged between 25 and 34, ceteris 
paribus, increased the size of the labour force, which further exacerbated the observed 
fall in the youth share of the labour force, and so further exaggerated previous estimates 
of the impact of demographic change on the unemployment rate. However, shifts in the 
composition of the labour force driven purely by demographic change in the population 
still explain about a 45 basis point fall in the unemployment rate over the period.
6 .2  T h e  im p a c t  o f  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e  o n  t h e  f r a c t io n  o f  t h e
POPULATION THAT IS UNEMPLOYED
An alternative estimate of the impact of demographic change on the proportion of 
individuals of working age who are unemployed can be obtained by repeating our shift- 
share analysis using working-age population shares and the ratio of each age group who 
are unemployed. The advantage of this approach is of course that we can abstract from all 
changes in labour force participation by focusing on changes in the composition of the 
working-age population—which is affected solely by demographic forces. However, the 
drawback is that we will not be estimating the impact of demographic change on the 
unemployment rate itself.
We can repeat the analysis, as before using each year in turn as a base for our 
calculations, and the results from this alternative shift-share decomposition are given in 
Table 6.2. Overall, our results indicate the smallest role for demographic change in 
explaining the absolute and proportional fall in the fraction of individuals who are 
unemployed. However, this is largely due to the fact that the gap between the proportion 
of the youth and adult populations who are unemployed is significantly smaller than the 
differential between the youth and adult unemployment rates'®. So shifts in the 
composition of the working-age population can be expected to have a more marginal role 
in explaining changes in the fraction of the whole population that is unemployed.
We have outlined two alternative approaches here to that presented in the previous 
section, each of which seeks to isolate the effect of demographic change on the
See Appendix Table A.5.3.
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unemployment rate. Unsurprisingly, both show that once we control for changes in labour 
force participation rates by age, shifts in the composition of the labour force explain less 
of the change in the aggregate unemployment rate over the period. However, it still 
appears that demographic change in the population was the predominant cause of the 
change in the composition of the labour force, and hence of the estimated change in the 
unemployment rate that it produced.
T a b l e  6 .2 . : S u m m a r y  ^^  o f  t h e  im p a c t  o f  d e m o g r a p h ic  c h a n g e  o n  t h e  f r a c t io n
OF THE WORKING-AGE POPULATION WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED
Basis points Percentage explained
Index of demographic pressure: 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
Average age adjustment to 
unemployment
-37.6 -32.2 8.5 7.4
Average age-driven change in 
unemployment
-31 -28.9 7 6.6
Average chain-weighted 
measure
-27.8 -24.6 6.3 5.6
7. T h e  e f f e c t  o f  d e m o g r a p h y  o n  f u t u r e  u n e m p l o y m e n t
The focus of this chapter has so far been retrospective, investigating how much of the 
change in the aggregate unemployment rate can be explained by demographic pressures. 
However, shifts in the composition of the population will doubtless continue, and we now 
attempt to predict the likely implications of demographic change on the unemployment 
rate in the near future. Given reasonable assumptions on the pattern of fertility and 
mortality rates, and the size and direction of cross-border migration, we can project the 
resident population into the future. In order to estimate the composition and size o f the 
labour force, we also need to forecast the percentage of each of the separate groups in the
' ' A comprehensive set o f our results can be found in Appendix Tables A.6.2.1 and A.6.2.2.
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labour force that will be either employed or actively searching for work’^ . The following 
analysis is based on projections of the composition of the labour force given in the June 
1998 edition of Labour Market Trends.
F igure  7.1 : P rojection  of  the com position  of th e  La b o u r  F or c e  : 1998-2011
Share (%): 
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We can identify three broad trends in the projections of the labour force illustrated in 
Figure 7.1 above: first, that the youth share of the labour force begins to recover from the 
baby bust and slightly increases over the period; second, that the number of people aged 
between 25 and 34 declines quite sharply (quite unsurprisingly—this is the generation of 
youngsters in the baby bust, ten years into the future when they reach maturity); and 
third, that the relative share of the older section of the labour force—aged 35 years and 
over—increases (as the bulge in fertility rates in the early 1960s passes through the age 
distribution).
" These projections o f  the group-specific activity rates typically rely on four separate sets o f  explanatory 
variables: the level or change in the level o f the unemployment rate, the number o f  dependent children aged 
under 5 per woman, lagged activity rates, and time trends to capture other structural factors (see Armitage 
and Scott (1998), page 291).
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Since youths have higher unemployment rates than adults, the slight shift towards the 
young is likely marginally to drive up the unemployment rate (an effect which might be 
amplified by any generational crowding effects), as will a decrease in the numbers of 25-
34 year olds with lower unemployment rates than younger workers. However those above
35 years of age have unemployment rates lower still than those in early adulthood (in 
1998 the unemployment rate for those aged 25-34 was 6.3%, while for those 35 years 
and older it was 4.4%), and therefore an increase in the proportion of those aged 35 and 
over in the labour force should drive the unemployment rate down.
Given these projections of the composition of the labour force, we can make a tentative 
forecast of the implied change in the aggregate unemployment rate due to demographic 
pressures. Taking 1998 as the base year, we divide the labour force into the three broad 
groups described above and calculate the age-driven change in the unemployment rate 
based on the observed unemployment rates of each of these groups in our base year (see 
equation [4.14]):
S  (0 “ ^ 2 998^ ^^ ^^  ^ 1998^^
i
Given the projected increases in the labour force shares of both the high and low- 
unemployment groups, the impact of demographic change is relatively weak throughout 
the period (see Figure 7.2 below) — at most, demographic pressures will be responsible 
for a fall of about 3!6 basis points in the aggregate unemployment rate. However, the 
potential for these benign demographic forces to reduce the unemployment rate has 
already been almost exhausted. The age-driven unemployment rate is projected to fall 
until 2001, and thereafter, following a short period of turbulence, to be at its level in 
1998. Of course, in the interim, any generational crowding effects from changes in the 
composition of the labour force might amplify these results. But, on the basis of these 
results, it is difficult to draw any conclusion other than that, however important 
demographic change might have been in the evolution of the unemployment rate in the
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past 20 years, there is little evidence that it will have much effect for the foreseeable 
future.
However, as we have emphasised previously, shifts in the composition of the labour force 
can arise not only through demographic change in the population, but also through 
changes in the proportion of each age group that is economically active'^. Nevertheless, 
controlling for any projected changes in the age-specific activity rates over the period has 
a negligible effect on our estimates of the reduction in the unemployment rate implied by 
future shifts in the composition of labour force. Finally, when we turn to the impact of 
demographic change on the proportion of the working-age population that is unemployed 
we find results that are quantitatively similar to our original projections.
F igure  7.2 : P rojected  A ge D riven Change in th e  U n em pl o y m e n t  Rate
(BASIS p o i n t s )
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Therefore, it appears that irrespective of the particular method used, demographic change 
in the population is likely to have a negligible effect on the aggregate unemployment rate 
over the next decade.
For example, it is estimated that irrespective of any increase in the number o f  youths in the population, 
approximately 150,000 more youths will be economically active in 2011 than in 1998.
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8 . C o n c l u s io n s
The proportion of youths in the UK labour force has almost halved over the past 15 years. 
Since youths have a higher unemployment rate than adults (although this differential 
varies across the cycle), and the aggregate unemployment rate is simply the weighted 
average of the age-specific unemployment rates, a shift of this kind in the composition of 
the labour force should have been reflected in a fall in the aggregate unemployment rate.
Quantitatively, demographic pressures do indeed appear to explain part of the change in 
actual unemployment. Although we have shown that this is sensitive to the precise 
measure we use and particularly the assumption made about the base year, our best 
estimate is that approximately 55 basis p o i n t s o f  the fall in the unemployment rate 
between 1984 and 1998 (or about 10% of the total change) can be explained by changes 
in the composition of the labour force. We also find no robust evidence that youths have 
become relatively more likely to become unemployed, through generational crowding 
effects, as their share of the labour force declined. However, if the decline in the youth 
share did reduce youth unemployment rates below the level they would otherwise have 
been, then our previous estimates seriously under-estimate the true impact of 
demographic change on the unemployment rate. Taking a reasonable estimate of the 
elasticity of the relative youth unemployment rate to their relative share of the population 
from the literature, we find that changes in the age composition of the labour force alone 
between 1984 and 1998 can explain almost a half of the total fall in the aggregate 
unemployment rate over the period.
However, demographic pressures were not the only forces that affected the composition 
of the labour force over the period. Changes in the fraction of each age group either 
employed or actively searching for work clearly affect the composition of the labour 
force and therefore will also affect the unemployment rate. Once we control for these 
shifts in labour force participation rates by age group we find that, unsurprisingly.
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demographic change explains less of the change in the unemployment rate over the 
period. However, it appears that the shift in the composition of the population caused by 
the baby boom and bust still explains about 45 basis p o i n t s o f  the fall in the 
unemployment rate over the period.
Finally, on the basis of current projections, it appears that future shifts in the composition 
of the labour force will have little effect on the unemployment rate over the next decade. 
However, to some extent, this masks the fact that the benign impact of demographic 
change is likely to be offset by increases in youth activity rates.
This is approximately equal to the average (over all base years) o f the age-driven change in the 
unemployment rate, the age adjustment to the unemployment rate and the chain-weighted index, when the 
labour force is divided into only youths and adults (actual figure = 55.67 basis points).
As before, this is equal to the average (over all base years) of the age-driven change in the unemployment 
rate, the age adjustment to the unemployment rate and the chain-weighted index, when the labour force is 
divided into only youths and adults.
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A p p e n d ix  1: T a b l e s
Ta b l e  A .2.2 T h e  d u r a t io n  str uc tur e  of  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  a g e
16-17 1 8 -2 4
Unemployment
Rate
Percentage unemployed
Unemployment
Rate
Percentage unemployed
<  6  months 6 - 1 2
months
> 1 year <  6  months 6 - 1 2
months
> 1 year
1984 22 62.9 22.5 14.6 19.2 33.5 19.9 46.5
1985 20.3 62.6 24.1 13.3 17.1 36.4 18.9 44.7
1986 20.9 6 6 .2 21.4 12.4 17.3 37 22.4 40.6
1987 19.4 64 26.9 9.1 15 40.3 21.8 37.9
1988 14.2 69 20 11 12.3 44.8 23 32.2
1989 10.8 82 10.8 7.2 9.9 54.6 19.7 25.7
1990 11.3 80 13.3 6.7 9.9 62.8 15.6 21.6
1991 14.9 80.9 15.3 ^  3.8 13.3 58.3 21 20.7
1992 16 70.7 22 7.3 15.4 45.9 25 29.1
1993 16.8 55.9 27.9 16.2 17.4 42 22.8 35.1
1994 17.9 65.9 20.3 13.8 15.9
41
22.5 36.5
1995 17.3 66.4 23 10.7 14.9 47.1 21.9 31
1996 18.3 68.3 22.5 9.2 14 50.2 19.9 30
1997 17.7 68.1 20.1 11.8 12.5 55.4 17.7 26.8
1998 16.6 74.4 18 7.5 11.3 62.6 16.9 20.5
2 5 -4 9 50 +
Unemployment Percentage unemployed Unemployment Percentage unemployed
Rate < 6 months 6-12
months
> 1 year Rate < 6 months 6-12
months
> 1 year
1984 9.9 32.6 16.7 50.7 8.5 21.8 17.5 60.7
1985 9.9 31.9 16.1 52 8 2Ï.9 13.9' 64.1
1986 9.7 34.5 14.9 50.6 8 23.8 13.5 62.7
1987 9.6 35 14.8 50.2 8.6 24.2 12.8 62 9
1988 7.6 39.9 15.2 44.9 7.9 26.3 11.8 61.9
1989 6.2 45.1 16.4 38.5 6.9 27.4 12.1 60.5
1990 5.9 49.8 17.1 33.1 6.1 30.1 12.7 57.2
1991 7.2 54.1 17.6 28.3 6.9 37.8 15.3 46.9
1992 8.6 41.7 20.8 37.5 7.7 30.4 21 48.6
1993 8.8 35.2 19 45.8 8.9 28.7 19.5 51.8
1994 8.3 35.5 16.3 48.2 8.2 25.9 15.7 58.4
1995 7 : r - 36 15.6 48.4 6.7 28.5 13.9 57.6
1996 7.1 39 17.4 43.6 6.3 31.1 15.3 53.6
1997 6 41.3 15.6 43.1 5.5 33.8 13.3 52.9
1998 5.2 49.3 14.7 36 4.6 35.8 11.5 52.7
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T a b l e  A .4 .1 .1  : B a s is  P o in t  C h a n g e  in  U n e m p l o y m e n t  e x p l a in e d  b y  I n d ic e s  o f  
D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e
Age adjustment to 
unemployment
Age-driven change in 
unemployment
Chain-weighted index
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 -55 -51 -77 -69 -48 -40
1985 -54 -50 -63 -54 -48 -40
1986 -55 -49 -66 -58 -48 -40
1987 -55 -48 -49 -42 -48 -40
1988 -57 -49 -38 -35 -48 -40
1989 -59 -50 -28 -26 -48 -40
1990 -61 -51 -32 -30 -48 -40
1991 -64 -54 -49 -46 -48 -40
1992 -68 -57 -54 -50 -48 -40
1993 -71 -59 -65 -62 -48 -40
1994 -73 -62 -60 -57 -48 -40
1995 -75 -64 -60 -57 -48 -40
1996 -75 -66 -59 -55 -48 -40
1997 -76 -68 -58 -54 -48 -40
1998 -77 -69 -55 -51 -48 -40
Mean -65 -56 -54 -50
Variance 79 58 175 143
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T a b l e  A .4 .1 .2  P e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  in  u n e m p l o y m e n t  e x p l a in e d  b y  in d ic e s  o f
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE BY BASE YEAR
Age adjustment to | Age-driven change in 
unemployment unemployment
Chain-weighted index
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 9.7 9 13.7 12.3 8.6 7.2
1985 9.6 8.8 11.2 9.6 8.6 7.2
1986 9.7 8.6 11.7 10.2 8.6 7.2
1987 9.8 8.5 8.6 7.4 8.6 7.2
1988 10 8.7 6.6 6.1 8.6 7.2
1989 10.3 8.8 4.9 4.7 8.6 7.2
1990 10.9 9.1 5.6 5.4 8.6 7.2
1991 11.4 9.5 8.7 8.1 8.6 7.2
1992 12 10.1 9.5 8.8 8.6 7.2
1993 12.5 10.4 11.4 11 8.6 7.2
1994 12.9 10.9 10.6 10.1 8.6 7.2
1995 13.2 11.3 10.6 10 8.6 7.2
1996 13.3 11.6 10.5 9.7 8.6 7.2
1997 13.5 12 10.2 9.5 8.6 7.2
1998 13.7 12.3 9.7 9 8.6 7.2
Mean 11.5 10 9.6 8.8
Variance 2.5 1.8 5.6 4.5
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Ta bl e  A .6.1.1 B a sis  P o in t  C hange  in In d ices  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e , h o l d in g
ACTIVITY RATES CONSTANT BY BASE YEAR
Age adjustment to 
unemployment
Age-driven change in 
unemployment
Chain-weighted index
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 -44 -42 -62 -59 -41 -38
1985 -46 -43 -52 -48 -41 -38
1986 -46 -43 -54 -51 -41 -38
1987 -46 -43 -40 -38 -41 -38
1988 -48 -44 -31 -31 -41 -38
1989 -50 -45 -23 -23 -41 -38
1990 -51 -45 -26 -26 -41 -38
1991 -53 -46 -40 -39 -40 -37
1992 -53 -45 -42 -40 -39 -36
1993 -54 -46 -50 -50 -39 -36
1994 -55 -48 -46 -45 -38 -35
1995 -56 -50 -46 -44 -38 -35
1996 -58 -53 -46 -44 -39 -36
1997 -59 -54 -44 -42 -38 -35
1998 -59 -55 -42 -39 -38 -35
Mean -52 -47 -43 -41 -40 -37
Variance 26 18 107 90 2 2
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T a b le  A .6 .1 .2  P e r c e n t a g e  C h a n g e  in  I n d ic e s  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e ,
HOLDING ACTIVITY RATES CONSTANT BY BASE YEAR
Age adjustment to 
unemployment
Age-driven change in 1 Chain-weighted index 
unemployment
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 8 7.6 11.2 10.6 7.3 6.8
1985 8.2 7.7 9.3 8.6 7.4 6.9
1986 8.3 7.7 9.7 9.1 7.4 6.9
1987 8.2 7.7 7.2 6.7 7.4 6.9
1988 8.7 7.9 1 5.5 5.5 1 7.4 6.9
1989 9 8 4.1 4.2 1 7.4 6.9
1990 9.2 8.1 1 4.7 4.7 7.3 6.8
1991 9.5 8.3 7.1 7 7.3 6.8
1992 9.5 8.2 7.6 7.4 7.1 6.6
1993 9.8 8.4 9.1 9.1 7.1 6.5
1994 10.1 8.7 8.3 8.3 7 6.4
1995 10.3 9.1 8.4 8.1 7 6.4
1996 10.6 9.6 8.3 8 7.1 6.5
1997 10.7 9.9 8 7.7 7 6.5
1998 10.7 10 7.6 7.2 7 6.4
Mean 9.4 8.5 7.7 7.5 7.2 6.7
Variance 0.9 0.7 3.6 2.9 0 0
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T a b le  A.6.2.1 B a s is  P o in t  C h a n g e  in In d ic e s  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e , u s in g
UNEMPLOYED TO WORKING POPULATION RATIOS BY BASE YEAR
Age adjustment to 
unemployment
Age-driven change in 
unemployment
Chain-weighted index 1
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 -28 -27 -48 -45 -28 -25
1985 -29 -26 -40 -36 -28 -25
1986 -30 -26 -42 -38 -28 -25
1987 -30 -26 -31 -28 -28 -25
1988 -31 -26 -24 -23 -28 -25
1989 -33 -27 -18 -17 -28 -25
1990 -35 -28 -20 -19 -28 -25
1991 -37 -30 -30 -28 -28 -25
1992 -39 -31 -28 -26 -28 -25
1993 -41 -33 -33 -32 -28 -25
1994 -43 -36 -29 -28 -28 -25
1995 -45 -38 -30 -28 -28 -25
1996 -46 -41 -31 -29 -28 -25
1997 -47 -43 -30 -28 -28 -25
1998 -48 -45 -28 -27 -28 -25
Mean -38 -32 -31 -29
Variance 51 46 61 50
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T a b l e  A .6 .2 .2  P e r c e n t a g e  C h a n g e  in  U n e m p l o y e d  t o  W o r k in g  P o p u l a t io n
RATIOS EXPLAINED BY INDICES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, BY BASE 
YEAR.
Age adjustment to 
unemployment
Age-driven change in 
unemployment
Chain-weighted index
Base year 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups 2 groups 5 groups
1984 6.47 6.07 10.92 10.25 6.34 5.6
1985 6.71 5.9 9.1 8.26 6.34 5.6
1986 6.81 5.85 9.58 8.78 6.34 5.6
1987 6.87 5.86 7.02 6.39 6.34 5.6
1988 7.12 6.03 5.46 5.2 6.34 5.6
1989 7.55 6.22 4.11 3.97 6.34 5.6
1990 8.03 6.46 4.53 4.33 6.34 5.6
1991 8.52 6.78 6.75 6.41 6.34 5.6
1992 8.9 7.11 6.37 5.94 6.34 5.6
1993 9.42 7.61 7.51 7.22 6.34 5.6
1994 9.89 8.16 6.65 6.38 6.34 5.6
1995 10.24 8.73 6.76 6.42 6.34 5.6
1996 10.54 9.34 6.96 6.57 6.34 5.6
1997 10.77 9.87 6.83 6.49 6.34 5.6
1998 10.92 10.25 6.47 6.07 6.34 5.6
Mean 8.58 7.35 7 6.58
Variance 2.64 2.41 3.18 2.59
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T a b l e  A .6 .3  U n e m p l o y e d  t o  W o r k in g  P o p u l a t io n  r a t io s  b y  a g e  g r o u p  : 1 9 8 4 -  
1 9 9 8 .
16+ 16-17 18-24 16-24 25+ 25-34 35-49 50+ 16-59/64
1984 9.26 13.03 15.49 14.95 7.45 9.75 6.83 6.01 9.26
1985 8.89 12.49 13.95 13.63 7.38 9.80 6.87 5.61 8.89
1986 8.87 13.21 14.05 13.87 7.30 9.82 6.58 5.63 8.87
1987 8.57 12.04 12.31 12.25 7.43 9.77 6.57 6.13 8.57
1988 7.03 9.30 10.07 9.91 6.16 7.81 5.26 5.63 7.03
1989 5.80 7.00 8.23 7.98 5.16 6.54 4.28 4.88 5.80
1990 5.53 7.05 8.18 7.96 4.85 6.05 4.20 4.42 5.53
1991 6.76 9.22 10.69 10.41 5.78 7.32 5.07 4.99 6.76
1992 7.78 8.91 11.81 11.26 6.88 8.60 6.20 5.81 7.78
1993 8.24 8.45 13.29 12.37 7.21 8.72 6.42 6.59 8.24
1994 7.68 9.37 11.84 11.36 6.80 8.27 6.03 6.18 7.68
1995 6.88 9.04 11.07 10.65 6.01 7.45 5.48 5.09 6.88
1996 6.51 10.02 10.53 10.42 5.64 7.12 5.12 4.67 6.51
1997 5.64 9.89 9.37 9.49 4.80 5.82 4.50 4.06 5.64
1998 4.88 9.11 8.36 8.53 4.09 5.32 3.68 3.35 4.88
T a b l e  A .7 .1  P r o j e c t io n s  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  f o r c e , A c t iv it y  r a t e s  a n d  W o r k in g  
A g e  p o p u l a t io n  b y  a g e  : 1998  - 2 0 1 1 .
% of Labour Force Activity Rates % of Working Age Population
Year 16-24 yrs. 25-34 yrs. 35+ yrs. 16-24 yrs. 25-34 yrs. 35+ yrs. 16-24 yrs. 25-34 yrs. 35+ yrs.
1998 15.40 26.24 58.35 71.18 84.06 55.22 17.54 25.30 57.16
1999 15.38 25.50 59.12 71.60 84.45 55.73 17.49 24.58 57.93
2000 15.37 24.68 59.95 71.66 84.65 56.18 17.50 23.78 58.71
2001 15.54 23.82 60.64 71.91 84.76 56.52 17.64 22.95 59.40
2002 15.81 22.99 61.21 72.13 84.83 56.64 17.88 22.11 60.00
2003 16.07 22.26 61.67 72.36 84.91 56.70 18.12 21.39 60.49
2004 16.22 21.71 62.08 72.47 85.01 56.74 18.26 20.84 60.90
2005 16.25 21.33 62.42 72.48 85.10 56.76 18.30 20.46 61.24
2006 16.31 20.92 62.78 72.56 85.20 56.81 18.35 20.04 61.60
2007 16.48 20.62 62.90 72.74 85.28 56.66 18.53 19.78 61.70
2008 16.62 20.47 62.91 72.85 85.33 56.45 18.68 19.64 61.68
2009 16.72 20.46 62.82 72.95 85.40 56.20 18.78 19.63 61.59
2010 16.76 20.59 62.65 73.17 85.47 55.94 18.78 19.76 61.46
2011 16.73 20.82 62.45 73.32 85.51 55.67 18.72 19.98 61.30
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C h a p t e r  3
A  M a t c h  M a d e  in  H e a v e n  ? T h e  
IMPACT OF D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e  o n  
THE D e m a n d  f o r , a n d  t h e  S u p p l y  o f , 
S k il l s  in  t h e  L a b o u r  M a r k e t
1. In t r o d u c t io n
In the media and academia alike, the causes and consequences of skill biased 
technological change have been discussed at length. It is widely believed that one result 
of this phenomenon has been that the labour markets of the developed world have 
experienced a skill biased shift in demand which has led to a deterioration in the fortunes 
of the unskilled members of the workforce on either side of the Atlantic, albeit 
manifested in different ways -  or as Krugman (1994) so famously put it : ‘the European 
unemployment problem and the U.S. inequality problem are two sides of the same coin’ 
(Krugman (1994) p.71). Yet, together with this infamous shift in demand away from the 
unskilled, it is also common knowledge that there has been an unambiguous shift in the 
relative supply o f skilled workers in the economy. There has been a clear rise in the level 
of educational attainment of successive cohorts entering the post-war labour markets, 
which has led to an ever increasing fraction of skilled workers in the labour force. What 
really matters then is whether there has been a net shift in demand -  i.e. whether the 
growth in demand for the skilled members of the workforce has outstripped the increase 
in their supply.
This chapter is based on the hypothesis that there has been a second relative supply shock 
which may have altered the relative balance between the demand for, and supply of skills
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in the labour market, other than the rise in educational participation. Since the Second 
World War most nations of the developed world have experienced considerable 
fluctuations in their birth rate; most countries, although to different degrees, experienced 
a huge surge in their birth rate in the 1960’s (in what became known as the ‘baby boom’) 
which was followed by a slump (or ‘baby bust’) in the decade that followed. These 
fluctuations in the birth rate inevitably repeated themselves in the age structure o f the 
labour force some fifteen to twenty years later. Since youths lack the labour market 
experience that older workers have gained over time at the workplace, they can be 
considered relatively unskilled compared to an adult with similar academic qualifications, 
and therefore demographic change also has the potential to shift the relative supply of 
skilled workers in the labour force.
This chapter uses the established ‘mismatch’ theoretical framework to clarify the exact 
nature of the net shift in demand towards the skilled that occurred in the U.K. economy 
since 1979, and to understand how any such net shift in demand might have affected the 
labour market, and in particular the aggregate unemployment rate. Layard et. al. (1991) 
develop two stylised arguments to explain how the level of mismatch in the economy 
might explain the level of aggregate unemployment in the economy. The first relies on 
the presence of non-linearities in wage setting, so that an increase in the dispersion of 
unemployment across groups leads to an increase in aggregate unemployment, since :
“wages are more sensitive to unemployment when unemployment is
low than when it is high. (Layard et. a l (1991) p.47)”
so that in sectors of the labour market where unemployment is low, wage pressure is 
proportionately greater than wage restraint in groups where unemployment is high - 
requiring the “extra” unemployment to bring consistency between wage and price setters 
at the aggregate level. Greater mismatch in the group specific unemployment rates 
therefore requires higher unemployment on average to restrain wages.
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The second argument is based upon the existence of a ‘leading sector’ -  the tightest 
labour market in the economy, which enjoys the lowest sector specific unemployment 
rate. Wage pressure in this model depends only on conditions in the leading sector, so 
whenever unemployment rates in the other sectors of the economy exceed that in the 
leading sector, then that unemployment can be deemed to be of no useful purpose -  since 
‘extra’ unemployment in the sectors that ‘follow’ exerts no downward pressure on wages. 
Greater mismatch in the sector specific unemployment rates will therefore once again 
lead only to higher unemployment on average. The conclusions which we shall draw 
from this chapter should therefore be judged in the context of the empirical evidence to 
support each of these arguments -  either non-linearities or an asymmetry in the wage 
setting process.
The literature provides a number of alternative approaches to measuring mismatch in the 
demand for, and the supply of skills is the economy. The first approach is to use simple 
‘outcomes-based’ statistics which are based on the variance o f either the unemployment 
rates or the wages of the different skill groups in the economy. Effectively these 
mismatch measures abstract away from the underlying balance between the demand for 
and supply of each skill group and instead focus directly on their relative labour market 
performance. So, for example, a deterioration in the unskilled labour market either 
through either a fall in the unskilled wage, or an increase in the unskilled unemployment 
rate relative to skilled labour, is taken as prima facie evidence of increased skill 
mismatch. However, irrespective of whether his parable as to the common cause of North 
American wage inequality and European unemployment was correct or not, Krugman’s 
basic premise that a net shift in demand away from one group may result in either a 
realignment of wages or unemployment rates underlines the futility of relying on 
mismatch measures which gamer information from only one of these sources. If wages 
are sufficiently flexible a net demand shift away from the unskilled may be worked 
through entirely in terms of higher wage inequality; alternatively if wages are rigid, this 
shift may result only in changes in the groups’ unemployment rates. A mismatch measure 
based on the variance of the wages of each skill group will only report increased
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mismatch in the former scenario; a measure based on the variance of their unemployment 
rates will report increased mismatch only in the latter.
The approach of Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) provides a framework which utilises 
both wage and employment outcomes to identify net demand shifts. Abstracting from the 
role of capital and land in the production process, they consider a stylised economy 
where the only input to production is labour, but where there exists a heterogeneity in the 
productivity, or level of skill, of the labour force. They then derive a measure of the 
relative demand for, and supply of each input, allowing them to define a ‘true’ measure 
of skill mismatch. They then show that if we make assumptions on the wage setting 
process in this stylised economy, the change in the aggregate unemployment rate can be 
decomposed into that generated by a shift in the composition of the labour force across 
skill inputs, that caused by a change in wage pressure and that caused by a change in the 
degree of mismatch across skill groups. This is the basic framework which we adopt in 
this chapter^^.
This research aims to quantify both the evolution of skill mismatch in the U.K. labour 
market between 1979 and 1996, and the role that mismatch can play in explaining the 
path of the aggregate unemployment rate over that period. In Section 2 we construct a 
simple definition of skill based on both the age and highest level of educational 
attainment of an individual, and then categorise the labour force according to our 
definition. We then illustrate in broad brush terms how each of our different skill groups 
fared in the labour market, and summarise the degree of skill mismatch in the U.K. labour 
market over the period as reported by the standard ‘outcomes’ based mismatch measures. 
Section 3 provides a description of the framework used in the chapter to derive a measure 
of skill mismatch based on the underlying shifts in the demand for, and the supply of, 
different skills in the labour market, which under certain assumptions can then be used to 
quantify the role changes in the degree of skill mismatch played in determining the path
An alternative class of mismatch measure are those which draw upon information on vacancies, to 
estimate the degree of mismatch between the stocks of unemployed people and vacant jobs in the economy 
(see for example, Jackman and Roper (1987)). However, given the paucity o f reliable data on vacancies.
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taken by the aggregate unemployment rate over the period. Section 4 presents the key 
results of the chapter, and tests their sensitivity to alternative assumptions on the 
parameters of our model; and finally, Section 5 concludes.
2  S k il l  M is m a t c h  : P r e l im in a r ie s
There appears to be a fairly broad consensus that in recent years there has been both a 
demand and supply shift away from the unskilled in O.E.C.D. labour markets. However, 
it is the extent to which one of these forces has outpaced the other which will determine 
whether there have been any macroeconomic consequences. Typically, attempts to 
quantify the role of net shifts in the demand for skilled labour on the aggregate 
unemployment rate have tended to focus on a rather narrow definition of skill -  an 
individual’s level of educational attainment’^ . While academic qualifications are certainly 
a good signal of ability and hence productivity in the workplace, it is difficult to argue 
that they give a complete description of an individual’s level of skill. It must be the case 
that the knowledge an individual acquires through experience at the workplace, both of 
an informal kind through increased familiarity with work practices and the use of capital, 
but also more formal training programmes must all contribute to the level of skill of a 
worker. Of course finding accurate information of this kind in the data is not 
straightforward. However, we argue there is one variable that does act as a good proxy 
for at least an individual’s experience of work: his age. We know that there are marked 
differences in the experiences of different age groups in the labour market: the 
differential in wages and unemployment rates by age are as least as large as those by 
educational attainment’ .^ We argue that these differences reflect, in part, the fact that 
older workers are more productive than their younger counterparts, or in other words they 
are more highly skilled (despite the fact that on average they have fewer academic
and in particular the difficulty of categorising vacancies according to the age of their intended occupant, we 
do not consider this alternative class of mismatch measure.
After completion of this chapter I was made aware of a paper by Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela 
(2001) which does indeed use a workers age as a proxy of his level of productivity.
For example in 1998, the unemployment rate of those aged 35 to 49 years o f age (who enjoyed the lowest 
age-specific unemployment rate) was about a quarter of the unemployment rate of those aged 16 to 17 (who
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qualifications). We therefore develop a measure o f skill which incorporates information 
on both the educational attainment and the experience (proxied by the age) of members of 
the labour force. Typically then we shall sub-divide the labour force into a number of 
sub-groups: collecting together within a given skill group those who are both of a similar 
age and share a similar level of educational attainment. This method is not altogether 
new; Card and Lemieux (2001) use the same conceptual approach when explaining the 
change in the return to acquiring qualifications. However, they proceed under the 
assumption that the relative unemployment rates of the separate groups are exogenous, 
which intuitively is entirely at odds with the approach we are taking here; for mismatch 
to have a role in explaining changes in the aggregate unemployment rate, net demand 
shifts must have an effect on the unemployment rates of each group. We shall proceed as 
follows: first, we give some simple descriptive statistics to illustrate the relative 
performance of the labour markets for these different skill groups over the period, then 
we turn to analyse some simple mismatch measures to establish the broad trends in the 
growth of mismatch between the demand and supply of skill in the U.K. labour market.
2.1  T h e  U .K . L a b o u r  M a r k e t  f o r  S k il l  : 1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 6 .
We argue that a more complete definition of the skill composition of the labour force 
must rely not only on the level of educational attainment on the workforce but also their 
level of labour market experience, which we proxy by their age. Therefore, to begin with 
we shall describe how the educational and age composition of the labour force has 
changed over time. For the sake of simplicity, we shall divide the labour force into four 
separate groups by qualification and age respectively: in the case o f qualifications, we 
divide individuals into four groups according to their highest level of educational 
attainment: less than O level (or equivalent),0 Level, A Level (or equivalent) and finally 
degree or higher^^. In the case of age, we divide the labour force into those aged 24 or 
less, those between 25 and 34 years of age, those aged 35 to 49 years of age and finally
suffered the age specific unemployment highest unemployment rate) while the unemployment rate of those 
with a degree was also about a quarter of those with no qualifications (Nickell (1999)).
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those 50 years and above. Data on wages is taken from the General Household Survey (or 
G.H.S.), while labour force data is drawn from the Labour Force Survey (or L.F.S.)^®.
Figures 2.1 [a]-[c] overleaf reveal the broad developments in the labour markets for the 
separate qualification and age groups we have defined. They also underline the 
importance of tracking developments in both the market for qualifications and experience 
(or age); simply put, focusing on only one of these separate components of skill can give 
rise to misleading (and even contradictory) interpretations^\
These figures graphically illustrate the impact of the benign supply shocks that have hit 
the U.K. labour market. Since 1979 there has been a marked fall in the fraction o f the 
workforce with no qualifications, and a gradual increase in the proportion with each level 
o f qualification (O Level, A Level and Degree (and above)). Although between 1979 and 
1985, the fraction of youths (those aged 24 or less) in the workforce increased rapidly as 
the baby boomers arrived in the labour market, thereafter in relative terms, their numbers 
declined both as a result of the baby bust and the fact that the baby boomers themselves 
were entering middle age. By the end of the period, there were thus fewer youths and 
more mature adults in the labour force.
A complete description of our classification of the different qualifications held by members of the U.K. 
labour force into the four separate groups is given in Appendix 2, and follows the practice adopted by, 
among others, Dearden et. al. (2000).
Given that the L.F.S. was biannual between 1979 and 1983, labour force data for 1980 and 1982 was 
approximated as the average of the years immediately before and after.
For example, between 1979 and 1985, the fraction of the labour force with no qualifications fell 
dramatically- from about 69% to a little over 50% -  which implies a massive fall in the numbers of 
unskilled members of the workforce. However, over the same period, the fraction of the labour force below 
the age of 25 actually increased, which implies that, certainly in terms of their experience at the workplace, 
the labour force was becoming more unskilled.
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F i g u r e  2.1 : S u m m a r y  S t a t i s t i c s
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Figures 2.2 [a] -  [c] reveal how each of sub-groups fared in the labour market, we find 
that across the different qualification groups, those with degrees stand out for they 
enjoyed a relative improvement in their fortunes -  their wages rose faster, and their 
unemployment rate fell further, than those with less qualifications. Conversely, in terms 
of their experience in the labour market, it was the least skilled workers -  the young -  
whose experiences contrasted most with the rest of the labour force. Indeed, between 
1979 to 1996 the youth labour market appeared to stagnate -  their real wages actually fell 
over the period, and their unemployment rate remained far higher than all other age 
groups in the economy.
However, in order to develop a coherent picture of how the demand and supply for skill 
has evolved in the U.K. labour market since 1979 we need to integrate developments in 
each of these labour markets. Therefore, we repeat the exercise, now modeling the labour 
force as the sum of sixteen sub-groups, according to the age and level o f educational 
attainment of the worker. The figures above reveal that certainly in terms o f their wages, 
and to a lesser extent in terms of their unemployment rates, the experiences of youths (i.e. 
those aged 24 or less) in the labour market are quite distinct from their older counterparts, 
who within the same qualification group, have broadly similar experiences. We argue that 
these differences in the wages earned by individuals with similar qualifications but who 
differ in age must at least in part reflect differences in their productivity and hence their 
level of skill. The fact that the age differential in wages for individuals with similar 
qualifications diminishes the older they get may well reflect that age becomes an 
increasingly poor signal of the human capital an individual has acquired at the workplace 
the older he gets; in other words, its not the number o f years you have been in the labour 
market but what you have done with them that matters. When we turn to translate this 
information on the outcomes of these disparate sub-groups in the labour market into a 
single statistic on the degree of skill mismatch, we shall also consider a simplified model 
of the labour force where in terms of individuals’ ages we distinguish only between 
youths and adults, together with the full decomposition into sixteen separate skill groups.
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Figure 2.2 [a ] : Age Composition of the Labour Force by Qualification  Group
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F ig u r e  2.2 [e] : A g e  D ist r ib u t io n  o f  W a g e s , by  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p
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F ig u r e  2.2 [c] : A g e  S p e c if ic  U n e m p lo y m e n t  R a t e s ,  b y  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  G r o u p  
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2.2 C o nstructing  an Index of Skill M ism a tc h .
The most straightforward approach to measuring the degree of mismatch between the 
demand and supply of different skills has proved to be to focus on outcomes in the labour 
markets for different skills -  in other words, to compare how the wages and the 
unemployment rates of the different skill groups have evolved over time. The logic 
behind this approach is that if the wages or unemployment rates of the groups diverge 
then this can be taken as evidence of an increased mismatch between the demand for and 
supply of different skills in the economy. Obviously, this argument is most convincing 
when both measures give a consistent story -  i.e. both the relative wages and 
unemployment rates of the different groups are diverging.
In order to provide a quantitative measure of the degree of mismatch in the economy, 
information on outcomes in these separate labour markets is usually condensed into a 
single index, typically based on the dispersion of the relative or absolute wage or
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unemployment rates of each of the groups. Of course, not all shifts in demand and supply 
are skill biased -  i.e. in favour of one group at the expense of another -  and the wages 
and unemployment rates of each of the groups will therefore move for reasons other than 
shifts in relative demand and supply. Any outcomes based measure of mismatch must 
therefore distinguish between those movements in prices and quantities in the skill- 
specific labour markets which are driven by skill biased shocks and those driven by skill 
neutral shocks.
Absolute measures of wage [AWM] and unemployment mismatch [AUM] can be 
calculated as follows:
A WM = var(w. ) = ^  (w. -  E(w. ) f  = ^  ?i. (#% -  w f [2.1]
AUM  = var(w.) = % ] / ,(w, - E(w,.)f = Y , h [2.2]
where n. is the employment share of group i ,  is the average wage earned by 
members of group i ,w  is the average wage earned in the economy, /. is the labour force 
share of group i and u is the weighted average of the age specific unemployment rates 
W. -  in other words, the aggregate unemployment rate. Absolute mismatch measures
implicitly assume that skill neutral shocks have equivalent impacts on skill-specific 
wages and unemployment rates, so for example if a skill neutral shift in demand away 
from labour caused an equal percentage point increase in the unemployment rates of all 
skill groups the AUM index remains unchanged.
Similarly, indices of relative mismatch [RWM,RUM] can be calculated as follows:
RWM = var
a - ; - '
^ - E
w [^wJJ = S " . w
[2.3]
/
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RUM  =  var =x/,(^-eWT=i /,
i \ U  j  J i
[2.4]
since the weighted average of the groups’ relative wages or unemployment rates must be 
one by definition. Relative mismatch measures are based on the assumption that skill 
neutral shocks have equi-proportionate effects on the wages and unemployment rates of 
each of the skill groups, so the ratio of their wages and unemployment rates (and thus the 
RWM and RUM indices) remain unchanged.
In the following figures we illustrate the evolution of these different mismatch measures 
over the period: 1979 -  1996, for both the simplified and full decompositions of the 
labour force.
2 .3  E v id e n c e  F r o m  W a g e s
Figure 2.3 overleaf reveals a clear and consistent account of the degree of mismatch 
between the wages earned by the separate age and qualification groups earned in the 
economy. Broadly speaking, as average wages in the economy have grown over time, so 
has the dispersion of the group-specific wages around that average, as reported by either 
measure. Nonetheless, this dispersion in wages has become more volatile over time, as 
has been found elsewhere in the case of the dispersion of wages across qualification 
groups alone (Burriel-Llombart and Thomas (2001)). As such, there appears to be some 
evidence of a growth in skill mismatch on the basis of this increase in wage dispersion; 
nonetheless, the data does reveal that given that the increase in wage dispersion has been 
fairly constant across the period that the implied rate o f  growth o f skill mismatch has 
fallen.
Finally, we note that there is little discrepancy between the wage mismatch measures 
constructed from the simple and full decompositions of the labour force, implying that 
any further distinction between individuals according to their age beyond youths and
adults adds little to our understanding of mismatch, at least as far as wages are concerned. 
However, this is not to say that age does not matter whatsoever; if we consider those 
wage mismatch measures generated from a decomposition of the labour force based 
solely upon individuals’ level of educational attainment, we find that, measure for 
measure, mismatch is approximately three quarters of the level reported in the figures 
below.
F ig u r e  2 .3 : S k ill  M ism a t c h : E v id e n c e  f r o m  W a g e s
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2.4 E v id e n c e  F r o m  U n e m p l o y m e n t  R ates
At first glance, the first thing that strikes the reader about Figure 2.4 overleaf is the 
volatility of both measures, and in particular the absolute mismatch measure. Within the 
space of two years (between 1979 and 1981) absolute mismatch quadrupled in value 
while relative mismatch increased by a about a quarter. Thereafter the two series appear 
to diverge somewhat; with relative mismatch falling far further in proportionate terms 
over the following five years and from 1987 onwards in all but one year the two 
mismatch measures move in opposite directions. It also appears that both unemployment 
measures of mismatch are sensitive to the business cycle -  witness the fall in both 
through the recovery of the 1980’s. In actual fact, this result has been established in a 
number of other studies; for example, Entorf (1996), discussing the relationship between 
the aggregate Spanish unemployment rate and a relative measure of mismatch, finds that:
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“After Franco's death and the start o f the new political institutions in 
1975, the negative correlation was almost perfect ...At a first glance, 
one again gets the impression that [relative] mismatch is more or less 
the inverse o f  unemployment (Entorf (1996) p. 6) ”
In summary it appears that neither of the mismatch indices based on the group-specific 
unemployment rates are able to strip out the effect of cyclical, skill neutral shocks to 
demand and supply. We know that equi-proportionate increases in all the skill-specific 
unemployment rates leave the relative unemployment rates unchanged but results in an 
increase in the variance of the absolute unemployment rates. Conversely, if each 
unemployment rate increases by the same amount, then the variance of the absolute rates 
will be unchanged, but the variance of the relative unemployment rates will decrease. 
Therefore, where the co-movements in the group specific unemployment rates lie 
between linearity and proportionality, we will inevitably see our measures of absolute 
and relative mismatch moving in opposite directions.
Burriel-Llombart and Thomas (2001) argue that a growth in aggregate wage pressure -  
the gap between the growth in wage pressure in the economy and the feasible growth in 
real wages -  generates a rise in the variance of the absolute unemployment rates, but a 
fall in the variance of the relative rates, and vice versa. There are therefore reasons to 
suspect that changes in aggregate wage pressure might be the root cause of the divergent 
behaviour of our two series over the latter half of the period.
We also note that once again the finer decomposition of the labour force appears to add 
little to our measures of mismatch although the displacement between the series is 
certainly greater than that obtained with the wage mismatch measures. Once again it is 
important to point out that this in no way implies that distinguishing between individuals 
who hold similar qualifications according to their age is a worthless exercise; 
unemployment mismatch measures based solely on a decomposition o f the labour force 
by qualification are typically a third to a half the value of those presented here.
90
F ig u r e  2 .4  : S k il l  M ism a t c h : E v id e n c e  fr o m  U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a t e s  
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Had the wage and unemployment mismatch measures indicated a common trend in the 
developments in the labour markets for different skills over the period -  i.e. either a 
convergence or divergence in the wages earned and the unemployment rates suffered by 
each of these groups -  then we might have reasonable grounds to claim that there had 
been a definite change in the degree of skill mismatch in the U.K. labour market, based 
on the outcomes in the individual markets. However, it is apparent that our mismatch 
measures do not provide a compelling, nor even consistent, description of the evolution 
of skill mismatch over the period. While the measures based on wages indicate an 
increased dispersion of the group specific wages (albeit at a declining rate) the 
unemployment measures fluctuate considerably over the period. Furthermore, there is 
some concern that aggregate developments in the labour market might have been the 
driving force behind changes in the unemployment measures. Nonetheless, what is clear 
is that mismatch is demonstrably higher when we take account of an individual’s age 
when we classify his level of skill.
3 S k il l  M ism a t c h  : A  T h e o r e t ic a l  F r a m e w o r k
The mismatch indices we have presented in the previous seetion suggest that based on 
outcomes in the labour market, that there may well have been a change in the degree of
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imbalance between the demand for, and supply of the different skill groups in the labour 
market. However, as was discussed earlier, the limitations of these mismatch measures 
are now well understood: they focus solely on either prices or quantities and are therefore 
to some extent theoretically flawed, and in practice the measures based on the group- 
specific unemployment rates appear to be unreliable, being highly collinear with changes 
in the aggregate labour market. In order to provide a more compelling analysis of the 
effect of skill mismatch on the aggregate labour market, we therefore need to integrate 
both wage and unemployment outcomes into our analysis.
Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) provide just such a framework, assuming that 
production is Cobb-Douglas in separate skill inputs in order to define the demand for 
each input, and wages are set according to an “own sector” double logarithmic wage 
setting function. In the following work we generalise their analysis in three ways. First, 
we assume that technology is now defined by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution -  or 
C.E.S. -  production function, which allows us to test how sensitive our results are to the 
degree of substitution between different inputs in production (which is of course fixed at 
one for the Cobb-Douglas production function). Second, we allow for the fact that 
amongst workers with a common level of educational attainment, productivity can vary 
dramatically; specifically, older workers may have acquired considerable human capital 
at the workplace, so we allow for a much richer definition of skill by dividing workers 
not only according to the qualifications they hold, but also their age. Third, we allow for 
the fact that there may be an asymmetry in wage setting, so that wages are set according 
to the state of a “leading sector” in the economy, namely the labour market for skilled 
adult workers, and examine the extent to which our results are affected by this alternative 
assumption.
3 .1  D e f in in g  t h e  T e c h n o l o g y
To fix ideas, we assume that output Y  is produced via a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution production function in each of the separate skill inputs A^.as follows:
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Y  = A \ ^ a , N , p
y
[3.1]
where for the sake of simple exposition we have chosen to illustrate the model hereafter 
with only four inputs^^, and where the coefficient A captures technological progress and 
we assume that the sum of the a ’s is equal to one. The elasticity of substitution between 
different skill inputs in our production function is of course defined as :
0- = - ^  [3.2]
l - p
A  richer analysis might allow for the fact that the elasticity of substitution might vary 
between these different inputs so that, for example, individuals with the same level of 
educational attainment but from different age groups may be more substitutable in 
production, than those with different levels  o f  educational attainment but who are from 
the same age group. This approach is most easily accomplished by way of a multi-level 
production process, as used by, for example Card and Lemieux (2001). This approach 
pioneered by, among others, Sato (1967) assumes a production function which has n 
primary inputs (classified by, say, qualification groups) each of which can then be 
subdivided into secondary inputs (classified by, say, age). The drawback to this approach 
is that obtaining tractable mismatch indices from such production functions is extremely 
complicated^^. We therefore make the simplifying assumption that all inputs in the 
production process share the same constant elasticity of production, and proceed with the 
production function described in [3.1].
It is straightforward to generalise our framework to a scenario with more inputs, as we will go on to do in 
the Section 4.
Given such a production function, the elasticity of substitution between factors from different primary 
input groups may well then vary with the relative shares in production o f those inputs, which given the 
mismatch measure we employ will considerably complicate the analysis. For example, in the case of a two- 
level C.E.S. production function (i.e. where the elasticity of substitution between different primary inputs is 
constant, and where there is a different constant elasticity of substitution between secondary inputs in each 
of the primary input group) then the elasticity of substitution between secondary inputs which are members 
of different primary input groups is defined as a harmonic mean of the inter- and intra- elasticities of 
substitution (Sato (1967)).
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Now if we assume competitive factor markets, then it can be shown^"  ^that the wage of a 
given skill input W. is given by its marginal product:
<T-1/
w ,= a , .A [3.3]
where [3.3] can be thought of as a standard labour demand function for skill input i , so 
that (as we would expect) the wage of a particular group will rise given either a positive 
shift in demand in favour of that group -  which we argue below is captured by -  or an
increase in total factor productivity. Leaving shifts in demand and technology aside, we 
then have that a group’s wage is a function of its average product. From the law of 
diminishing returns, as a group is used more intensively in production, its marginal 
product -  and hence, its average product -  falls, and therefore so does its wage (of course 
this result follows automatically from our assumption that the groups’ wages are set equal 
to their respective marginal products). Conversely, an increase in the employment of the 
other factors of production raises output, and therefore, indirectly, the group’s average 
product, and thus its wage. Therefore, as we shall see later, where the labour force is 
unchanged both in size and composition, then a rise in the unemployment rate of all other 
factors of production will lead to a fall in output, a fall in the productivity of the 
remaining factor, and therefore a fall in their wage too. Furthermore, the lower the value 
o f the elasticity o f substitution between different skill inputs in production, the stronger 
these effects from the average product of the input onto its wage become.
3 .2  D e f in in g  T h e  M is m a t c h  In d e x
Now, rearranging equation [3.3] we have that :
See Appendix 3 for a comprehensive derivation of all expressions used in this section.
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,cr
i - y  f  N . y
a,. =  w,..^ [3.4]
w  y
SO that the term is defined as the wage bill share of group i adjusted for the elasticity
of substitution between the different labour inputs, and can therefore be thought of as an 
ideal measure of the demand for the i* input (Burriel-Llombart and Thomas (2001)). The 
supply of an input is of course given by its share of the labour force /.(or L j L ) .
However, following Nickell and Bell (1996) we adjust relative supply by the elasticity of 
substitution to reflect the ease with which firms can switch between available inputs in 
production; so for example, if the separate inputs are near perfect substitutes then the 
supply of a particular input will become increasingly irrelevant to the firm. We can 
therefore construct an absolute measure of the mismatch between the demand for and the 
supply of skill input i , written below in terms of logarithms:
In M^ = In or. - — In/. [3.5]
G
However, as Jackman et. al. (1999) argue, such an absolute measure of mismatch may 
prove misleading since it makes no reference to developments in the markets for other 
skills. It is possible that using such measures we might find that demand has grown faster 
than supply for all skill groups if there has been (net) skill neutral shift in demand. We 
are interested here in whether there has been any discernible net shift in demand in favour 
of a given (set of) skills, at the expense of others -  in short whether the relative demand 
and supply of the different skills has become increasingly mismatched over the period. 
We therefore require a definition of mismatch which compares the evolution of demand 
and supply across skill groups; we define the level of relative mismatch between the 
demand and supply of inputs i and j  as :
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or expanding our index we have that :
Wj \ ^ ~ " u
[3.7]
Within this framework, (skill-) neutral shifts in relative demand and supply are assumed 
to imply no resultant pressure on relative wages or unemployment rates (Jackman et. al. 
(1999)). Of course, our mismatch index is such that the degree of mismatch between 
inputs i and j  is equal to the reciprocal of the mismatch between j  and i . Alternatively
written in logarithmic form, our index then shares the appealing feature of Manacorda 
and Petrongolo’s index -  that the log of the mismatch between the demand and supply of 
skill-group i relative to that for skill-group j  is of opposite sign but equal in absolute
value to the log o f mismatch between the demand and supply of skill-group j  relative to
that for skill-group i .
When the number of separate skill inputs in the production function [3.1] becomes large 
we are left with a huge number of separate mismatch indices between each pair of inputs. 
In order to clarify the underlying trends in the supply of, and demand for each of these 
inputs we select a fixed reference skill group against which we compare the relative 
demand and supply of the remaining n -1 skill inputs^^. We shall follow the convention 
in the literature by defining as our reference group j  the least skilled group in the labour
force.
Of course, given these n - 1 mismatch indices it is straightforward to calculate the level of mismatch 
between any pair of inputs k  and /  given a reference group j  , using the following rule:
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3.3 Writing Labour Demand in terms of the level of Mismatch
In logarithmic form, we can express the labour demand curve for, say, the 1®^ skill input 
[3.2] asf* :
Inw, = ln a ,+ ln ^ - ( l - p ) ln A T [  +
Û ^ l n ( a , i V , ' ’ +  +  a^N ^'’ )  [3.8]
which we can expand and rearrange to give:
InWj + ln ^—(l —/?)(l — dfj) In (l — Wj) +(l — yo).ûf2.111(1 — Wj)"!"
(1 — . ln(l — W3 )+(1 — p).o?4. lfl(l —1/4 )+
(1 — ' 111 ^  + (1 — p).ûf3.1n— + (1 — . In +
/] /j h
In
P
[3.9]
Then the total differential of the labour demand curve for the 1®^ input can be defined as 
i/lnw i =  J ln c t j  +  J l n ^ - ( l - p X l ~ < ^ i V l ^ ( l “ ^ i)+
m m  = - 2 i Z ^ =  ^ 9
" ( i / / , r  (4 / ly V  ( ( A r  ^ m ,
In order to simplify the exposition of our model we shall write our expressions in terms o f p  as opposed 
to the elasticity of substitution itself, although of course, we can always rewrite in terms of (J  using [3.2].
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(l — -d ln(l — M4 )+
(1 — p).ln(l — u^.doc^ +
— p).û^3 >d ln(l — W3 )+
— p).ln(l — u^.dcc^ +
— p).(%2 • In — +  (1 — p).û^3. In — +
h h
J ln
v H y
[3.10]
where we denote:
[3.11]
[3.12]
From [3.10] if we compare the relative demand for the i^  ^ and j*  inputs in total 
differentiated form we have (for small values of Uj and uj):
d I n - d Xn Wj ^ d I n MMy  + — (t/w. - duj ) [3.13]
so that, a net demand shift in favour of the i* input relative to the j*  input will, to a first 
approximation, result in either an increase in i‘^ ’s group relative wage, or an increase in
the difference between their unemployment rates, or both27
In practice, the consequences of a net relative demand shift are determined by the functional form of the 
wage setting curve, which closes the model (Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999)).
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In order to quantify the effect of changes in the relative mismatch between the demand 
and supply of the separate skill inputs on the aggregate unemployment rate we need to 
specify the nature of the wage setting function. As we discussed in Section 1, a change in 
the extent of mismatch has the potential to affect the aggregate unemployment rate in two 
scenarios: where the wage setting function is convex, or where wage setting is 
asymmetric (i.e. there exists a leading sector which determines wage setting behaviour 
throughout the labour market). We take each of these scenarios in turn.
3 .4  T h e  S u p p l y  S id e  : C o n v e x  W a g e  S e t t in g
Taking the standard^^ double logarithmic wage function, (the log of) a group’s wages is a 
linear function of (the log of) their unemployment rate, so that the change in the wage 
caused by an increase in the unemployment rate of a group falls as their unemployment 
rate increases. In other words we have:
In w. = z . - /  Inw,. [3.14]
where the term z. captures exogenous wage pressure specific to the group, and /  is the
absolute value of the elasticity of group’s real wage with respect to its unemployment 
rate. We explicitly assume that the value of this elasticity is common across all skill 
inputs.
The convexity of this double log wage setting function implies that when the (own group) 
unemployment rate is low, a fall in wages can be achieved through a relatively small rise 
in unemployment; conversely, when the (own group) unemployment rate is already high, 
a fall in wages can only be bought at the heavy price of large increases in the 
unemployment rate. Therefore we might expect a skill biased shift in demand to increase 
the unemployment rate at the aggregate level since the required fall in the wage o f the 
unskilled may result in large increases in unskilled unemployment while there is only a
See, for example, Layard et. al. (1991).
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small counterbalancing fall in the skilled unemployment rate. This is one mechanism 
through which skill biased shifts in demand can lead to rising aggregate unemployment.
So for the first group, the wage setting function in totally differentiated form is:
yJlnW j = d z^  du^
w,
[3.15]
Substituting [3.10] into [3.15] we have, after rearranging terms, that
+
(l — Wj ).Z Mj
du2
du^ ~
(1 -  .(l - u ^ y
( l -
du . =
d z ^ -d \n A  + a2.dlnMM2, + a^.dInMM^^ + a^.dInMM^^ -
+ N / J a , + N / J a ,  + N / ’xla,)+
p.Z
+ N ,'’x I a 2 + N / .d a ,+ N /’J a , )
p X
+
dl2 +
100
\d l,
V J
[3.16]
where we denote
O j -  (i -  /? )(z  -  ÛT, I f  .{^ [3.17]
and:
J ln M M j = J i n — - ( l - p ) .^ / ln — \f j
a .
[3.18]
It can be shown that a similar expression can be derived for the second input of the form
{ [ -  p \ a j f  .{ V -u ff
( l-W i)Z
r
du^ + du2 ~
2J
{ i -  p ) .a y l f  . { [ - u f f  
(l — W3 ).Z
J 1/3 — du^ =
dz^-dXnA -^ -(«2 - 1)JlnMM2i + .dInMM^^+a^.dXnMM^^ -
^ — ^ { N / ’.d a ,+ N / .d a ,  + N { jd a , + N f J a ) +  
/?.E
\ \
dL +
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.dL [3.19]
where :
^2 -  (l “ /^)(^ “ ^ 2 *(l “ ^ 2 )^  ) [3.20]
In essence then we have a system of equations -  one for each of the separate skill inputs 
to the production function -  which may be written in matrix notation as follows:
0 .
 ^d u ^
f ' l
du^ dz^ 1 1
— d \n A -
dii'^ dz^ 1 1
J ; l l
4^  +
«2 «3 «4
û?2 ~ 1 «3 «4.J ln M M .. + .dlnMM^^ +
«2 21 (%3 — 1 31 «4
< ^2 ; V ^3 y <^4 -  ly
.d In MM
41
[3.21]
Where we define :
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0  =
-A
“A
0
~^ 2
V -^ 2 /^
( l - « 3 k
( l - « 3 . k
- « j j z “3
;
( l - « 3 . k
- ; i
“ “4) '
-A .
■ “4) '
“ “4) '
O
4 j
[3.22]
such that :
[3.23]
and :
^ ( A f '’^ « ,  + N /M a , + N / J a ^ + N / J a ^ ) +  
p.E
VV 4
dl2 +
lA /
dl^ +
J I
dL [3.24]
Now if we assume that the matrix © is nonsingular, we can rewrite [3.21] as
 ^d u ^ f l \ r n
du2
= 0 " ^
dz2 _ 0 - l 1 d \r \.A -& ^
1
du^ dz^ 1 1
J ; j j
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0- 1
 ^ 2^ ^
0^2 ~ 1 
a .
\  J
+0
21
- 1 «3 
(%3 — 1
V ^ 3  y
dXnMM^^ + 0 -1
a.
«4
v « 4 “ ly
J ln M M ^^  [3.25]
We know that the aggregate unemployment rate w is a weighted average of the 
unemployment rates of the separate labour inputs, so we have that
du = lydu^ + + lyduj^ + lydu^ +
d l y U ^  +  d l y U 2 +  J / 3 . W 3  +  d l y U ^
Therefore, if we define the matrix S  as :
s= (/, /, /, /J0 -
[3.26]
k-i [3.27]
Then, finally, we have that the change in the aggregate unemployment rate can be 
expressed as follows :
du = H,
r r  ^ «2  ^ 3^
dZry 1 1 — 1 «3L d \n A - 'E . T^  + S. 2 .dlnM M ^^ + H. •t/lnMM^^ +
dz^ 1 1 «2 21 û?3 — 1 31
V ; < 2^ ; < ^3 ;
r « 4 1 ' 4 ^
«4 .dXnMM +(w, «2 W3 W4) dll
«4 41 dl,
V^4 -  ly , dl  ^ .
[3.28]
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We can thus identify three potential sources of pressure on the aggregate unemployment 
rate within our model. The first is an increase in ‘wage push’, a nebulous term which in 
this framework is interpreted as any growth in wage pressure, captured by J z ., over and
above that implied by the increase in T.F.P. and the impact on total output (and therefore 
indirectly on the marginal product and hence wage of each group) of a shift in the 
productivity of any factor. This latter point can be best illustrated in the case of the Cobb 
Douglas production function, since using L’Hôpital’s rule it can be shown that:
'F  = In— .da2 + In— . Jo , + In—  da^ [3.29]
p = 0  TV, TV, TV,
The second cause can be thought of as the pure demographic component of the change in 
the unemployment rate -  i.e. that part of the change caused directly by a change in the 
composition of the labour force between skill groups with different group specific 
unemployment rates -  captured by the final term in [3.28]. The third and final source of 
pressure on the unemployment rate within our model is the impact of net shifts in the 
relative demand for skills, which will be captured here by the mismatch terms.
3 .5  T h e  S u p p l y  S id e  R e c o n s id e r e d  : A s y m m e t r ic  W a g e  S e t t in g
We now assume that all wages in the economy are set subject to conditions in a leading 
sector, so that in all other sectors of the economy “excess” unemployment (i.e. any 
unemployment over and above that in the leading sector) is inefficient since it exerts no 
downward pressure on wages. In the context of our model where skill groups are defined 
both in terms of age and educational attainment, asymmetric wage setting requires that 
wages in the economy must be set according to conditions in, say, the market for middle- 
aged graduates^^. So, if we denote the fourth sector as the leading sector in our stylised 
economy, then [3.14] becomes:
The analysis in this section hinges on this assumption. While it might be reasonable to argue that in a 
world of only four skill groups (adults and youths, with or without an A Level or above) more educated
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In w^  = z . -  X In «4 [3.30]
Although wages in the leading sector are still set according to a convex wage setting 
function so that wages respond more to the unemployment rate in the leading sector when 
that unemployment rate is low, wages elsewhere in the economy are completely 
unresponsive to the particular conditions that prevail in their respective sub-sections of 
the labour market. For all other skill inputs in the production function, equilibrium is now 
determined by the intersection of their labour demand curve and a wage setting function 
which is horizontal in (log) wage -  (log) employment space; in fact, the precise position 
o f each of these skill specific wage setting functions is defined by the level of exogenous 
wage pressure and conditions in the leading sector.
Now consider the impact of a skill biased shift in demand -  towards the leading skill 
group. Absent any change in wage pressure, a fall in unemployment in the leading sector 
will cause wages to rise both in the leading sector itself and elsewhere in the economy too 
and thus employment to fall in the remaining sectors o f the labour market. However, a 
fall in the employment of all the other factors of production will lead to a fall in the 
marginal product of the leading skill group, causing its wage and employment to fall 
back. In fact, for the leading sector these two forces exactly cancel out^ ® so that a shift in 
demand in favour of the leading sector actually has no effect on either the wage or the 
employment of that group. However, the other skill groups in the economy are 
disadvantaged by this shift in demand suffering higher unemployment rates as a result. 
Therefore, within such a model of asymmetric wage setting, skill biased shifts in demand 
once again have the potential to affect the aggregate unemployment rate.
We can express [3.30] in total differentiated form as:
adults play a key role in setting wages, in the case of the finer decompositions of the labour force into up to 
16 different skill groups our assumption appears more tenuous.
This result can be verified from the solution of [3.32] which first requires the inversion of the matrix Q .
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yd  In  W; — dZ; d U f [3.31]
so that our set of equations is now of the form
Q.
^ d u ^ r r rA
dUrs dz^ 1 12 d \n A  —
du^ dz^ 1 1
J ; .1
Y +
/  _ A«2 «3 «4
(X2 ~ 1 «3 «4
.6? In M M .  ^ + .c/lnMM.^ +
«2 21 CÏ3 — 1 31 «4
 ^ 2^ >  ^ (^ 3 ; «^4 -  1;
.d In MM
41
[3.32]
where we define the matrix Q  as:
Q  =
"l
o .
(^1 — Wj jis (l —
-A
— A .
V
-A
(^1 ~ W- - T - V
® 3  r  4
( l-W g)z  «
w. (1 - « 4 ) 2
[3.33]
Once again if we assume that the matrix Q is  nonsingular, then if we define the matrix 
r  as :
r= (/. I, I, / J o - ’ [3.34]
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Then finally we have that :
d u = r
 ^dz^^ rA  ^ «2  ^ 0^ 3 ^
dzr. 1 1 — 1 a .z - r . d \n A - Y . 'T + r . .d\nM M ^^ + r . 3
dz^ ^ 1 1 «2 — 1
l i j < 2^ / < ^3 V
31
r .
oc.
a .
a .
V « 4  -  V
.dXnMM +(w, 
41  ^ ^
u.
dl2
dl,
\d l ^ j
[3.35]
Our firamework thus enables us to establish the role that net shifts in demand towards the 
skilled played in the behaviour of the aggregate unemployment rate over recent times, 
given suitable values of our key parameters -  namely : y  the (absolute value) of the
elasticity of a group’s real wage with respect to its unemployment rate and : cr the 
elasticity of substitution between the different skill inputs, and an assumption on the 
nature of wage setting in the economy. In the following section we quantify the effect of 
any change in the degree of skill mismatch in the labour market on the unemployment 
rate, using reasonable values of our two key parameters taken from the literature.
4 . R e s u l t s
We proceed as follows: first we calculate the behaviour of the demand for and the supply 
of skills in the labour force over the period 1979-1996, which in turn enables us to 
directly quantify the change in skill mismatch over the period. We then estimate directly 
the effect of changes in the degree of skill mismatch on the aggregate unemployment 
rate, using the mean values of the variables of our model, under both the assumptions that 
wage setting is convex, or follows a leading sector.
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4.1 P r e l im in a r y  R e s u l t s  : T h e  G r o w t h  in  S k i l l  M is m a tc h
We now turn to directly quantify the effect of any change in the degree o f skill mismatch 
in the U.K. labour market between 1979 and 1996. In order to test how sensitive our 
results are to the particular form of the model we apply we calculate the impact of 
changes in the degree of skill mismatch in the economy using four alternative 
decompositions of the labour force. The first two are based purely on individuals’ level of 
educational attainment, dividing the labour force into two and four groups respectively^ \  
The final two decompositions divide each of the four qualification groups into two and 
four sub-groups according to the age of the individuals in that group (in the case of the 
former differentiating between youths -  those under 25 years of age -  and adults; and in 
the latter into the following categories: below 25, 25-34, 35-49 and 50 years and above). 
In the model presented in the previous sections it is apparent that it is the change in the 
level of the logarithm of our mismatch index that drives changes in the aggregate 
unemployment rate, so we shall therefore focus on the growth rate of mismatch over the 
period. Our results are detailed in Tables 4.4 -  4.15, where we denote each group in 
ascending order according to their level of educational attainment, and then by their age 
group; so for example, when we divide the labour force into sixteen skill groups, group 8 
refers to those whose highest level of educational attainment falls in the category O Level 
or equivalent and who are aged 50 years and above.
It appears to be an incontrovertible fact that there has been a growth in the level of 
mismatch between the demand for and supply of skilled workers relative to the unskilled 
since 1979 in the U.K. labour force -  as can be gauged for example from Table 4.4. 
However, it is the aim of this research to investigate whether this broad growth in skill 
mismatch at the aggregate level masks more complex behaviour at the disaggregate level. 
When we adopt a more comprehensive definition of the level of skill of a worker to 
include not only his level of educational attainment, but also his age (as a proxy for his 
experience at the workplace) it becomes apparent that the evolution of the demand and
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supply of these separate skills in the labour market has varied dramatically. O f course, the 
diverse behaviour of the relative supply of each of these groups should come as no great 
surprise given the large rise in educational attainment and the fluctuations in the age 
composition of the workforce which we detailed in Section 2. However, the shifts in the 
relative demand for skills has been equally varied across skill groups, and as a result the 
growth of mismatch has also varied widely across different skills (see for example Table 
4.7). Even before we take any account of the age composition of the workforce we find 
that the annual growth rate of mismatch for individuals holding degrees relative to those 
with no O Levels (or its equivalent) has grown far faster than that between either those 
with A or O Levels and the most unqualified members of the workforce (see Table 4.5). 
Moreover, for individuals who share the same level of educational attainment but whose 
age differ we find that mismatch has grown to varying degrees over the period.
In the following figures and tables (Figures and Tables 4.1 -  4.3) we present the time- 
series behaviour and average annual growth rates of the relative demand, relative supply 
and mismatch in the UK economy when we use our most disaggregated decomposition of 
the workforce into sixteen separate skill groups. We assume an elasticity of substitution 
between skill inputs of one (i.e., technology is Cobb Douglas) so the demand for one skill 
input relative to another is given by the ratio of their wage bill shares, the supply of one 
input relative to another is given by the ratio of their labour force shares, and finally, the 
mismatch between them is given by the ratio of demand and supply. If one believed that 
controlling for changes in the age distribution of the workforce would add little to our 
understanding of the evolution of skill mismatch in the labour market then it ought to be 
the case that within these qualification groups the growth rates of skill mismatch should 
be to a first approximation equivalent. To test this hypothesis, when calculating relative 
demand, relative supply and mismatch we have chosen to use a separate reference group 
(the youngest age group) for each qualification group to isolate these differences. Of 
course, since we do not use a common reference group across each all the different 
qualification groups, our figures and tables do not illustrate the growth in mismatch
The first decomposition follows Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) and classifies individuals as either 
skilled or unskilled according to whether their highest level of educational attainment is an A Level (or its
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between skill groups who belong to different qualification groups. Our results suggest 
that the evolution of the demand and supply for individuals within the same level of 
educational attainment does indeed vary according to their age. This is most evident 
amongst the least qualified members of the workforce where the growth rate of mismatch 
between those aged 50 and above and our reference group is more than 2.5 percentage 
points greater than that between those aged 25 to 34 and our reference group. For the 
most qualified members of the workforce, mismatch between the youngest and oldest 
graduates has declined while it has grown between 25 and 34 year olds and our reference 
group. In other words, as far as skill mismatch is concerned, the age distribution o f the 
workforce matters.
The statement that skill mismatch has grown on average across the period is however 
somewhat misleading. If we focus on the profile of skill mismatch it appears that while 
mismatch grew throughout the first few years of the 1980’s, thereafter any significant 
growth in skill mismatch is far harder to discern. For that reason we have calculated the 
rate of growth of mismatch over these two separate sub periods: 1979-1984 and 1985- 
1996, as well as over the period as a whole to illustrate this point. Our results confirm our 
suspicions -  while skill mismatch grew at a rate of over 10 percent per year for some of 
our finer definitions of skill in the early 1980’s, in the period that followed the growth in 
skill mismatch died on its feet, and in many cases mismatch fell back^^. The fact that 
changes in the sample period appear to have such a significant impact on the magnitude 
and even direction of the growth in skill mismatch is of potential concem^^. As a result, 
the estimated impact of the growth in skill mismatch on the aggregate unemployment rate 
is also highly dependent on the sample period chosen (as we shall go on to discuss).
equivalent) or higher; the latter follows the more comprehensive classification given in Appendix 2.
Of course, our choice o f the dividing line between these two sub-periods is somewhat arbitrary, since 
several o f our mismatch indices experienced uninterrupted growth beyond 1984; nevertheless, given that 
the majority of the mismatch indices fell in the years that followed 1984, and in certain instances did not 
return to their peak level in that year during the remainder of the period, we find our choice of dividing line 
as convincing as any other.
It might be the case that this sensitivity of our estimates of the growth in skill mismatch to the sample 
period reflects the fact that, as with the ‘outcomes’ measures described above, we are not completely 
stripping out the effect o f the cycle.
I l l
F igure 4.1: R ela tiv e  D em and  for Skills assum ing  Co b b-D o u g l a s  T e c h n o lo g y
: 1979-1996
No O LEVEL O L e v e l
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4
2
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
4
3
2
1
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
•25-34 •35-49 •50 + ■25-34 •35-49 •50 +
A L e v el D e g r e e
3
2
1
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
12
8
4
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
•25-34 •35-49 •50 + ■25-34 •35-49 •50 +
T a b l e  4.1 : T h e  A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e  o f  R e l a t iv e  D e m a n d  (% )
Age Group No 0  level 0 level A level Degree
25-34 4.60 5.29 3.31 2.42
35-49 5.49 8.54 4.73 3.31
50 + 3.99 13.16 2.54 2.22
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F igure  4.2 : R elative  S upply  o f  S kills a ssu m in g  C o b b -D o u g l a s  T ec h n o lo g y  :
1979-1996
No O LEVEL O  L e v e l
3
2
1
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
2
1
0
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
•25-34 •35-49 •50 + •25-34  35-49 •50 +
A L e v e l D e g r e e
1.5
1
0.5
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79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
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79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
•25-34 ■35-49 •50 + •25-34 •35-49 •50 +
T a b l e  4 .2  : T h e  A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e  o f  R e l a t iv e  S u p p l y  (% )
Age Group No 0  level O level A level Degree
25-34 2.54 3.72 0.95 0.57
35-49 2.85 6.76 2.36 1.90
50 + 1.53 11.99 0.17 1.17
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F ig ure  4.3 : T he D egree of M ismatch  o f  S kills a ssu m in g  C o b b-D o u g las
T echnology  : 1979-1996
No O LEVEL O L e v e l
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A  L e v e l D e g r e e
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1
■25-34 ■35-49 ■50 +
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
 25-34  35-49  50 +
T a b l e  4 .3  : T h e  A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e  o f  M is m a t c h  (% )
Age Group No O level 0 level A level Degree
25-34 4.95 3.44 2.50 0.59
35-49 5.59 4.20 2.16 -0.31
50 4- 7.51 2.94 2.60 -0.58
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It is tempting to attribute this decline in the rate of growth, and in some instances, the 
level, of skill mismatch to benign supply shocks generated by expansion of further and 
higher education and the ‘baby bust’, which together reduced the proportion of the labour 
force who were both unqualified and young. However, it is not quite that simple -  any 
story of the evolution of mismatch is incomplete without a reference to both the 
behaviour of supply and demand. It also appears that a fall in the rate of growth of the 
relative demand for skills may also have played some part in reducing the rate of growth 
of skill mismatch through the late 1980’s and into the 1990’s. O f course, these two 
periods refer to very different labour markets: in the early 1980’s the U.K. labour market 
suffered a deep slump and the unemployment rate rose sharply, but from the mid- to late 
1980’s onwards the trend at least in the unemployment rate was downwards, and the fall 
in the rate of growth of the relative demand for skills might reflect this to some extent. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that the growth in educational attainment and the aftershock 
of the collapse in the birth rate in the 1970’s on the age composition of the labour force 
together restrained the growth in skill mismatch into the 1990’s.
Of course, there is one other supply shock that might have had a similar effect on the 
relative supply of skilled labour -  and that is the well documented growth in economic 
inactivity^" .^ To the extent that the rise in inactivity has been concentrated amongst the 
least skilled members of the workforce then this will have also contributed to a fall in the 
share of the workforce who have little or no qualifications, and will therefore reduce the 
level of mismatch, ceteris paribus. However, exits out of the labour force were not solely 
restricted to the young nor even the unskilled. For example, the rise in ‘early retirement’ 
documented by Disney (1999) encompassed both voluntary exits among typically skilled 
members of the workforce who had amassed sufficient wealth to support themselves in 
retirement and quasi-involuntary exits by those typically unskilled members of the labour 
force who were unemployed and who realistically faced little prospect of future 
unemployment. Nonetheless, to the extent that the unskilled bore the brunt of the rise in 
inactivity, this phenomenon can be thought of a beneficial supply shock, at least as far the 
level of mismatch is concerned.
For a detailed analysis o f this phenomenon see Gregg and Wadsworth (1999).
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Burriel-Llombart and Thomas (2000) take a different approach to this issue of inactivity 
distinguishing instead between the employed and the non-employed, and thereby 
including the inactive within analysis, treating them explicitly as equivalent to the 
unemployed. In some respects, given that we know that there are significant flows 
between inactivity and employment, this treatment makes a good deal of sense; however 
since our focus is on explaining the observed behaviour of the aggregate unemployment 
rate it does not seem appropriate here.
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[il A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e s  f o r  t h e  R e l a t iv e  D e m a n d  a n d  R e l a t iv e  
S u p p l y  o f  S k il l s  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  S k il l  M is m a t c h : 1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 6
T a b l e  4 .4 2 S k il l  G r o u p s
Measure Relative Demand Relative Supply M ismatch
O’=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7 = 1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2
MM21 11.7 5.8 3.1 11.0 5.3 - 0.7 0.6 0.5
T a b l e  4 .5  4  S k il l  G r o u p s
Measure Relative Demand Relative Supply Mismatch
(7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2
MM21 22.3 9.8 4.6 21.5 9,4 4.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
MM31
-
19.0 8.5 4.0 18.5 8.4 4.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
MM41 21.3 10.3 5.4 19.5 9.0 4.3 1.4 1.1 0.9
T a b le  4 .6 8 S k il l  G r o u p s
Measure Relative Demand Relative Supply
1
M ismatch
(7=0.5 (7=1 0 = 2 (7=0.5 0= 1 0 = 2 0= 0.5 0= 1 0 = 2  1
MM21 8.5 4.7 3.1 5.4 2.3 1.0 3.0 2.4 2.1
MM31 17.5 8.0 3.9 16.0 7.1 3.4 1.1 0.7 0.5
MM41 35.4 15.9 8.1 31.9 13.5 6.2 2.8 2.1 1.8
MM51 23.4 10.3 4.9 21.7 9.6 4.5 1.3 0.6 0.3
MMôi 29.2 13.9 7.5 25.0 10.9 5.1 3.4 2.6 2.2
MMy, 27.3 12.8 6.9 24.0 10.4 4.8 2.9 2.3 2.1 1
MMgi 32.2 15.4 8.6 26.2 11.5 5.4 4.4 3.4 3.0
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T a b l e  4 .7  16 Sk il l  G r o u ps
Measure Relative Demand Relative Supply Mismatch
cr =0.5 CT=1 a  =2 cr =0.5 cr= i (J= 2 cr =0.5 cr= i a  =2
MM21 8.4 4.6 3.0 5.7 2.5 1.2 2.3 1.9 1.7
MM31 10.1 5.5 3.6 6.5 2.8 1.3 3.2 2.5 2.2
MM41 7.5 4.0 2.8 4.2 1.5 0.6 3.4 2.6 2.2
MM51 17.5 8.0 3.9 16.0 7.1 3.4 1.1 0.7 0.5
MMei 28.4 13.3 7.0 25.4 11.1 5.2 2.8 2.1 1.7
MM7) 40.0 17.2 8.6 36.3 14.8 6.7 3.0 2.2 1.9
MMg] 66.4 23.5 10.5 60.1 20.3 8.4 2.5 1.8 1.5
MM91 23.4 10.3 4.9 21.7 9.6 4.5 1.3 0.6 0.3
MMioi 27.9 13.3 7.1 23.3 10.3 4.9 3.2 2.4 2.0
MMni 32.5 15.4 8.4 28.0 12.2 5.7 3.8 3.0 2.6
MM)2| 27.0 12.6 7.0 23.7 9.9 4.5 3.6 2.8 2.5
MMi31 27.3 12.8 6.9 24.0 10.4 4.8 2.9 2.3 2.1
MM 14, 31.1 15.0 8.5 24.7 10.8 5.0 4.7 3.7 3.2
MMisi 33.3 16.0 8.8 27.3 12.1 5.7 4.3 3.3 2.9
MM161 32.2 14.9 8.1 27.2 11.6 5.4 3.9 3.0 2.6
fiil A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e s  f o r  t h e  R e l a t iv e  D e m a n d  a n d  R e l a t iv e  
S u p p l y  o f  S k il l s  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  S k il l  M is m a t c h : 1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 4
T a b l e  4 .8  2 S k il l  G r o u p s
M easure Relative Demand Relative Supply Mismatch
cr =0.5 cr= i cr=2 1 cr =0.5 cr= i cr=2 cr =0.5 cr= i (T=2 j
MM21 13.5 7.0 3.9 1 10.3 4.9 2.4 3.0 2.0 1.5
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Ta b l e  4 .9  4 S k il l  G r o u ps
M e a su r e R e l a t iv e  D em a n d Rel a t iv e  Su p pl y M ism a t c h
(7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2
MM21 45.6 20.8 10.5 42.2 18.7 8.8 2.4 1.8 1.5
MM31 27.5 13.5 7.3 23.6 10.9 5.3 3.3 2.4 1.9
MM41 28.1 14.1 7.9 22.1 10.2 4.9 5.2 3.6 2.9
T a b le  4 .1 0  8 S k i l l  G r o u p s
M e a su r e R e l a t iv e  D em a nd Rel a t iv e  Su pply M ism a t c h
(7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2
MM21 1.5 2.2 2.8 -6.6 -3.6 -1.9 9.2 6.3 4.9
MM31 26.0 13.7 8.2 18.3 8.6 4.2 7.0 4.9 3.9
MM41 56.8 26.3 14.2 45.2 19.1 8.8 10.1 6.8 5.2
MM51 23.5 11.7 6.6 16.5 7.5 3.6 6.5 4.2 3.0
MMô, 31.1 16.9 10.8 17.7 7.9 3.7 12.8 8.9 7.0
MM7] 24.4 13.8 9.3 13.0 5.7 2.7 11.9 8.5 6.9
M M ., 31.5 16.7 10.6 17.5 7.5 3.5 13.2 9.1 7.1
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Ta b l e  4.11 16 Sk il l  G ro ups
M e a su r e
R e l a t iv e  D em and Relativ e  Su p p l y M ism a t c h
(7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2 <7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2 <7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2
MM21 -1.5 0.9 2.3 -7.8 -4.0 -2.0 7.0 5.3 4.4
MM31 4.8 3.8 3.4 -3.4 -1.8 -0.9 9.0 6.0 4.5
MM41 0.3 1.3 2.5 -8.8 -5.1 -2.8 10.7 7.4 5.8
MM51 26.0 13.7 8.2 18.3 8.6 4.2 7.0 4.9 3.9
MMôi 35.0 17.3 10.0 25.7 11.1 5.2 9.5 6.4 5.0
MM71 71.9 30.4 15.5 59.6 23.3 10.4 10.1 6.6 5.0
MMgi 147.5 50.6 23.4 124.8 39.2 16.0 10.3 7.1 5.6
MM91 23.5 11.7 6.6 16.5 7.5 3.6 6.5 4.2 3.0
M M ioi 30.4 16.5 10.4 17.2 7.8 3.7 12.1 8.3 6.5
MMin 33.8 18.5 11.9 20.1 8.9 4.2 13.8 9.8 7.9
MM121 27.5 15.0 9.8 14.3 5.9 2.7 12.9 8.9 7.1
M M i3i 24.4 13.8 9.3 13.0 5.7 2.7 11.9 8.5 6.9
M M i4i 25.3 13.4 8.5 13.0 5.6 2.6 11.9 7.9 6.0
M M i5, 35.1 18.1 11.2 20.4 8.8 4.1 13.3 9.1 7.1
M M ,61 34.7 18.5 12.0 20.4 8.7 4.0 14.2 10.2 8,2
fiiil A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  G r o w t h  R a t e s  f o r  t h e  R e l a t i v e  D e m a n d  a n d  R e l a t i v e  
S u p p ly  o f  S k i l l s  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  S k i l l  M is m a t c h  ; 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 6
T a b l e  4 .1 2  2 S k i l l  G r o u p s
M e a su r e R e l a t iv e  D em a nd Relativ e  Su p pl y M ism a t c h
<7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2 <7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2 <7=0.5 <7=1 <7=2
MM21 11.0 5.4 2.7 11.3 5.4 2.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.1
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T a b l e  4.13 4 Sk il l  G r o u ps
M e a su r e
R e l a t iv e  D em a nd R elativ e  Su p pl y M ism a t c h
a  =0.5 <J=l <J=2 < 7 -0 .5 <7=1 <7=2 (7 = 0 .5 <7=1 <7=2
M M 21 12.5 5.2 2.1 12.8 5.6 2.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5
M M 31 15.4 6.5 2.7 16.3 7.3 3.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9
M M 41 18.4 8.6 4.3 18.4 8.5 4.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1
T a b l e  4 .1 4  8 S k il l  G r o u p s
M e a s u r e R e l a t iv e  D e m a n d R e l a t iv e  Su p p l y M is m a t c h
<7=0.5 (7 = 1 <7=2 <7=0.5 <7=1 < 7= 2 < 7=0.5 <7=1 (7 = 2
M M 21 11.5 5.7 3.3 10.3 4.7 2.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
M M 3, 14.0 5.6 2.1 15.1 6.5 3.0 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0
MM41 26.4 11.5 5.6 26.3 11.1 5.1 -0.2 0.1 0.3
M M 51 23.3 9.8 4.2 23.9 10.5 4.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8
MMôi 28.4 12.6 6.1 28.0 12.2 5.7 -0.5 0.0 0.2
MMvi 28.5 12.4 5.9 28.6 12.3 5.7 -0.9 -0.3 0.0
MMgi 32.5 14.9 7.7 29.8 13.1 6.2 0.7 1.0
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Ta b l e  4.15 16 S k il l  G ro u ps
M e a s u r e R e l a t iv e  D em a n d R e l a t iv e  Su p p l y M is m a t c h
a  =0.5 cr= i a  =2 a  =0.5 a = i <J=2 cr =0.5 cr= i cr=2
MM21 12.5 6.1 3.3 11.3 5.3 2.5 0.3 0.5 0.6
MM31 12.3 6.2 3.7 10.6 4.8 2.3 0.8 1.1 1.3
MM41 10.5 5.1 2.9 9.6 4.3 2.0 0.3 0.6 0.8
MM51 14.0 5.6 2.1 15.1 6.5 3.0 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0
MMôi 25.6 11.6 5.7 25.2 11.1 5.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
MM7J 26.7 11.7 5.8 26.6 11.2 5.1 0.1 0.4 0.6
MMgi 32.6 12.2 5.1 33.2 12.4 5.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3
MM91 23.3 9.8 4.2 23.9 10.5 4.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8
MM,01 26.8 11.9 5.8 25.9 11.3 5.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.2
MMiii 31.9 14.2 7.0 31.3 13.6 6.3 -0.3 0.2 0.4
MMi21 26.8 11.6 5.8 27.5 11.6 5.3 -0.3 0.3 0.6
MMi3i 28.5 12.4 5.9 28.6 12.3 5.7 -0.9 -0.3 0.0
MMi4, 33.5 15.7 8.5 29.6 12.9 6.1 1.7 1.9 2.1
MMis, 32.6 15.0 7.8 30.1 13.4 6.3 0.5 0.9 1.1
MM, 61 31.2 13.4 6.5 30.0 12.9 6.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3
4 .2  E s t im a t in g  t h e  I m p a c t  o f  t h e  G r o w t h  o f  M is m a t c h  o n  t h e  
U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a t e
We now turn directly to estimate the effect of the growth in skill mismatch documented 
above on the aggregate unemployment rate over the period: 1979 -  1996. We follow the 
approach taken by Jackman et. al. (1999) and substitute the average values over the 
whole period of the variables that appear as coefficients in our model, and then calculate 
the total impact of skill mismatch on the average change in the aggregate unemployment 
rate over the entire period. In the case of asymmetric wage setting -  i.e., where one 
leading sector determines wage setting throughout the economy as a whole -  we select
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the skill group which enjoys the lowest average unemployment rate over the period for 
each of the decompositions we apply^^ as the leading sector of the model.
Before we can move to quantifying the part skill mismatch played in driving 
developments in the labour market over recent years, we first need to select reasonable 
values for our two key variables: the elasticity of substitution between the different skill 
inputs and the (absolute value) of the elasticity of a group’s real wage with respect to its 
unemployment rate. We shall then proceed directly to simulating our stylised model of 
the economy given these parameter values.
4.2.1 E s t i m a t i n g  “ cr ” in  t h e  C.E.S. P r o d u c t i o n  F u n c t io n .
Following Burriel-Llombart and Thomas (2001) we can rearrange [3.5] such that we have 
that the relative demand for the second, third and fourth inputs can be written :
=  — \ f k ^ \  [4.1]
and therefore we have that :
In =  -O ’. In —  + cr. In —  [4.2]
w, «1
Now if we assume that relative wages are exogenously determined, then the k  relative 
demand equations in [4.2] can be estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Estimation (or SURE). Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that we can estimate the common 
elasticity o f substitution <7 by assuming that the evolution of relative demand shifts (i.e. 
the quotient of the Of’s ) can be proxied by a linear trend. O f course the assumption that
These leading sectors are the markets for groups 2 (A Level and above; all ages), 4 (Degree; all ages), 8 
(Degree; aged 25 and above) and 15 (Degree; aged 35 to 49 years) respectively for the 2 ,4 , 8 and 16 group
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relative wages are exogenous is far from innocuous. However, if  we are prepared to 
ignore any dynamic effects in [4.1] we can use lagged wages as instruments to 
circumvent this endogeneity problem
The results from estimation of [4.2] are however far from convincing. In practice we 
cannot obtain significant estimates of cr. Previous research in the literature^^ has 
produced a range of alternative estimates of the elasticity of substitution between 
different skill inputs in such a production function as [3.1]. Therefore, given that our 
estimation of the elasticity of substitution in our production function is at best 
inconclusive, and that an elasticity of zero (implying a Leontief technology where inputs 
are not substitutable at all) is implausible, we shall proceed instead by testing the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative values of (J -  which we a half, one and two^^.
4 .2 .2  T h e  E l a s t ic it y  o f  t h e  R e a l  W a g e  w it h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  (O w n  G r o u p -) 
U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a t e .
Krugman’s parable that high European unemployment and high American wage 
inequality are flip sides of the same coin teaches us that the degree of flexibility in the 
labour market is crucial in determining the outcome of any skill biased shift in demand. 
Previous research (see, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)) as to the 
magnitude of the parameter: y  has typically produced estimates that lie in the range: 0.035
to 0.1 (Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999)). In the analysis that follows we shall present 
results from three alternative scenarios: where (real) wages are flexible (/= 0 .1 ) , where
they are not ( y  =0.035), and finally, an intermediate case ( /  =0.07).
4 .3  S im u l a t io n  R e s u l t s
decompositions.
For a comprehensive survey, see Hammermesh (1993).
Nickel! and Bell (1995) argue that since under a Cobb Douglas technology it is impossible to produce 
any output unless one employs a positive quantity of every input, then the elasticity of substitution must 
logically be greater than one because such a state of affairs implausible. Nonetheless, given both our own 
inconclusive results and the lack of consensus in the literature, we experiment with values of O ' both 
above and below one.
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The thing that strikes one most about the results of our simulations presented in Tables 
4.16-4.21 overleaf^* is the extent to which changing the key parameters of our model 
affects the magnitude of the effect of the growth in skill mismatch on the aggregate 
unemployment rate. If we assume that the wage setting function is convex, our results 
suggest that the growth in skill mismatch over the period can explain an average annual 
increase in the unemployment rate of anything from two basis points to a third of a 
percentage point, depending on the number of separate skill groups we define, and the 
particular parameter values we choose. In fact, our results depend both on two key 
issues: whom we should aggregate together as members of the same skill group, and the 
functional form of the wage setting function -  and on the magnitude of two key 
parameters: the elasticity of substitution between different skill inputs in production and 
the elasticity of the wages with respect to the unemployment rate (or the slope of the 
double-log wage setting function). Finally, we have established above that the rate of 
growth of skill mismatch over the period was far from constant, and therefore we shall 
also investigate whether skill mismatch was a more important factor in driving the 
observed changes in the aggregate unemployment rate in either the period when 
mismatch rose sharply (1979-1984) or the period where mismatch stabilised (1985-1996). 
We shall address the role each of these issues plays in shaping our results in turn.
That the growth in skill mismatch between 1979 and 1996 contributed to the rise in the 
unemployment rate over that period seems irrefutable. However, the magnitude of the 
effect of rising skill mismatch on the unemployment rate under the assumption of a 
convex wage setting function appears to vary considerably depending on how we 
measure skill (or equivalently, the number of separate skill groups we identify in the 
labour force). It is certainly the case that when we restrict our attention to qualifications -  
based measures of skill, we find that the finer our definition, the greater the proportion of 
the increase in the aggregate unemployment rate we can explain. Furthermore, when our 
definition of skill is adjusted to differentiate between individuals according to their age as
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well as their qualifications our results are larger still : the growth in mismatch can now 
explain between half to twice the observed rise in unemployment over the period ! 
However, it is not the case that further division of the labour force into yet smaller skill 
groups inevitably leads to a greater aggregate impact. When we turn to our most 
comprehensive decomposition of the labour force into sixteen skill groups, our results are 
now approximately a third to a half of the magnitude of those obtained when we used 
only eight skill groups. Nonetheless, it appears that relying on a solely qualifications 
based measure of skill leads us to underestimate of the role that imbalances in the 
demand for and the supply of different skills in the labour market can play in determining 
the behaviour of aggregate unemployment. In the case of the leading sector model of 
wage setting we find that once again the definition of skill we use matters a great deal in 
terms of the magnitude of our results (although in this case, we find we can explain that 
the role of mismatch in explaining changes in the aggregate unemployment rate is 
smallest when we employ the most comprehensive definition o f skill).
The literature establishes two mechanisms through which an increased imbalance in 
demand and supply can have an influence on the aggregate unemployment rate: where 
the wage setting function is convex, or where there exists a leading sector, which 
determines wages throughout the labour market. Our results suggest that depending on 
the nature of wage setting, rising skill mismatch has quite different aggregate impacts in 
magnitude, if  not direction. Under the assumption of a convex wage setting function, 
mismatch can at best explain an annual increase of a third of a percentage point in the 
unemployment rate between 1979 and 1996; conversely in the case of asymmetric wage 
setting, using the same decomposition of the labour force, the effect of the same increase 
in skill mismatch on the unemployment rate is three times as large (and the largest effect 
we can find is five times as large). Put simply, if there exists a leading sector in the 
economy which determines wages across the labour market for all skill groups then the 
divergence between the relative demand for and supply o f skills can explain a far greater 
proportion of the change in the aggregate unemployment rate over the period. We know
See tables 4 .1 6 -4 .1 8  for a summary of our results under the assumption of convex wage setting; and 
tables 4.19 - 4.21 for the results obtained under the alternative assumption of a leading sector in wage
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that in the asymmetric wage setting model, net shifts in demand toward the skilled have 
the result o f raising the unskilled unemployment rate, whilst leaving the skilled rate 
unchanged, generating a dispersion of the skill-specific unemployment rates solely 
through increases among those groups who had the highest unemployment rates to begin 
with. An analysis of U.K. data on group-specific unemployment rates reveals that this 
story appears to fit the facts quite well (see previous Figures 2.1 [c] and 2.2 [c]) and 
therefore mismatch might well appear to have had a greater role to play within such a 
leading sector model.
It is immediately obvious that the elasticity of substitution in production between the 
different skill inputs plays an important role in determining the role increased mismatch 
can play in explaining the rise in aggregate unemployment between 1979 and 1996. 
However, the relationship between the change in each of the skill-specific unemployment 
rates and the change in mismatch is highly non-linear in the elasticity of substitution. 
Across the period as a whole, the growth in mismatch was greatest where the elasticity of 
substitution in production was lowest which would imply that the impact of mismatch on 
the unemployment rate should also have been greatest in this instance. However, we also 
know that the downward shift in the demand for factor i induced by a decline in the 
employment of factor j  is greatest where the elasticity of substitution is lowest;
therefore, when the elasticity of substitution is low we should expect this 
counterbalancing force to any skill biased shift in demand to be greatest. Typically, in 
the case of convex wage setting model we find that the rise in skill mismatch had the 
greatest effect on the unemployment rate where we assigned the intermediate value (one) 
for the elasticity of substitution. Conversely in the case of asymmetric wage setting, the 
counterbalancing effect dominates, so that mismatch typically plays the greatest role the 
higher the value of the elasticity of substitution. Given that we were unable to identify a 
robust estimate of the elasticity of substitution in our production function at standard 
significance levels we would therefore argue for caution in placing too great a faith in the 
results obtained from any particular choice of elasticity of substitution, at least on the 
basis of the available data.
setting.
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The final parameter of our model : the slope of the double log wage setting function (i.e. 
the elasticity of a group’s wage with respect to its unemployment rate) has an ambiguous 
effect on our results which depends on the nature of the wage setting process. If we 
assume that the wage setting function is convex then as we might expect the more 
inflexible wages are, then the greater the cost is in terms of higher aggregate 
unemployment when a skill biased shock hits the economy. In other words, mismatch has 
a greater role in explaining the rise in aggregate unemployment the lower the value of y  •
Conversely, if we assume that there is a leading sector which determines wage setting 
throughout the labour market, then the more responsive wage setting is to a change in the 
leading skill group’s unemployment rate the greater the proportion o f the rise in the 
aggregate rate that can be explained by increased mismatch. The intuition for this result is 
fairly straightforward -  what matters for the rest of the economy is the wage set by the 
leading sector. The more flexible is the wage setting process in the leading sector, the 
greater the impact of a given fall in the unemployment rate in the leading sector on wages 
there, and therefore the greater the consequential shift in the perfectly inelastic wage 
setting curves of all other skill groups. Therefore the impact of net shifts in demand will 
be magnified where wages are most responsive in the leading sector.
We have established that from the mid 1980’s onwards there was little discernible growth 
in skill mismatch in the U.K. labour market. When we investigate whether mismatch 
played a more decisive role in shaping the path of the aggregate unemployment rate 
before this point we find weak circumstantial evidence in favour of this proposition. In 
particular, when we focus on the more comprehensive definitions of skill we find that 
there was still a marginal growth in skill mismatch over this latter period which should 
have generated a corresponding growth in the unemployment rate; in actual fact, from 
this point onwards the trend in the unemployment rate was downwards as the economy 
emerged from recession. This is no way invalidates our model, it only implies that some 
other cause must explain the improvement in the labour market, namely a relaxation in 
wage pressure or demographic change.
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T h e  I m p a c t  o f  S k il l  M is m a t c h  o n  t h e  A g g r e g a t e  U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a t e  : 
T a b l e  4 .1 6  C o n v e x  W a g e  S e t t in g : 1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 6
Number of 
Skill 
Groups
o ™
Average Annual 
Change in the 
Unemployment 
Rate
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
<J=0.5 <T=1 (7 = 2 a  =0.5 cr= i (7 = 2
X =0.035 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.15 17.6 68.6 101.1
2 Y =0.01 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.11 14.4 51.6 75.7
Y =o.\ 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.09 12.4 42.6 62.0
/  =0.035 0.15 0.04 0.18 0.17 28.4 120.3 118.7
4 Y  =0.07 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.13 22.4 87.9 89.4
7= 0.1 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.11 19.0 71.6 73.4
7=0.035 0.15 0.09 0.33 0.20 64.4 222.6 135.3
8 7= 0 .07 0.15 0.08 0.25 0.17 53.9 172.9 116.4
7= 0 .1 0.15 0.07 0.22 0.15 47.6 146.6 102.1
7=0.035 0.15 0.04 0.30 0.11 23.9 200.8 11.\
16 7= 0 .07 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.11 23.5 120.5 72.4
7= 0.1 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.10 23.2 95.0 68.8
T a b l e  4 .1 7  C o n v e x  W a g e  S e t t in g : 1 979-1984
Number of 
Skill 
Groups
Gamma
Average Annual 
Change in the 
Unemployment 
Rate
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
CT=0.5 <T=1 (7 = 2 cr =0.5 cr= i (7 = 2
7=0.035 1.23 0.10 0.35 0.49 8.2 28.2 39.9
2 7= 0 .07 1.23 0.08 0.26 0.36 6.6 20.9 29.5
7= 0.1 1.23 0.07 0.21 0.29 5.6 17.0 24.0
7=0.035 1.23 0.15 0.60 0.82 12.4 48.8 67.1
4 7= 0 .07 1.23 0.12 0.45 0.62 10.0 36.6 50.4
7=0.1 1.23 0.10 0.37 0.51 8.5 30.2 41.3
7=0.035 1.23 0.24 0.81 0.72 19.4 66.4 59.0
8 7  =0.07 1.23 0.20 0.65 0.61 16.3 53.2 49.4
7= 0.1 1.23 0.18 0.56 0.53 14.4 45.9 43.0
7=0.035 1.23 0.11 0.59 0.32 8.9 47.9 26.3
16 7= 0 .07 1.23 0.11 0.38 0.30 8.7 30.7 24.7
7= 0.1 1.23 0.11 0.31 0.29 8.6 24.9 23.5
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T a b le  4.18 C o n v e x  W a g e  S e t t in g :  1985-1996
Number of 
Skill 
Groups
Gamma
Average Annual 
Change in the 
Unemployment 
Rate
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
(J=0.5 G=\ (J=2 a  =0.5 (7=1 (7=2
X =0.035 -0.30 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 5.1 6.8 -2.3
2 y  =0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 4.2 5.2 -1.7
y=o.\ -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 3.6 4.3 -1.4
y  =0.035 -0.30 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 3.4 0.1 9.6
4 y  =0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 3.2 2.9 9.2
y = & l -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 3.1 3.7 8.4
X =0.035 -0.30 0.03 0.13 0.02 -8.4 -44.3 -6.7
8 y  =0.01 -0.30 0.02 0.10 0.02 -6.7 -32.3 -7.2
y=o.\ -0.30 0.02 0.08 0.02 -5.7 -26.3 -6.7
y  =0.035 -0.30 0.00 0.06 0.03 -1.4 -20.5 -10.9
16 y  =0.01 -0.30 0.00 0.04 0.03 -1.4 -13.2 -10.2
y=o.\ -0.30 0.00 0.03 0.03 -1.4 -10.8 -9.7
T a b l e  4 .1 9  A s y m m e t r ic  W a g e  S e t t in g : 1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 6
Number of Gamma
Average Annual 
Change in the
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
Skill Groups Unemployment
Rate (7=0.5 (7=1 (7= 2 (7=0.5 (7=1 (7=2
y  =0.035 0.15 0.03 0.34 0.45 22.6 232.6 305.8
2 y  =0.01 0.15 0.03 0.34 0.51 22.6 232.7 347.9
y  =0.1 0.15 0.03 0.34 0.54 22.6 232.7 365.0
y  =0.035 0.15 0.06 0.75 0.96 38.8 506.9 649.4
4 y  =0.01 0.15 0.06 0.75 1.11 38.8 507.1 754.9
y  =0.1 0.15 0.06 0.75 1.17 38.8 507.1 795.8
X =0.035 0.15 0.12 1.07 1.36 82.2 724.2 924.7
8 y  =0.01 0.15 0.12 1.07 1.60 82.2 724.5 1084.8
y  =0.1 0.15 0.12 1.07 1.69 82.2 724.6 1145.7
y  =0.035 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.10 22.8 96.3 71.2
16 y  =0.01 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.11 22.8 91.1 76.2
y  =0.1 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.12 22.8 89.5 80.1
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T a b le  4.20 A s y m m e tr ic  W a g e  S e t t in g :  1979-1984
Number of 
Skill 
Groups
Gamma
Average Annual 
Change in the 
Unemployment 
Rate
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
(T=0.5 CT=1 (7 = 2 CT=0.5 <T=1 a  =2
2
/  =0.035 1.23 0.13 0.35 1.59 10.8 28.2 130.1
y= 0 .07 1.23 0.13 0.26 1.81 10.8 20.9 147.7
X=&1 
X =0.035
1.23 0.13 0.21 1.90 10.8 17.0 154.8
4
1.23 0.20 0.60 2.76 16.6 48.8 225.0
X=0.07 1.23 0.20 0.45 3.09 16.6 36.6 252.2
/= 0 .1 1.23 0.20 0.37 3.22 16.6 30.2 262.8
8
X =0.035 1.23 0.30 2.48 2.98 24.6 202.7 242.8
X=0.07 1.23 0.30 2.49 3.40 24.6 203.0 277.4
X=&1 1.23 0.30 2.49 3.56 24.6 203.1 290.5
16
7=0.035 1.23 0.11 0.47 0.32 8.9 38.5 26.0
7= 0 .07 1.23 0.11 0.42 0.33 8.7 34.1 27.2
y  =0.1 1.23 0.11 0.40 0.34 8.6 32.6 28.1
T a b l e  4.21  A s y m m e t r ic  W a g e  S e t t in g : 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 6
Number of 
Skill 
Groups
Gamma
Average Annual 
Change in the 
Unemployment 
1 Rate
Impact of the Change in 
Skill Mismatch Percentage Explained
(7=0.5 <T=1 a  =2 a  =0.5 CT=1 a  =2
7=0.035 -0.30 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 6.4 6.8 -6.6
2 7= 0 .07 -0.30 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 6.4 5.2 -7.6
7=0.1 -0.30 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 6.4 4.3 -7.9
7=0.035 -0.30 -0.01 0.00 0.40 3.3 0.1 -133.3
4 7  =0.07 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.50 3.3 2.9 -164.7
7=0.1 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.53 3.3 3.7 -176.9
7=0.035 -0.30 0.04 0.11 -1.01 -11.7 -36.3 334.4
« 7  =0.07 -0.30 0.04 0.11 -1.08 -11.7 -36.3 356.8
7= 0.1 -0.30 0.04 0.11 -1.10 -11.7 -36.4 365.3
7=0.035 -0.30 0.00 0.02 0.03 -1.4 -6.9 -8.5
16 7  =0.07 -0.30 0.00 0.03 0.03 -1.4 -10.0 -10.3
7= 0.1 -0.30 0.00 0.03 0.04 -1.4 -11.0 -11.6 1
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Shifts in the composition of the labour force over the period towards skill groups with 
lower unemployment rates will also have had an impact on the aggregate unemployment 
rate (given by the final expressions in [3.28] and [3.35]), and we summarize these pure 
demographic contributions to the unemployment rate in Table 4.22 below. As was 
discussed previously, a series of supply shocks have led to an increase in the share of 
older and more qualified workers in the labour force who we know have lower 
unemployment rates. As a result, this has led to a fall in the aggregate unemployment 
rate, o f up to an average of 15 basis points each year, or almost two percentage points 
over the whole period.
T a b l e  4.22 T h e  I m p a c t  o f  D e m o g r a p h ic  C h a n g e .
Number 
of Skill
Average Annual Change in 
the Unemployment Rate
Impact of the Demographic 
Change
Percentage Explained
Groups 79-96 79-84 85-96 79-96 79-84 85-96 79-96 79-84 85-96
2 0.15 1.23 -0.3 ■0.053 -0.04 -0.059 -35.8 -3.3 19.5
4 0.15 1.23 -0.3 -0.118 -0.152 -0.103 -80.5 -12.4 34
8 0.15 1.23 -0.3 -0.141 -0.131 -0.142 -95.9 -10.7 47
16 0.15 1.23 -0.3 -0.142 -0.145 -0.139 -96.3 -11.8 45.9
5 . C o n c l u s io n s
We have argued that previous research into the issue of the labour market consequences 
of any imbalance between the relative demand and supply of different skills has failed to 
take account of the role of labour market experience in determining the level of human 
capital, and therefore skill of members of the workforce. This chapter has re-examined 
the evidence as to whether there has been any discernible growth in the mismatch 
between the demand and supply of different skills in the labour market using this 
alternative definition of skill based on both the level of educational attainment and age of 
individual workers, and in the light of that evidence, the role that increased skill 
mismatch might have played in the rise in the aggregate unemployment rate since 1979. 
We find that on the basis of the ‘outcomes’ measures favoured in the literature there is
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only patchy evidence to suggest that there has been a clearly identifiable growth in the 
imbalance between the demand and supply of separate skills in the economy over the 
period. Nonetheless, we argue that when we focus on a measure of skill mismatch which 
identifies the underlying demand for, and supply of separate skill groups, that at least 
until the mid 1980’s there is good reason to believe that there was a significant growth in 
skill mismatch. Thereafter, the evidence is far less conclusive, as a series of relative 
supply shocks led to a fall in the proportion of young and unqualified workers in the 
economy.
When we focus on the role rising skill mismatch might have played in determining the 
path of the unemployment rate we find that there is clear evidence that between 1979 and 
1996 the growth in skill mismatch contributed to the rise in the aggregate unemployment 
rate. Moreover, we find that in quantitative terms our results are significantly larger than 
those found elsewhere (e.g. Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999)). There are two 
explanations for this disagreement. First, by ignoring that component of skill derived 
through experience at the workplace which we have proxied here by the age of individual 
workers, one can seriously underestimate the role that increased skill mismatch played. 
Second, given the behaviour of the aggregate unemployment rate over the last few 
decades choosing the years over which we estimate the role o f skill mismatch makes a 
big difference. So, if we begin the analysis in the early 1970s when unemployment was 
low and end it in the early 1990’s during recession when the unemployment rate was 
high, it is inevitable that the annual change in the unemployment rate will be large and 
the change implied by rising skill mismatch proportionately small. Furthermore, we also 
find that in quantitative terms, the magnitude of our estimate of the impact of skill 
mismatch is heavily dependent on the particular values we assign to the key parameters 
and structure of our model: namely the degree of substitutability in production of our 
different skill groups and the precise form of the wage setting function.
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A p p e n d ix  1 : T a b l e s
Ta b l e  A .2.1 [a ] : T h e  C o m p o sit io n  o f  th e  L a b o u r  F o r c e
Qualifications Age Groups 
25-34 35-49< O level O level A levelYear Degree <25 > 50
T a b l e  A .2 .1  [b ] T h e  a v e r a g e  W a g e  b y  Q u a l if ic a t io n  a n d  A g e  G r o u p .
Qualifications Age Groups
1 Year < 0  level 0  level A level Degree <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
79 166 183 239 301 146 208 210 181
80 165 186 243 301 147 209 212 181
81 165 185 253 318 146 214 213 188
82 162 183 251 316 141 215 216 187
83 166 188 253 329 145 223 224 199
84 164 192 254 332 138 222 228 211
85 170 188 234 336 139 227 233 213
86 179 185 238 346 138 229 247 212
87 175 200 265 367 149 239 253 222
88 184 204 286 364 154 246 263 224
89 183 211 284 379 155 252 266 239
90 184 214 289 383 153 262 270 240
91 188 216 296 408 157 263 284 246
92 183 204 274 396 149 259 277 239
93 187 213 272 396 146 264 286 250
94 189 208 287 404 142 265 295 258
95 186 207 269 397 137 261 294 245
1 96 189 206 261 391 139 264 287 249
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Ta b l e  A .2.1 [c ]:U n e m p l o y m e n t  Ra t e s  b y  Q u a l if ic a t io n  a n d  A g e  G r o u p .
Qualifications Age Groups
Year
79
< 0  level 0  level A level Degree <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
6.3 3.5 3.2 2.3 7.9 5.6 3.9 4.0
80 9.1 5.8 5.4 3.0 13.2 7.6 5.0 5.6
81 11.9 7.9 7.4 3.8 18.1 9.6 6.0 7.4
82 12.9 8.8 7.5 4.3 18.7 10.5 6.8 7.8
83 14.1 9.4 7.6 4.7 19.4 11.4 7.5 8.2
84 14.8 9.7 7.9 4.5 19.2 11.7 7.8 8.0
85 14.7 9.1 7.9 4.3 17.0 11.6 7.8 7.7
86 14.2 9.2 8.0 4.6 17.4 11.6 7.5 7.7
87 14.9 8.9 7.6 4.2 15.7 12.1 7.8 8.9
88 12.4 7.1 6.2 3.1 12.6 9.5 6.2 8.2
89 10.6 5.8 5.1 2.7 10.1 7.9 5.0 7.0
90 10.3 5.7 5.3 2.6 10.2 7.3 4.9 6.4
91 12.0 7.5 6.4 3.8 13.6 8.8 5.9 7.2
92 12.7 9.0 7.0 4.0 14.4 9.6 6.7 7.7
93 13.6 9.3 7.4 4.5 16.0 9.8 6.9 8.8
94 13.4 8.6 6.7 4.0 14.7 9.2 6.5 8.3
95 11.7 7.8 7.1 3.9 13.9 8.3 6.0 6.8
96 11.5 7.2 6.4 3.8 13.2 7.9 5.7 6.4
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T a b l e  A .2.2 [a] A g e  C om po sitio n  of t h e  La b o u r  f o r c e  b y  Q u a l if ic a t io n
G r o u p
no 0  level Olevel
year <25 25-34 35-49 >50 < 25 25-34 35-49 > 5 0
79 17 19 33 30 38 30 24 8
80 18 19 33 30 39 29 24 8
81 18 19 33 29 40 29 24 8
82 18 18 34 30 35 28 30 7
83 17 18 34 31 31 28 34 7
84 20 18 35 26 29 25 31 15
85 21 18 35 26 31 24 30 14
86 19 18 36 27 35 27 28 10
87 19 18 36 27 34 28 29 10
88 19 19 36 26 32 28 29 10
89 19 20 36 26 29 27 30 13
90 17 21 37 26 28 27 31 14
91 16 21 37 26 27 28 31 14
92 14 21 39 26 25 29 32 14
93 15 22 38 25 23 30 33 15
94 14 21 38 27 22 29 34 15
95 13 22 38 26 21 29 34 16
96 13 21 39 27 21 29 34 16
A level De^p-ee
year <25 25-34 35-49 >50 <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
79 33 31 24 11 10 36 37 17
80 34 31 24 11 10 36 38 17
81 34 32 24 10 10 35 38 17
82 33 31 25 11 10 34 39 17
83 33 31 25 11 9 33 40 18
84 33 32 25 10 10 33 40 17
85 36 30 25 9 10 33 40 16
86 35 31 25 9 10 32 41 17
87 36 30 25 9 11 32 40 17
88 35 31 25 8 10 32 41 16
89 36 30 25 9 10 33 41 16
90 33 31 27 9 10 33 42 16
91 32 33 27 8 9 34 42 16
92 32 30 28 9 9 33 41 16
93 31 32 28 9 9 33 43 16
94 29 33 29 9 9 33 42 16
95 31 32 29 9 9 32 42 17
96 29 31 31 10 9 33 42 17
136
T a b l e  A .2 .2  [b ] A ge  D istribution  of  W a g e s  b y  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p
no 0  level O level
year < 25 25-34 35-49 >50 <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
79 139 179 177 159 137 207 216 212
80 137 176 179 157 141 209 215 223
81 135 178 175 161 138 213 211 222
82 134 181 170 156 131 202 215 215
83 137 183 171 164 134 205 215 213
84 119 182 175 166 134 209 216 220
85 122 188 185 171 137 207 210 214
86 129 191 204 168 127 203 226 218
87 126 196 189 171 144 214 241 226
88 136 193 208 175 143 223 240 235
89 140 197 201 177 144 228 244 241
90 132 199 204 174 139 238 244 247
91 138 195 206 182 146 232 247 239
92 124 199 200 172 135 221 232 221
93 122 205 205 179 133 225 248 232
94 115 197 208 187 132 211 243 227
95 108 209 207 170 120 221 237 224
96 121 194 208 187 120 220 238 216
A level Dej»ree
year < 25 25-34 35-49 >50 1 <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
79 180 255 280 272 198 271 341 342
80 177 254 305 267 207 276 328 348
81 190 256 314 294 212 289 350 364
82 173 259 308 322 197 285 351 358
83 179 266 297 327 200 294 370 365
84 169 273 315 299 215 284 372 392
85 155 264 291 270 211 298 374 395
86 165 264 286 288 211 312 379 405
87 179 269 361 321 230 331 405 429
88 184 311 366 370 1 253 334 400 402
89 181 307 355 414 242 345 413 441
90 182 321 367 336 255 361 407 443
91 183 319 384 326 243 367 452 467
92 177 296 337 338 230 361 446 428
93 165 291 325 385 231 367 438 429
94 151 325 353 368 224 369 451 444
95 156 276 351 340 1 230 353 453 421
96 152 282 322 319 1 220 371 430 412
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T a b l e  A .2 .2  [c] U n em pl o y m e n t  Rates  by A ge g r o u p  b y  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p
no 0  level O level
year < 25 25-34 35-49 >50 <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
2.4279 11.57 7.62 4.73 4.36 4.08 3.93 2.27
80 18.30 10.41 6.08 6.22 8.01 5.50 3.15 3.44
81 24.59 13.24 7.46 8.18 11.52 7.01 3.95 4.43
82 26.30 14.81 8.47 8.56 12.45 8.45 5.47 5.73
83 28.59 16.99 9.72 9.01 13.38 9.60 6.29 6.80
84 27.76 18.09 10.32 8.83 13.59 9.85 6.48 8.21
85 25.41 19.04 10.62 8.66 11.87 9.62 6.50 7.39
86 25.85 17.79 10.27 8.74 12.32 9.55 5.61 6.97
87 24.13 19.98 10.83 10.46 11.51 9.55 5.84 6.88
88 19.88 15.87 8.79 9.44 8.94 7.50 4.53 7.20
89 16.73 13.57 7.48 8.26 7.00 6.49 3.77 6.33
90 17.20 12.75 7.33 7.77 7.44 5.92 3.94 5.28
91 21.71 14.94 8.72 8.50 10.68 8.00 4.96 6.13
92 23.61 16.63 9.50 8.57 12.23 9.44 6.53 8.12
93 24.54 16.80 9.72 9.81 12.83 9.12 6.95 9.26
94 23.86 17.51 9.69 9.83 1 12.70 8.66 6.24 7.97
95 22.32 15.69 8.57 7.38 11.66 7.65 5.82 6.98
96 22.93 14.92 8.69 7.43 1 11.01 7.34 5.24 6.26
A level Degree
year <25 25-34 35-49 >50 <25 25-34 35-49 > 50
79 4.03 3.68 2.03 2.36 3.20 2.77 1.68 1.79
80 7.81 5.35 2.87 3.28 6.15 3.48 2.04 2.47
81 11.41 6.96 3.69 4.26 9.01 4.16 2.37 3.10
82 10.80 7.35 3.92 5.90 9.09 4.64 2.93 3.87
83 10.22 7.72 4.12 7.31 9.16 5.08 3.41 4.52
84 12.72 6.36 4.57 5.25 7.75 5.33 3.19 4.00
85 12.03 6.17 4.91 6.07 7.85 4.56 3.33 3.67
86 11.40 7.40 4.42 6.20 8.96 5.70 3.05 3.65
87 10.20 7.13 4.88 5.63 6.83 4.51 2.93 4.63
88 7.35 5.76 4.55 7.37 5.55 3.60 1.97 3.40
89 6.50 4.58 3.64 5.35 4.25 3.06 1.80 3.46
90 6.95 5.14 3.46 5.14 4.21 2.64 1.83 3.34
91 9.41 5.59 4.03 5.71 8.58 3.76 2.51 4.69
92 8.96 5.82 6.02 6.93 10.84 3.70 2.43 4.79
93 12.01 5.27 5.03 6.77 9.29 4.41 3.18 5.70
94 9.52 5.42 5.18 6.54 8.52 3.69 2.86 5.24
95 10.77 4.68 5.73 7.83 8.98 3.34 2.92 4.87
96 1 8.27 6.17 4.60 6.99 8.93 3.28 2.93 4.11
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T a b l e  A.2.3 : S k i l l  M is m a tc h  : E v id e n c e  f r o m  W a g e s
A.W.M. R.W.M. 1
Year full
2520
simple full simple
79 2359 0.072 0.068
80 2623 2457 0.074 0.070
81 3257 3088 0.089 0.084
82 3572 3367 0.099 0.093
83 4046 3842 0.104 0.099
84 4397 4111 0.111 0.103
85 4387 4154 0.106 0.100
86 4825 4508 0.111 0.104
87 5990 5632 0.128 0.120
88 5656 5386 0.114 0.108
89 6367 6054 0.122 0.116
90 6746 6526 0.124 0.120
91 8066 7696 0.139 0.132
92 8118 7793 0.147 0.141
93 8309 7989 0.142 0.136
94 9524 9166 0.157 0.151
95 9267 8721 0.159 0.149
96 8271 8067 0.141 0.138
T a b l e  A.2.4 : S k il l  M is m a t c h  : E v id e n c e  f r o m  U n e m p l o y m e n t  R a t e s
1 A.U.M. R.U.M.
1 Year full simple full simple
79 7 6 0.275 0.236
80 19 17 0.338 0.304
81 37 33 0.375 0.342
82 38 35 0.353 0.319
83 43 38 0.350 0.310
84 42 37 0.332 0.289
85 37 31 0.312 0.260
86 36 31 0.308 0.260
87 34 27 0.283 0.227
88 23 19 0.288 0.240
89 15 13 0.293 0.243
90 15 13 0.306 0.265
91 21 18 0.289 0.248
92 22 19 0.268 0.224
93 25 22 0.271 0.234
94 24 20 0.300 0.255
95 20 16 0.302 0.248
96 19 16 0.325 0.279
T a b l e  A.4.1 : R e l a t iv e  D e m a n d  F o r  S k il l s  w it h in  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p s
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Relative Demand Index
21 31 41 65 75 85 109 119 129 1413 1513 1613
79 1.52 2.70 2.23 1.18 1.00 0.33 1.34 1.16 0.52 4.81 6.29 2.81
80 1.52 2.82 2.22 1.14 0.98 0.33 1.37 1.31 0.51 4.85 6.19 2.88
81 1.58 2.87 2.31 1.17 1.00 0.33 1.31 1.28 0.51 5.12 6.85 3.08
82 1.60 2.95 2.41 1.30 1.51 0.37 1.45 1.43 0.62 5.47 7.77 3.46
83 1.56 3.06 2.69 1.43 1.91 0.39 1.42 1.37 0.62 5.57 8.43 3.66
84 1.59 3.25 2.34 1.36 1.83 0.92 1.65 1.57 0.58 4.67 7.44 3.42
85 1.45 3.07 2.15 1.20 1.57 0.75 1.54 1.41 0.46 4.71 7.33 3.13
86 1.55 3.65 2.25 1.27 1.52 0.49 1.48 1.31 0.46 4.68 7.46 3.29
87 1.63 3.44 2.28 1.27 1.52 0.50 1.29 1.44 0.46 4.27 6.60 2.89
88 1.51 3.39 2.06 1.40 1.58 0.54 1.52 1.47 0.48 4.13 6.44 2.53
89 1.57 3.09 1.93 1.49 1.84 0.78 1.47 1.43 0.56 4.94 7.53 3.04
90 1.90 3.68 2.19 1.70 1.99 0.91 1.69 1.67 0.51 4.90 7.09 2.90
91 1.96 4.06 2.50 1.71 2.11 0.90 1.87 1.92 0.49 5.96 9.30 3.47
92 2.65 5.47 3.13 1.92 2.30 0.98 1.63 1.69 0.56 6.15 9.48 3.51
93 2.60 4.94 2.86 2.27 2.82 1.18 1.95 1.89 0.71 6.39 10.12 3.61
94 2.84 5.78 3.68 2.24 3.10 1.27 2.51 2.38 0.77 6.70 10.42 3.91
95 3.55 6.48 3.75 2.68 3.46 1.51 1.96 2.24 0.65 6.16 10.40 3.69
96 2.92 6.07 3.92 2.67 3.52 1.46 2.02 2.33 0.70 6.75 10.08 3.79
T a b l e  A .4 .2 : R e l a t iv e  S u p p l y  o f  S k il l s  W it h in  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p s
Relative Supply Index |
21 31 41 65 75 85 109 119 129 1413 1513 1613
79 1.13 1.96 1.79 0.78 0.62 0.21 0.94 0.73 0.34 3.50 3.60 1.61
80 1.08 1.88 1.69 0.75 0.61 0.20 0.94 0.72 0.32 3.53 3.74 1.65
81 1.04 1.81 1.59 0.72 0.61 0.19 0.93 0.71 0.30 3.57 3.87 1.69
82 1.02 1.86 1.67 0.81 0.86 0.21 0.93 0.74 0.32 3.59 4.08 1.80
83 1.01 1.94 1.77 0.90 1.10 0.23 0.93 0.77 0.33 3.61 4.28 1.90
84 0.92 1.78 1.33 0.84 1.05 0.53 0.96 0.77 0.30 3.45 4.09 1.80
85 0.87 1.69 1.25 0.77 0.97 0.46 0.85 0.70 0.25 3.22 3.94 1.60
86 0.94 1.90 1.40 0.77 0.79 0.27 0.89 0.70 0.25 3.06 3.90 1.62
87 0.99 1.96 1.43 0.83 0.85 0.30 0.83 0.67 0.24 2.90 3.60 1.52
88 1.01 1.94 1.41 0.88 0.90 0.32 0.88 0.72 0.24 3.07 3.93 1.56
89 1.07 1.93 1.38 0.93 1.05 0.46 0.85 0.71 0.24 3.42 4.30 1.66
90 1.20 2.13 1.50 0.98 1.10 0.50 0.94 0.80 0.27 3.41 4.34 1.66
91 1.28 2.33 1.62 1.04 1.17 0.52 1.03 0.86 0.27 3.76 4.69 1.74
92 1.52 2.86 1.89 1.13 1.25 0.57 0.94 0.86 0.29 3.63 4.47 1.77
93 1.41 2.46 1.64 1.28 1.41 0.65 1.03 0.89 0.29 3.82 5.00 1.87
94 1.53 2.70 1.92 1.34 1.57 0.70 1.12 0.97 0.31 3.87 4.87 1.91
95 1.69 2.87 2.00 1.39 1.64 0.77 1.04 0.94 0.29 3.77 4.95 1.93
96 1.66 2.99 2.11 1.40 1.67 0.77 1.06 1.06 0.33 3.77 4.84 1.92
T a b l e  A .4 .3  : M is m a t c h  o f  S k il l s  W it h in  Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p s
Mismatch Index
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21 31 41 65 75 85 109 119 129 1413 1513 1613 1
79 0.30 0.32 0.22 7.13 8.02 7.72 2.02 2.33 2.24 1.71 2.24 2.25
80 0.34 0.40 0.27 3.80 4.16 4.37 2.01 2.57 2.21 1.58 1.92 2.02
81 0.42 0.46 0.37 3.63 3.73 3.99 1.69 2.16 2.02 1.57 1.89 1.94
82 0.45 0.46 0.37 4.11 4.73 4.72 1.99 2.46 2.52 1.71 2.08 2.10
83 0.44 0.46 0.42 3.67 4.15 4.07 1.86 2.15 2.28 1.70 2.10 2.06
84 0.55 0.60 0.57 2.61 2.85 2.84 2.02 2.32 2.21 1.36 1.71 1.76
85 0.51 0.60 0.54 2.52 2.70 2.73 2.47 2.75 2.54 1.50 1.82 1.89
86 0.50 0.65 0.47 4.34 5.33 4.99 2.19 2.45 2.43 1.60 1.92 2.01
87 0.49 0.57 0.47 2.50 3.05 2.79 1.86 2.47 2.23 1.48 1.75 1.80
88 0.40 0.56 0.37 3.64 4.24 3.96 2.21 2.60 2.56 1.38 1.63 1.62
89 0.38 0.47 0.33 4.29 4.98 4.69 2.47 2.89 3.25 1.53 1.81 1.88
90 0.46 0.54 0.38 4.36 4.64 4.63 2.34 2.70 2.45 1.45 1.61 1.70
91 0.43 0.56 0.43 3.65 4.15 3.91 2.38 2.85 2.43 1.64 1.95 1.96
92 0.56 0.65 0.50 3.39 3.75 3.46 2.04 2.28 2.26 1.68 1.97 1.89
93 0.61 0.70 0.56 3.54 4.06 3.67 2.41 2.66 3.00 1.63 1.86 1.80
94 0.62 0.76 0.65 2.91 3.53 3.21 2.83 3.02 3.08 1.65 1.89 1.85
95 0.74 0.81 0.63 3.81 4.19 3.90 2.25 2.70 2.59 1.54 1.81 1.71
96 0.57 0.71 0.62 5.73 6.46 5.69 2.59 2.96 2.87 1.76 1.96 1.89
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A p p e n d ix  2 : A  C l a ssific a t io n  of  U .K . Q u a l if ic a t io n s
Any classification of individuals into separate ranked skill groups according to the 
academic qualifications that they hold clearly involves an implicit ranking of all the 
different qualifications one can obtain in the UK educational system. However, such a 
ranking is not straightforward -  a cursory look at the data reveals the extent of the range 
in the type and level of academic and vocational qualifications held by different members 
of the workforce (leaving aside any discussion of whether the nature of the qualifications 
themselves have changed over time -  for example, the accusation is consistently made 
that the standards required to achieve a particular grade in G.C.S.E. examinations have 
been consistently reduced). At any one time it may be straightforward to rank the 
different qualifications that a given cohort can obtain according to their level of 
complexity or the attractiveness of the skills they signal to potential employers. However, 
the educational system has been in a state of almost permanent revolution, where frequent 
educational reforms have ensured that successive generations of students enter the labour 
force holding different kinds of qualification (or perhaps more cynically, similar 
qualifications with different names). Of course individuals will often hold a number of 
different qualifications but they are usually ranked according to their highest level of 
achievement (which typically, but not always, will be the last qualification they achieve 
before entering the labour market).
Although there is no absolute standard for the ranking of qualifications, the majority of 
the literature which has drawn on educational data has tended to follow an approach 
similar to that adopted here, which is taken from Burriel-Llombart (2001). Effectively, 
we identify four separate qualification groups -  those with no qualifications whatsoever 
or qualifications less than the standard of an 0  level; those holding O Levels (or their 
vocational equivalent); those with a Further Education qualification: an A Level or its 
vocational equivalent; and finally those with a qualification obtained from a Higher 
Education institution: a degree or its vocational equivalent. For the sake of clarity, we 
shall briefly outline this classification system overleaf -  however, a more comprehensive 
description of this kind of ranking system of the various academic and vocational
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qualifications that exist among the U.K. labour force can be found for example in 
Dearden et. al. (2000)^^.
A  C l a s s if ic a t io n  o f  U .K . Q u a l if ic a t io n s ;
Q u a l if ic a t io n  G r o u p Q u a l if ic a t io n s
L e ss  t h a n  O  L e v e l
V o c a t io n a l  : NVQ level 1, GNVQ foundation level, 
SCOTVEC modules, YT/YTP certificates, RSA other. 
City and Guilds ‘other’, BTEC/SCOTVEC general 
certificate.
A c a d e m ic  : CSE below grade 1, GCSE below grade C.
O  L e v e l
V o c a t i o n a l  : NVQ level 2, GNVQ intermediate level, 
RSA diploma. City and Guilds Advanced and Craft level, 
BTEC/SCOTVEC general diploma and completed 
apprenticeship.
A c a d e m ic  : 0  Level, CSE grade 1, GCSE grade A to C.
A  L e v e l
V o c a t io n a l  : NVQ level 3, GNVQ advanced level, 
RSA advanced diploma, ONC, OND, BTEC/SCOTVEC 
national level.
A c a d e m ic  : A Level, AS Level, Scottish 6^  ^year 
Certificate, SCE higher level.
D e g r e e
V o c a t io n a l  : Nursing qualifications, NVQ level 4 -5 , 
GNVQ advanced level, RSA higher diploma, HNC, 
HND, BTEC/SCOTVEC higher level.
A c a d e m ic  : Graduate and Undergraduate Degree, all 
teaching qualifications.
In fact, Dearden et. al. (2000) identify five separate qualification groups (rather than the four used here) 
since they sub-divide the highest qualification group into those holding degrees and those holding diplomas
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A p pe n d ix  3 : D er iv a t io n  o f  the  R esu l ts  in  M a in  C h a p t e r
Consider the following C.E.S. production function:
Y = A [Al]
The marginal product of the input is defined as follows:
dY  1
dN, p
dY
dN,
[A3]
If we assume perfectly competitive factor markets, and profit maximisation on the part of 
firms:
Wj = a ^ . A ^ .
f  Y
[A4]
or in terms of the elasticity of substitution:
=a^.A
(7-1/
[A5]
or rearranging:
and other Higher Education qualifications below degree level.
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= w .^A
l-CT/ f N , ) ‘
[A6]
Therefore if the relative wage of the first and second skill inputs is defined as follows:
V ,
[A7]
which when we rearrange gives us
« 2  ^ 2
[A8]
Now from [A5] taking logs we have;
InWi = \na^+  p \n A -\-{ i-  p ) \n Y  p)\nN^ [A9]
Now from [Al] we have that :
In y  = In ^  + T ln (a , + « , # / +  a , iV /  ) [AlO]
(1 -  p ) \n Y  = (1 -  p ) \n A  +
[A ll]
SO substituting back into [A9] we have that :
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In Wj = Incfi + \n A - ( l  -  p)ln +
+ a ^ N / + a ,N /  + a , N / )  [A12]
Now adding and subtracting terms in the total labour force and the labour force of the 
particular group we have :
InWj = Inûfj + h \A —(l — p)lnA^j + (l — p)lnZj — (l — yo)lnXj + (l — /?)lnZ/ —
(l -  p )ln l+ fi^ ln (a ,A T ,'’ + a , N /  + a , N /  + a , N / )  [A13]
=> In Wi = Inaj +lny4 -  (l -  />)ln(l-  Wj)- (l -  p)\nl^ -  (l -  p )ln L  +
+ a ^ N /)  [A14]
Now if we take the log of the labour demand function for the second group from that of 
the first we have:
In Wj — In Wj = In —-— (l — p)ln —— (l — p)(ln(l ln(l — Uj )) [A 15]
^2 4
and taking the total differential of this expression we have:
In Wj — In W2 — d\m —-— (l — p ^  In——
0C2 Ij
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(l — ln(l ~ u ^  — d  ln(l — Uj )) [A16]
Now for small values of X  the approximation ln(l + %) «  % is reasonable, so we can 
rewrite [A 15] as follows:
cc IIn Wj — d \r i W2 ~  In —-— (l — pX? In — + (l — — d u 2 ) [A 17]
or alternatively in terms of the elasticity of substitution:
In Wj — d]n W2 — d\v\. — ------ d\vi—-\—  {du^  — du,2 )
«2 cr li cy
[A18]
Consider the following rearrangement of the final term in [A 13]:
ln(p^#i  ^+ a2^^2 + + «4A^ 4^ )=
In [ - 1 - 1Y 1 r t > t , 2 - t T 2  ■
J)
[A19]
= p.ln(iV“W /W 3“W / ‘ )+ ln [A20]
= p.(pCx InA^ j 4 - «2 In A2 + (^ 2, kiA^ 3 + In#4)+ In
v H y
[A21]
[A22]
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and n={N ,‘‘'N,‘‘^ N,“=N“')’ [A23]
Therefore substituting into [A 13] we have :
In Wj — In df J + In —(l — p)ln(l — Wj )—(l — /?)ln /j — (l — /?)ln JL +
(l -  p ).a ^. In A^4 + —— —  In^ ^
vH y
[A24]
Now if we add and subtract terms in the labour force of each skill input we have:
Inw, =\na^ + ln^-(l-p)ln(l-w ,)~(l-yc>)ln/i - ( l - p ) ln Z  +
(l -  p).ai.ln(l -  Mi) + (l -  p).(%2.1n(l -  ^ 2)+(l “ p).«3.1n(l -  u ^ +
( l - p )(1 — p^eCZ .^ln l^ — ^ 4)4 In — + (1 — p).dfj. In +
vH y
(1 — p).tZ2. In i>2 + (1 — p).6Zg. In Z3 + (1 ~ p)*^4 • [A25]
Now given that :
— (1 — p).ln/j — —(1 — p)(df| + 0^ 2 “f ^ 3 "f <3^4 )ln/^ [A26]
and :
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[A27]
we can rewrite [A 18] as follows:
=> In Wj — In #j + in —(1 — p)(l ~ cc^  )ln(l — ) + (l — /?).#2 • ln(l ~ 2^ ) +
(1 — p ) . # 3 .1 n ( l  — M3)  +  (1 — p ) .# 4 .1 n ( l  — M^)^- —— ^ ^ I n
V A
v n y
+
(1 — p).#2. In— + (1 — p).#3. In + (1 — p)*#4 • In—
A A A
[A28]
The total differential of this labour demand fiinction is thus
— p).#2 ln(l — M2 )+(1 p)-#3 -d ln(l — M3 )+
-  p).#4 .d ln(l -  M4 ) + (1 -  p). ln(l -  Ml ).d#, +
— p).ln(l — u^.doc2 + (1 ~ p).ln(l — u^-dcc^ +
— p).ln(l — u^dcc^ + (1 — p).#2 In — + (1 — p).#3.(f In — +
A A
-  p).#4.J in— + ——— d \ r i —  
A p  I n j
[A29]
Now if the wage setting curve is of the form :
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Inw. =z^-y\nu^ [A30]
then the total differential of the double logarithmic wage setting curve for the first input 
is :
[A31]
Substituting [A31] into [A29] we have:
t/Zj —— du^ = c?Inûfj -\-d\nA —{\ — — û f j ln(l — Wj) +
U\
(l — ln(l — Wj ) ^ " (l ~ p)‘^ 3 ki(l “ W3 )+
(1 -  p).a^.d  ln(l -  W4) + (1 -  p).ln(l -  w, ).da^ + 
(1 — In^l — u^ .^doCj "b (1 “  /)). ln(l — u^.dct^ +
(1 — /?).ln(l — u^.doc^ + (1 — p^cCj-d In — + (l — p -^oc .^d In — +
h h
(1 -  p).a^ .d \n — + ——— d  Inf—
h p  V nJ
[A32]
Evaluating the final term in this expression, we know that
n j  p  U
d —
J I n J
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=  ( i - p ) f  HY n Æ - £ Æ [
P  U J l  n'
( i - p ) r Æ
[A33]
Therefore differentiating and collecting terms we have :
(l -  p).(s -  ,(l -  t/j y  )  ^ y du^  ~dz^ -d h ).A -d \x ia ^  -
(l — ‘dXxi—— (l — .t/ln — (l — .Û? In — +
h
I . P
da^ +
S.p ' £.p ^
(1 - p)(ln/,.p.£ - I (1 -  p )« i.( s - (1 - K,y ^ 
S.p “ S./, ‘
(1 -  p).a^  .(S -  (1 -  «2 f  2^ ^  I -^3^)
S.L 2./,
dl  ^ +
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(i -  p ) .a 4.(n -  (i -  u ^ y  .1 / )dL [A34]
Now since
[A35]
then
J a ,  + X<%2 +  da ^  + d a ^  =  0 [A36]
(l -  y9).p.I.ln/^ 
p . I
(d a ^ + d a 2 +  da^  + d a ^ )  = 0 [A37]
Furthermore
a^d Ina  ^+ a2d Inaj + a^d]na^ + \na^ = 0
(l -  «2 “ 0^3 “ VInaj + «2^ I^n«2 + oc^ dln% + Ina  ^=0
[A38]
[A39]
=> X ln a j =  - a 2X ln — - « 3^ 111— - « 4^ /111—
a , or,
Therefore, we can simplify as
[A40]
o
(l — Wj ) .I  wly (l — U2 ) .I y
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(l — W3 ).z
du^ —
dz^  -dXnA + aj-dXnMM^x +a^.d\nMM^^ +a^.d]nMM^^ -
6 — + N /.da ,+ N f.da , + N /J a ,)
p .li
+
f i— + N 2.da2 + N /.d o 2  + N /.d a 4 )+
p!L
^  I I  4 ;
d lj +
[dL [A41]
where we denote :
O j -  (1 -  p ) .( s  -  .{X - u ^ ) [A42]
and:
OC • I ■
In Â /A ^  J =  I n —— — (1 — / ) ) . ( /  In — V j
a . I
[A43]
Now from [A 14] the demand function for the second input is
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In ^ 2 — In + In ^ —(l — /?)ln(l — — p ) ln  /, — (l — /)) ln  L +
+ a , 7 / /  +  a ^ N f )  [A44]
or writing in terms of labour demand for the first input:
InW2 = InWi - Inaj + ln(%2 + ( l -  p)ln(l -  w,)-
(1 -  p )ln (l -  ^2 ) "  ^  [A45]
and therefore substituting [A28] into [A45] :
In Wj = In 0^ 2 + In ^  + (1 — p)(l — cUj )ln(l — Wj ) — (l — /?)(l — 0C2 )ln(l ~ u ^  +
(1 — . ln(l — ^3)+ (1 “  /?).6% .^ln(l — ^4)+ - — ^^In —  +  
v n j
(1 — p^.{pc2 “  l)- In — + (1 — f^.OL .^ In — + (1 — . In — [A46]
Thus from [A29] the total differential of this demand function is: 
Jlnw2 = d \n a 2 + d \n A - { } .-  p )^ -a ^ d \n ^ } .-u ^ -
{Y — p).(l — CC2 \ d  ln(l — W2 ) "f (1 ~ /?).(%3 .d ln(l — M3 ) + 
(1 — .d ln(l — M4 ) + (1 — p). ln(l — Mj ^ .dcc^  +
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(l — — U2^.dcc2 + (l — +
( l — p ) . ln ( l  — u^ .dcc^  +  (l — p).c^2-ln— +  (l — . In — +
h h
(l -  p).a^.\n— + 6 — ^ d \R
h P n
[A47]
Now, substituting the total differential of the wage setting function [A31] into [A47] we 
have, after collecting terms:
+  —  
Wo
du^ = d z 2 - d \ n A -  d \ n a 2 -
(1 — p\{^2 ~ l)-<^In — — (1 — p).(X2-dIn — — (1 — p).0Cj^ .d In-^ 4-
{ l -  p ) .a y ly ^ .{ l -u ^ y   ^ (l-/)).(%3 7 / . ( l - W 2 y  ^
S .(l-W i) ' 1.(1-W 3) '
(1 -  p).a^ .ly  i i  -  uy_  ^ (1 -  p).i}n .p .I  -  )
E.(1-W 4) X.p
doc  ^ +
( l - p ) . ( l n / , A S - V / ) ^^. , ( l - p ) . ( ln / , .p .Z - A r 3^ )^^ . ^  
S .p  '  '
0  ~  p)-(ln A ~  ^ 4  ^ I (1 -  p ).a , .(z -  (1 -  W; y )
S .p Si,
c//j +
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Now from [A40]:
d \ n a 2 = -oc^d In —  -  « 3^  In —  -  a^d  In —  [A49]
«2 <%2 «2
=> < iln a 2 In^Zg +  [A50]
{a ^ + a j  + « 4 ^  l n a 2 
= > d ln a 2  = - a ^ d ln a i  - a ^ d ln a ^  - a ^ d ln a ^  + ( l - a 2) ^ l n a 2 [A51]
Now given [A3 5]:
: . ( l - a ^ - a 2 ~ a ^ - a ^ ) d ] n a ^ = 0  [A52]
d  In CC2 — ~(^2id In —-—  cc^d In —— + (l — 0C2 ^ d In —— [A53]
and therefore, given [A37], we can rewrite [A48], after simplification as :
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V J
® 2  , Ï+
(l — IÀ2 ) z  u
du2 —
2 7
( l -  p ) .a ^ . l / . ( ] . -u ^ y  
(1 — W3 ).Z du2 ~
du^ —
dz2 ~ d \n A  + {a2 ~ \).d + ^ 3-  ^InA/Mgj + «4. /^ hiMM^^ -
Û— ^(A r,'’^ a ,  + N ^^d a ^+ N ^'’J a , + N / d a )  
p 'L
+
VV 7 V
dU +
h 7
lA /  
+
I f )
dL [A54]
where
^2 -  (1 “  P ) ( ^  ~  “  ^2)^) [A55]
So we have an equation like [A55] for each of the terms di4. which all contain a term in 
the change in the unemployment rates of the other labour inputs, which gives us a classic 
system of equations, which if we define the matrix 0  :
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0 =
0 1
_ y_ _
(l -  Wj )z  Wj (l -  «2 (l -  «2 (l -  ) l
-A . -A - ; i
1
( l - “l
- À
(l-M,
— À
( l - « j
0  _  ~^3
(l-M ^)^ «2 (l-M g)z
- / I
‘2-
-1
-A .
r - V
-Â . 04 + 7
(l- 1/3)1 M4 y
[A56]
where we define :
4  -  (1 ~
then we describe this system of equations as follows:
[A57]
0.
 ^d u ^ r i )
dUr^ dz^ 1 1
= 2 d ln A -dU'^ dz^ 1 1
j J lij
Y +
/  _  A«2 «3 « 4
0^2 ~ 1 «3 « 4
.dlnM M ^^  + .dlnMM^^ +
«2 21 (%3 — 1 31 « 4
V 2^ > < ^3 V
.d In M M
41 [A58]
where
T  =
1 r ( i
1
Jy
p.Z
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4 ^
1
1
viy
w
\  r  
.dl^ +
I
Æ2 +
.dL [A59]
then if we assume that the matrix © is nonsingular, we can rewrite [A59] as
^ d u ^  ^ ^ d z ^ ^ r r
d u 2 = 0"^ d z 2 - 0  ^ 1 d \ n A - ( d  ^ 1 T +
d u ^ d z ^ 1 1
j j w
«2 «3 «4
0 "^ (%2 ~ 1 .dXnMM^^ +0 ^ «3 .dXnMM^^ +0 ^ «4
«2 21 (%3 — 1 31 «4
< 2^ /  ^ ^3 V ^«4 -  ly
.d lnM M ^^  [A60]
Now we know that the aggregate unemployment rate u  is a weighted average of the 
unemployment rates of the separate labour inputs, i.e. :
W=/j.Wj + / 2.W2 + / 3.W3 + /4.M4
du = l^ .du^  + 2^.^ 2^ l '^du^  + L-du^ + 
dl^ .u  ^ +  dL  .U2 +  dL .u  ^ +  dL
[A61]
[A62]
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Therefore, if  we define the matrix H as
k-iE = (/, /, I, Z j0 - 
Then from [A60] we have that :
[A63]
du = S,
f ' l r  1  ^ «3dZr. 1 1 — 1 a .L d \n A - 'E . 'P + S. 2 .dlnM M ^^ + S. 3 .d XnMM^^
dz^ 1 1 «2 21 0^3 — 1 31
J ; J / < 2^ ; < ^3 ;
r «4 1 4^ ^
«4
.i/lnMM^^+(«1 «2 3^ “4)
di.
«4 dl^
<^4 -
[A64]
Now, if alternatively there is a leading sector, so that all wages in the economy are set 
subject to conditions in one sector, say for example the market for input 4, then the 
generic wage setting function is of the form :
Inw. = z . - y \ R u ^
then the total differential of this asymmetric wage setting function is
[A65]
YJlnw. = d z , du,
' u r '
[A66]
Therefore, we now have to rewrite [A41] as
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du^  —
(l — U2 ).Z
du2 ~
(1 - p).a^.1/ . ( 1  - W 3 y  (1 - p ) . a ^ . ( l- u ^
v “ 4
du^ =
d z^ -d \n A  + a2-d\nMM21 + a ^ d I11MM3, + a^.dInMM^^ -
Ü— ^ (iV ,'’.rfa, +N^'’A a ^ + N f d a ,  + N f d a ) +  
p .S  
^ ^ { N f d a ,  + N { d a ^ + N ^ '’J a ,+ N ^ '’J a ) +
p l i
I
\  r 
dl  ^+
W "I J
dl2 +
J
Æ [A67]
Therefore we can define the matrix Q  :
161
n  =
0 ,
A
-A - 1 A
(l — Wj jis (l — 2^ “  Wg
0 , —
4
r
4
(l-M ^)l (l -  «2 )^  (l -  Wg ) s  “4 (1 - 1/4 ) s
-A . 03 r  ^4
-A .
(i-M4)z  
^ 4
U V~^ÜJ^y
4
7 +
[A68]
so that our set of equations is now :
a
'  d z ^ f ù ri^
du^ dz^ 1 1
d \n A -
du^ dz^ 1 1
Jv
T  +
«2 «3 «4
«2 ~ 1 «3 «4.dlnM M ^^ + .d lnM M .^ +
«2 21 CC3 — 1 31 «4
< 2^ ; < ^3 ; v^4 -
.d \nM M
41
[A69]
then if we assume that the matrix Q  is nonsingular, we can rewrite [A69] as
r r m
J «2 = Q "^ 1 r f l n ^ - n  ' 1
du^ dz^ 1 1
Jy J y
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Q-1
\  J
-1
^ «3 ^
«3
0^3—1 dXrvMM^^ + Q
-1 a.
V 3^ y
a.
-1
.dXrvMM^^ [A70]
Therefore, if  we define the matrix F  as :
r= (/, k h /4>o-'
Then from [A62] and [A71] we have that
[A71]
du = F.
 ^d z ^ 'A r  « 3 1
dz^ 1 1 0^2 — 1 «32 - Y . d \n A - Y . Ÿ + r . .dXnMM^^ + F. .d\nMM_^ +
^ 3 1 1 «2 21 (%3 — 1 31
\ d z ^ j J ; I  (^ 2 V < ^3 y
r. a .
a.
(dl,
dl^
dl-^
[A72]
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C h a p t e r  4
‘T h e  C h r o n ic ’ -  A n  A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  D e g r e e  o f  
C o n c e n t r a t io n  in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  
C l a im a n t  U n e m p l o y m e n t  A c r o s s  M e n
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
The unemployment rate is defined as the fraction of the labour force who are out of work 
and claiming benefit, or seeking employment (depending on one’s definition) on any 
given day. A time series of the unemployment rate tells us how the aggregate incidence 
of unemployment has varied over time. However, time series data on the rate cannot tell 
us how that unemployment is distributed over time -  whether it is the same people who 
are unemployed day after day, or whether each day the stock flows out of unemployment 
to be replaced by a new inflow. In order to answer this question we need to look beyond 
the aggregate unemployment rate and focus on the long run distribution of unemployment 
at the micro level, and that is the focus of this chapter.
We know that experiences of unemployment vary. For some, the experience is short 
lived, as they rapidly exit unemployment and return to work. However, for others -  the 
long term unemployed -  that spell of unemployment may last months, or even years. Yet, 
many of those who exit unemployment at a given point in time, perhaps after only a brief 
spell, will also flow back within a short space of time. Thus, over the course of a number 
o f spells separated only by ephemeral interludes of employment or inactivity, these 
individuals -  the recurrent unemployed -  may also spend a considerable fraction of any 
given period unemployed. Focusing only on the duration of particular spells of 
unemployment suffered by individual can therefore obscure the true incidence of 
unemployment among the population. To get a clearer picture of the extent of this
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accumulated exposure to unemployment -  or what we define here as chronic 
unemployment -  we need a wider perspective on outcomes in the labour market.
We might well ask what extra information do we gain from focusing on individuals’ 
accumulated experiences of unemployment over and above observing the length o f the 
current spell, or put another way, does a past history of unemployment matter ? We argue 
there are (at least) three reasons why chronic unemployment matters: because the 
existence of a rump of chronically unemployed individuals upon whom experience of 
unemployment is heavily concentrated may help us understand the relationship between 
wage setting and the unemployment rate at the aggregate level; because if past spells of 
unemployment cause (or extend) future spells then recurrent unemployment may help 
explain the persistence of outcomes at the individual level and unemployment at the 
aggregate level; and because chronic exposure to unemployment is likely to be heavily 
correlated with the incidence of poverty. In order to motivate this chapter we shall briefly 
outline each of these arguments below.
The causes and consequences of long term spells of unemployment have received a great 
deal of attention in the literature"^  ^ in recent years. From the macroeconomic perspective, 
it has been argued^^ that the growth in long term unemployment across Europe through 
the late 1970’s and 1980’s offers an explanation for the sustained rise in the aggregate 
unemployment rate suffered there over the period. The long term unemployed appear 
particularly ineffective at filling vacancies, and therefore provide little restraint on wage 
behaviour -  since those in jobs know that if the firm wants to replace them, there are few 
adequate substitutes in the unemployment pool. The shift in the Beveridge curve over the 
period is usually taken as strong corroborative evidence of this persistence mechanism -  
as the search intensity of the unemployed is said to have fallen with the rise in the 
average duration of unemployment. However, there is a growing realisation that the rise 
in long term unemployment is insufficient both in theory and in practice to explain the
^°For example, for a survey of the existing research see Machin and Manning (1999). 
See Layard at. al. (1991).
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hysteresis in European unemployment rates"*^ ,^ and therefore high unemployment should 
restrain wage growth, even if that unemployment is predominantly long term in nature. 
O f course, once we accept that individuals vary in their probability of being unemployed, 
the aggregate unemployment rate may cease to be an accurate signal of the 
unemployment risk faced by wage setters. The least skilled members of the labour force 
are always going to be the most likely to both become and remain unemployed, and for a 
given aggregate unemployment rate, the less evenly that unemployment is spread across 
the population, the lower the probability that insiders will suffer any significant 
experience of unemployment. In other words, in order to understand how wage setters 
respond to the incidence of unemployment in the labour market we need to appreciate 
how that unemployment is distributed across the labour force, as well as just the level.
Blanchard outlines a particular form of this hypothesis: since unemployment is 
concentrated amongst the young, then even though adult wage setters are at risk of 
becoming unemployed they are certainly not at risk of becoming young -  and therefore, 
they are not at risk of becoming chronically unemployed. Consequently, wage setters pay 
little regard to a high unemployment rate where it is driven by chronic youth 
unemployment, and so high unemployment will fail to control wage pressure. For this 
reason, understanding not only how much unemployment is concentrated among the few, 
but also whom it is concentrated on, may prove insightful in understanding the link 
between wage setting and the incidence of unemployment.
It often argued that there is duration dependence in unemployment -  the longer a spell of 
unemployment lasts, the smaller the chance that a given individual will escape -  as his 
level of motivation, human capital and even psychological well-being are eroded through 
exclusion from work. It seems plausible that any “scarring effect” of unemployment 
might not be instantly cleansed upon exit from unemployment (that any erosion of human 
capital is not instantly reversed); instead this damage to the individual may persist - and
The evidence suggests that the mechanism does not appear to be quantitatively powerful enough to 
explain the degree of persistence we observe in the evolution of unemployment rates across countries, and 
in any case, the existence of long term unemployment should still moderate wage behaviour on the part of 
insiders, because one day it may be them who are long term unemployed (Blanchard (2000)).
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past experiences of unemployment will continue to have an impact on current outcomes 
through so called lagged duration dependence effects^^. The existence o f significant 
lagged duration dependence effects would generate a further powerful persistence 
mechanism to that described above -  not only would it be the case that those in jobs are 
unlikely ever to suffer much unemployment (and pay little heed to a high aggregate 
unemployment rate, driven by high durations of those unfortunate enough to suffer it) but 
moreover, those out of jobs who have suffered prolonged exposure to unemployment in 
the past will over time search less effectively, and provide an ever weaker restraint on 
wages. We return to investigate this issue in greater depth in Chapter 5.
There is also a growing literature' '^  ^which suggests that recurrent unemployment is part of 
a wider phenomenon -  the “low pay -  no pay” cycle -  where individuals are trapped in a 
cycle of poverty pay and unemployment -  a fact observed thirty years ago by Robert 
Hall:
“Changing from one low-paying, unpleasant job to another, often several 
times a year, is the typical pattern of some workers. The resulting 
unemployment can hardly be said to be the outcome of a normal process 
of career advancement. The true problem of hard-core unemployment is 
that certain members of the labor force account for a disproportionate 
share of unemployment because they drift from one unsatisfactory job to 
another, spending the time between jobs either unemployed or out of the 
labor force. (Hall (1970) p.389)”
The welfare implications of this “low pay -  no pay” cycle are clear. Repeated exposure to 
unemployment may not be of great concern if between spells, individuals are earning 
very high wages, which in some sense compensate them for the insecurity of their work. 
However, if  it is the case that even when the recurrent unemployed do find work, their 
earnings are very low, then these individuals may spend a considerable period of time on.
For an excellent exposition of this concept see Heckman and Borjas (1980). 
See, for example, Dickens et. al.(2000) and Stewart (2000).
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or below, the poverty line'^ .^ If lagged duration dependence effects are significant -  so 
past spells of unemployment erode individual’s employability and/or productivity, then 
this process becomes a vicious cycle -  each successive spell of unemployment further 
reduces the individual’s ability to escape by making them less and less attractive to 
employers offering anything other than poverty pay.
We have argued then that understanding the long run distribution of unemployment 
across individuals, and in particular how concentrated those experiences of 
unemployment are, is important. However, in order to address these issues it is first 
necessary to gain a clearer idea of exactly how much unemployment individuals 
experience in the long run. We therefore focus on experiences of unemployment across 
spells -  aggregating the duration of each separate spell o f unemployment experienced by 
the individual to gain an insight into the total amount of time an individual is unemployed 
over a specified period. Inevitably this will involve censoring spells at the beginning and 
end of each period -  so the true impact of long term unemployment will be understated -  
since many spells which began in the year in question will endure into following years 
(and sometimes, decades/^. This approach to measuring longer run experiences of 
unemployment has its antecedents in the work of Hall (1970), Clark and Summers (1979) 
and Disney (1979); more recently it has been suggested by Machin and Manning (1999) 
as a means to resolve the extent to which unemployment (and therefore poverty) is 
concentrated among a few individuals.
This research focuses on the distribution of unemployment across individuals within a 
given period; therefore a natural benchmark against which we can compare our results is
There is an alternative interpretation of the high rates of job destruction that we observe in the labour 
market -  that contrary to Hall’s claim, they reflect individuals searching through alternative careers until a 
suitable match is found -  a process labelled as “job shopping”. Nonetheless, to the extent that both 
interpretations imply that individuals will spend a prolonged period o f time earning low or no wages, then 
at least on welfare grounds, there is good reason to be concerned over the amount of unemployment 
individuals suffer in the long run -  a chronic lack of paid employment is likely to be highly correlated with 
the incidence of poverty and social exclusion.
For this reason, we will vary the length of the ‘window’ over which we analyze experiences of 
unemployment. For simplicity’s sake, we measure the total duration of unemployment suffered by an 
individual as a percentage of the total length of the period we are analyzing, to allow comparison across 
these alternative ‘windows’.
168
the distribution of unemployment across spells in that period. Of course, if  individuals 
did not suffer repeated spells of unemployment, then the two distributions would be 
identical Therefore, in some respects, the extent to which the two distributions differ can 
be thought of as capturing the impact of repeat spells of unemployment on the 
distribution of unemployment. Consequently, we believe that the distribution of 
unemployment across spells constitutes a useful yardstick against which to compare 
developments in the labour market, and we will reference our results against those 
obtained with this alternative distribution. Finally, a note of caution should be made; our 
estimate of distribution of spell lengths in the JUVOS panel will be censored since we 
treat all spells as if they started no earlier than the beginning of the period, and finished 
no later than the end of the year.
In summary then, our research aims to describe the distribution of the total duration of 
unemployment across individuals, and in particular how concentrated that distribution is. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data set upon which the research 
is based -  the J.U.V.O.S. cohort panel. Section 3 reports on the distribution of 
unemployment across the male working age population. Section 4 focuses on those in the 
population who suffer the most -  the chronically unemployed -  whom we define here as 
those who spend at least half of a given period in unemployment, and addresses 
Blanchard’s assertion that chronic unemployment falls on the young. We have argued 
that if experiences of unemployment are segregated between those who suffer very little, 
and those who are chronically unemployed, then we might expect to observe both 
extreme poverty among a small rump of the population at the micro level, and persistence 
in the unemployment rate at the macro level. However, it is not clear which particular 
feature of the distribution of unemployment across individuals drives wage setting, and 
Sections 5 and 6 represent alternative approaches to quantifying the variation in 
experiences of unemployment or the degree to which the distribution of unemployment 
shifts through time'^ .^ Section 5 focuses on the degree o f inequality in the distribution of
Although one could attempt to discriminate which of these concepts better describes how insiders assess 
their risk of being unemployed -  for example, by including each of these measures in a wage curve 
regression -  we do not pursue this line of enquiry in this thesis.
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unemployment, drawing upon established tools taken from the that literature"^ ;^ 
alternatively Section 6 draws upon the concept of polarisation within a distribution to 
examine whether there is instead any evidence of stratification in experiences of 
unemployment, where individuals can be separated out into separate ‘clusters’. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.
2 . T h e  D a t a
The JUVOS Cohort is a longitudinal data set which contains information on 
approximately of 5% of all claims for unemployment-related benefits paid through the 
National Unemployment Benefit Payments System (NUBS), which was established in 
October 1982 following the switch from a registrant to a claimant count basis'* .^ Spells^^ 
are randomly selected on the basis of the National Insurance number o f the claimant, 
which ensures that the entire spell histories (since the inception of the scheme) of those 
with the appropriate NI numbers are recorded. The twin virtues of the JUVOS cohort 
over and above other pre-existing labour market datasets are its size and length -  in May 
1995 the panel contained information on almost three million separate claims, and over 
one million separate claimants, collected over a thirteen year period^ \  Furthermore, the 
fact that the information is recorded in real time (information in the panel is updated on a 
daily basis, using information drawn directly from the local offices of the Employment 
Service) ensures that measurement error in recording spell information is minimized. In 
contrast, in those datasets where information on lifetime labour market experiences is 
collected retrospectively, the number of spells of both employment and unemployment 
tend to be under-reported (typically at the expense of those spells of only short duration) 
leading us to overestimate the incidence of long-term unemployment and underestimate 
the incidence of recurrent unemployment (see Pauli (1996)). Consequently, the JUVOS
For an excellent summary of this literature see Cowell (1995). 
Ward and Bird (1995), p.345.
The results in this paper are based on a subset of the sample which includes only those spells of 
unemployment which last for seven days or more. Similar results are achieved when we include all spells 
of a day or more in length, and these may be obtained from the author on request.
Ward and Bird (1996), p.346.
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panel enables us to obtain an insight into individual experiences of unemployment over 
their lifetime at a level of detail that was not previously possible.
Essentially, the JUVOS panel records the start and end date of each separate spell of 
unemployment suffered by each individual; however, without any alternative data source, 
we have no information on the labour market status of these individuals between each 
spell -  specifically whether they were employed or economically inactive^^. As such, the 
JUVOS cohort should be thought of as delineating periods of each individual’s labour 
market history as either “unemployed” or “not-unemployed” (as opposed to a more 
standard division of individuals’ status as either employed or not-employed). This may be 
of particular concern when attempting to make inferences about the long run labour 
market experiences of female claimants on the basis of their spell histories, when female 
inactivity rates are significantly higher than those of males at all ages (although the gap 
has closed considerably), and when, in particular, many females completely withdraw 
fi*om the labour force for an extended period of time in order to care for their children. 
Furthermore, relative to males, there is evidence that the claimant count definition of the 
female unemployment rate is particularly misleading, since there are a considerable 
number of women actively searching for work who are not eligible for government 
benefit^^. Similarly, since those at either extreme of the working age spectrum may have 
only weak attachment to the labour market and may be ineligible for those benefits which 
imply entry into the JUVOS panel, the dataset may not accurately describe the true 
incidence of unemployment among these groups. For these reasons this chapter will focus 
only on the unemployment histories of prime age males (those between 18 and 65 years 
of age) in the JUVOS cohort, of which there are over half a million, with information on 
nearly two million separate claims. Since data was only collected on spells of
From August 1996 onwards we can identify whether an individual left the claimant count for 
employment or inactivity. However, there is much evidence to suggest that flows between economic 
inactivity and employment are non trivial (see Gregg and Wadsworth (1999)) so there remains no water­
tight way to discern the labour market status of individuals throughout the periods in which they are not 
recorded as claimant unemployed.
In 1995 over a third of those women actively searching for work and defined as unemployed by the ILO 
measure were not registered as claimant unemployed; indeed, the abject failure of the claimant count to 
accurately record the incidence of female unemployment may well have been the final nail in the coffin for 
the claimant count as the government's measure of the unemployment rate (Nickell (1999)).
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unemployment in Northern Ireland from October 1993 onwards, we have also removed 
all these spells from our sample, so strictly speaking our research refers to unemployment 
in Great Britain, rather than the United Kingdom.
Finally, two notes of caution must be made as to how to interpret results derived from the 
JUVOS dataset. Firstly, although a random sample of the unemployed, the panel is not a 
representative sample of the labour force -  far from it, since in order to be included an 
individual must have made a claim for unemployment related benefits since October 
1982. Therefore, our results refer implicitly to that subset of the labour force who at some 
stage experience unemployment. Secondly, as in many countries, the rules governing the 
level of, and eligibility for, benefit payments to the unemployed in the U.K. were subject 
to significant and repeated change over the period "^ .^ These changes will doubtless have 
had an impact on the distribution of claimant unemployment, and hence the nature o f our 
sample.
3 . T h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t
Our approach in describing the distribution of unemployment among prime age males in 
the panel focuses on three key features of that distribution: the number of individuals who 
are unemployed at some point in any given period -  or the domain of the distribution; the 
shape -  or density -  of the distribution itself; and finally, the degree of turbulence within 
the distribution, captured by the gross flows into and out o f the claimant count. The 
extent to which the distribution of unemployment shifts over time will be investigated in 
Sections 5 and 6.
See Bell and Smith (2002) for an excellent summary of the changes in entitlements within the benefit 
system over this period.
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3.1 T he D om ain  of the  D istribution of Un e m pl o y m e n t
It is straightforward to estimate on the basis of the JUVOS panel, the total number of 
males, between 18 and 65 years of age, who made a claim for unemployment related 
benefits each year. It transpires that in any given year between 1983 and 1996, two to 
four million prime age males had some experience of unemployment^^. Although there is 
clear evidence of the cycle, that is (as expected) in a year when the unemployment rate is 
high, the number of men who have some experience of unemployment at some point 
during that year is also high, there is also circumstantial evidence that quantitatively this 
relationship has changed (see Figure 3.1) -  while the male unemployment rate was 
almost identical at similar points in the cycle in 1986 and 1994^ ,^ over 150,000 more men 
had some experience of unemployment in 1994^ .^
F ig u r e  3 .1: In c id e n c e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  in a  y e a r  (m il l io n s ) 58,59
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All figures quoted in this Chapter are grossed up by a factor o f  20 since the JUVOS cohort is a random 
5% sample o f the claimant unemployed.
In actual fact, the male unemployment rate was slightly lower in 1994 -  in June 1986 the male 
unemployment rate was 12.8%, while in June 1994 it was 12.6% - nonetheless approximately one hundred 
and seventy one thousand more men had some experience o f unemployment in 1994 than in 1986.
O f course, there were more men in the working-age population in 1994 than 1986. However, in 
proportional terms, more men had an experience o f unemployment in 1994 than 1986.
Strictly speaking, the male claimant unemployment rate in Great Britain for June o f  each year.
The data underlying this figure (and all the others included in this paper) are reproduced in Appendix 2.
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However, despite the fact that our panel contains imformation over a fourteen year period 
we feel that there is probably insufficient information to be able to decisively identify any 
change in the distribution of unemployment across successive cycles, and for that reason 
we shall make only tentative suggestions as to possible shifts in the distribution of 
unemployment across the labour force over time.
If we widen our perspective, to consider how many individuals are ever unemployed over 
a longer period of time, unsurprisingly we find the mumber increases -  between 1993 and 
1996, almost five and a half million prime aged males made at least one claim for 
unemployment related benefits. To put this figure in context, there were almost 18 
million economically active working age males in 1996.
The JUVOS cohort also allows us to estimate the total number of spells of unemployment 
experienced by males at some point over the sample period. There were in excess of three 
million separate claims made for unemployment related benefits in every year between 
1983 and 1996. As the figure above illustrates, the total number of spells over a year is 
also highly correlated with the unemployment rate in that year. Once again we find (at 
least circumstantial) evidence that this relationship may have changed over time -  there 
were more than a quarter of a million more spells of unemployment over the course of 
1994 than over 1986. Finally, due to the inevitable double counting of long spells, we 
find that as with individuals, the number of claims recorded increases less than 
proportionately with the size of the sample period -  between 1993 and 1996 there were 
over ten million separate claims for benefit made by prime age males, but in each of 
those years there were an average of over four million claims.
When we turn to the age profile of those who have some experience of unemployment, 
we find that as a group they are not representative of the labour force as a whole. As 
Figure 3.2 illustrates, we find that in particular, the young appear more likely to have 
some experience of unemployment. This would seem to support Blanchard’s hypothesis 
that unemployment is concentrated on the young: in 1983 there were about two and a half 
times as many 18 year olds who had some experience of unemployment as 35 year olds.
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However, over time we find the number of youths who were unemployed in successive 
cohorts declined substantially -  about half as many eighteen year olds had some 
experience of unemployment in 1996 as did in 1983, while for those in their thirties this 
figure was, broadly speaking, unchanged. Of course, over the time, the number of youths 
in the labour force has fallen dramatically, both as a consequence of a decline in the 
fertility rate some years before, but also as result of an increase in participation in tertiary 
education, and therefore the figure above will overstate the decline in the proportion of 
the youth labour force who are unemployed. However the dramatic fall in the number of 
youths who are unemployed each year is also likely to reflect both changes in the relative 
incentives and/or entitlement for youths to claim benefit when unemployed, as well as the 
effect of any shift in the demand for labour between different age groups.
F ig u r e  3 .2 : In c id e n c e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  by  a g e  (t h o u s a n d s ) 
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When we turn to the distribution of unemployment across spells we find that the youth 
spells are also over-represented in the JUVOS sample^^, but once again, we find that this 
differential has narrowed over the period.
In Figure 3.3 we highlight these shifts in the age composition of the population as a result 
of demographic change^\ In order to control for the impact of demographic change, we 
have calculated the fraction of the total population of each age group who have some 
experience of unemployment each year. As Figure 3.4 illustrates, although over time less 
youths had some experience of unemployment, they remained the age group most 
afflicted by unemployment.
F ig u r e  3 .3 : A g e  C o m p o sit io n  o f  the  L a bo u r  Fo r c e  [h u n d r e d s  o f  t h o u s a n d s ]
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Finally, we turn to the number of separate experiences of unemployment each individual 
suffers within a given period. The vast majority of those who have some experience of 
unemployment in a year will only have one experience of unemployment in that year. 
Nonetheless, something like three quarters of a million males, suffer recurrent 
unemployment each year. However, experience of a large number of separate spells in a 
single year is rare -  in all but one year (1984), less than one out of every hundred males
In fact youths and their individual spells are over-represented in the JUVOS sample to roughly the same 
extent; for example, in 1990 there were 2.43 eighteen year olds in the JUVOS sample for every thirty five 
year old, and 2.59 spells experienced by eighteen year olds for spell experienced by a thirty five year old. 
Our estimates o f  the age composition o f the population are taken from the annual Labour Force Survey.
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who had an experience of unemployment suffered four or more separate spells of 
unemployment (see Figure 3.5). We find that given the preponderance of youth spells in 
the JUVOS panel there is remarkably little difference in the incidence of recurrent 
unemployment among individuals from different age groups in the labour force (see 
Figure 3.6). Over a four year period, it remains the case that the majority of individuals 
who have some experience of unemployment suffer only one spell, although now only 
marginally so (see Figure 3.7). Over this longer period, more than one in ten of those who 
entered the JUVOS panel at some point suffered four or more spells. Quite simply, the 
longer the period over which we estimate the distribution of unemployment, the larger the 
role that recurrent unemployment plays.
F ig u r e  3 .4  : F r a c t io n  o f  ea c h  a g e  g r o u p  w h o  h a v e  s o m e  e x p e r ie n c e
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F igure  3.5 : T he D istribution  of  S pells of  U n e m pl o y m e n t  [ 1 y e a r ] (%)
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F ig ure  3.6 : T he D istr ibu tio n  of S pells of  U n em pl o y m e n t  by a g e  [1986] (% )
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F i g u r e  3.7 : T h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  S p e l l s  oif U n e m p l o y m e n t  [ 4 y e a r s ] ( % )
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It is clear then that youths suffer more spells of unemployment than adults, although it 
appears that this is because experience of unemployment is spread over a larger section of 
the youth population rather than on an individual basis, youths suffer more spells on 
average than older members of the labour force. Whether either on an individual or 
aggregate basis, youths suffer more days of unemployment each year is not clear. In order 
to answer that question definitively we need to turn to the shape of the distribution of 
unemployment itself.
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3.2 T he D e n sity  o f  th e  D istribution
To gain a more complete characterisation of the (distribution of unemployment across 
individuals we now turn to techniques that capture Ithe relative frequency of observations 
across the range of possible total durations of unemployment. It should be noted form the 
outset that we will not estimate the distribution of unemployment across the entire labour 
force -  those who suffered no unemployment over the period are deliberately excluded^^.
Initially, to give a broad overview of the distribution o f unemployment across our panel 
we have aggregated experiences of unemployment within the following categories -  for 
the one year periods: less than a month, between one and four months, between four and 
eight months, and more than eight months; and for the four year periods: less than three 
months, between three and six months, between six months and a year, between one and 
three years, and more than three years.
Figures 3.8-3.10 reveal the sharp contrast in experiences of unemployment in the JUVOS 
panel: about two in five men who have some experience of unemployment suffer less 
than four months of unemployment in total in a given year, while a roughly similar 
proportion spend eight months or more of that year in unemployment. O f course these 
proportions vary over the cycle -  in 1990, more than a half o f those who experienced 
unemployment suffered less than four months of unemployment, yet in 1993 this fraction 
fell to a third. It appears that a far smaller proportion of youths (who have some 
experience of unemployment) suffer long accumulated durations of unemployment in any 
year, and a higher fraction suffer less than a month of unemployment. When we extend 
the length of our period we find that while a quarter of the sample suffer three months or
One solution to this problem would be to try supplement the dataset to create a 5% sample of the entire 
labour force and then we could calculate the distribution of unemployment over (a representative sample 
of) the entire labour force. However, in doing so we would be simply adding a relatively large number of 
individuals all of whom had no experience of unemployment whatsoever over the period creating a 
frequency distribution with about 75% of the entire population concentrated at a point mass at one extreme 
of the distribution. It is not apparent what this would add to our understanding of how unemployment is 
distributed among those who suffer it, although in itself the percentage of the labour force who are never 
unemployed in any given period is clearly a meaningful statistic (of course, estimates of the proportion of 
the labour force who are never unemployed in a given period can of course be interpolated directly from 
the results presented above on the number of individuals who have some experience of unemployment).
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less of unemployment, one in ten of those with some experience o f unemployment suffer 
more than three years out of four out of work.
When we turn to the distribution of unemployment across spells, we find as we would 
expect, that short durations of unemployment are more common among spells, than 
among people. In proportional terms, almost twice as many spells as individuals involve 
a duration of unemployment less than a month over the course of a year. Figures 3.8-3.10 
also illustrate how a far greater proportion of individuals suffer very long durations of 
unemployment than spells last a similar length -  as a proportion, between three to four 
times as many people suffer two years or more of unemployment over a four year period 
as there are spells of unemployment which last for that length^^. Clearly, the number of 
long term spells of unemployment can be deceiving as to the true incidence of chronic 
unemployment. The length of the average spell experienced by different age groups also 
varies significantly -  about one in ten spells suffered by eighteen year olds in 1986 lasted 
more than eight months, but for twenty five year olds this figure was three in ten and for 
forty five year olds it was nearly four in ten.
Of course, in any period there are more spells than individuals who experience them so this will tend to 
overstate the point.
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F igure  3.8 : T he D istribution  of Unem plo ym ent  in m o nth s  [ 1 y ea r ] (% )
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F igure  3.9 : T h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p lo y m e n t  in m o n t h s  by age  [1986] (% ) 
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F igure  3.10 : T he D istribution of U n em ploym ent  in y ea r s  [4 y e a r s ] (% ) 
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Although it provides a useful broad brush description of the distribution of 
unemployment, the histogram is inevitably a crude instrument with which to illustrate a 
distribution in any detail. In effect, these histograms aggregate together individuals with 
different experiences of unemployment according to essentially arbitrary criteria, 
producing a discrete frequency distribution '^^. An alternative approach is to construct a
O f course, since the total duration o f unemployment experienced is in itself discrete, this may not be a 
problem. We could construct a histogram with a number o f bins equal to the total number o f  days across 
the period we are studying, so that within each bin all individuals will have an identical total duration o f  
unemployment -  giving the probability mass function - which could with som e justification be considered 
the true distribution o f  unemployment in a given year. However, this approach is unlikely to lead to a
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smoothed representation of the frequency distribution using kernel density estimation 
techniques'^. Essentially this non-parametric approach involves estimating the density at 
each point by counting the number of observations within a specified interval 
{x - h^x  + h) , and weighting each according to how close they are to that point, using a 
known, well behaved (i.e. symmetric) density function^^’^ ,^ as follows :
JC -X ;
[3.1]
In the final analysis, the kernel density and the histogram characterise a distribution in 
broadly the same fashion (although at varying level of mathematical complexity) -  
estimating the relative frequency of observations at a given point according to the number 
of observations that lie within a specified neighbourhood around that point. These 
estimates of the distribution of unemployment are presented in Appendix 1 and their 
salient features are discussed in the following section. To illustrate how the implied form 
of the distribution of unemployment varies according to the precision with which we 
measure the relative frequency of observations across all possible durations we vary the 
bandwidth of the kernel density, and the bin-width o f the histograms^*. We shall focus on
smooth frequency distribution, since in every period, chance is likely to lead to disproportionate numbers of 
individuals sharing certain numbers of days of total unemployment, producing a series of irregular spikes 
throughout the distribution. As a result, at the microscopic level, such probability mass functions are likely 
to be highly unstable over time. On a more aesthetic level, a histogram with 365 bins is unlikely to be a 
useful descriptive tool.
For a comprehensive summary of these techniques see Silverman (1986).
The kernel density functions estimated here are calculated using the standard Epanechnikov kernel, 
which weights observations as follows:
i f  \ t \< 4 5K(t) = 1 - L
5
V y
4V5
= 0 otherwise.
^^The result is a smoother representation of the underlying frequency distribution, although the degree to 
which the microscopic irregularities in the data are removed will depend on the width of the interval used 
to estimate the kernel (Silverman (1986)).
In particular, in the case of histograms, we use three alternative specifications, with 12, 25 and 50 bins 
respectively (so in the case where we are describing the distribution of unemployment over the course of a 
year, they correspond approximately to aggregating together those individuals who share the same number 
o f months, fortnights and weeks of unemployment respectively).
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two key features of the distribution: the ‘spike’ (representing those who are permanently 
unemployed) and the interior of the distribution.
3.2.1 T he  ‘S p i k e ’ in t h e  D istribution  o f  Un e m p l o y m e n t
Irrespective of the sample we use, and the period over which we estimate it, the 
distribution of unemployment always exhibits a common feature : a large point mass at 
the extreme end of the distribution, indicating the large number of individuals who are 
permanently unemployed throughout the period. About one in five of those who have 
some experience of unemployment each year will spend the entire year unemployed. 
Although this fraction varies anticyclically (see Figure 3.11) it does not appear that the 
incidence of permanent unemployment at a given point in the economic cycle has 
changed over time^^.
F ig u r e  3.11 : T h e  incid en ce  o f  p e r m a n e n t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
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When we extend the period over which we estimate the distribution of unemployment we 
find that the relative importance of this spike in the distribution diminishes. Obviously,
This result is somewhat surprising. We might have expected the introduction o f  the Restart programme to 
have reduced the fraction o f  the sample who are permanently unemployed from 1986 onwards by removing 
the long-term unemployed from the benefit rolls.
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the fraction of all those who have some experience of unemployment over a four year 
period who are unemployed throughout that period will be far lower than the 
corresponding figure in any of the individual years. Depending on the state of the labour 
market, between two to four per cent of those who have an experience of unemployment 
during a four year period will spend that entire period unemployed. However, this still 
implies that between one and two hundred thousand men are permanently unemployed 
over a four year period.
F ig u r e  3 .12 : T he in c id en c e  of  per m a n en t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  by  a g e  [% ]
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If we concentrate on the distribution of unemployment for specific age groups in the 
sample, then we find that the incidence of permanent unemployment is considerably 
lower among younger members of the workforce (see Figure 3.12). For example, in 1984 
of those who had some experience of claimant unemployment less than 7 % of eighteen 
year olds were unemployed throughout the year, while 25 % of twenty five year olds and 
35 % of forty five year olds were permanently unemployed.
3 .2 .2  T he In t e r io r  o f  th e  D istributio n
Self evidently, wherever the relative importance of this spike in the distribution of 
unemployment is low, there is more mass present in the main body of the distribution. 
However, the distribution of total duration of unemployment is far from uniform across
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this interval. The relative frequency of observations clearly appears to decrease as the 
total duration of unemployment increases, although this trend is not monotone^^. Indeed, 
as the length of the period which we estimate the distribution over increases, we find that 
a second spike emerges in the distribution at the other extreme -  representing the 
increasing number of fnctionally unemployed individuals who typically suffer a single, 
brief experience of unemployment which constitutes only a tiny fraction of the total 
period. However, those individuals who suffer either less than a month, or more than 47 
months of unemployment in a four year period still represent less than a fifth of all those 
with some experience of unemployment.
Finally, when we turn to the distribution of unemployment across spells, we find that, as 
expected, short durations of unemployment are more frequent among spells than among 
individuals. About a fifth of all spells that occurred at some point in 1983 lasted less than 
a month, while only about a tenth of those who had some experience of unemployment 
suffered less than a month of unemployment in total. Similarly, about 15% of spells last 
more than 51 weeks, while over 20% of individuals suffer this much unemployment.
3 .3  T h e  D e g r e e  o f  T u r b u l e n c e  w it h in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n
The previous analysis has established the key features of the distribution of 
unemployment across the range of possible cumulative durations o f unemployment. In 
this section of the Chapter we focus on one final feature o f the distribution -  the size of 
the flows into and out of claimant unemployment. However, it must be stressed that we 
shall not attempt the gargantuan task of explicitly explaining the distribution of 
unemployment itself by analysing the underlying gross infiows into the claimant count 
and outflow at each spell duration, in every separate day of the year.
The fact that the JUVOS database records information (collected in ‘real time’ rather than 
retrospectively) on the start and end dates of all the spells of unemployment experienced
See, for example, the kernel density estimates produced using the narrower band widths which illustrate 
the finer detail in the data and the inherent variation in the incidence o f unemployment.
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by a random 5 % sample of that part of the population who are eligible for unemployment 
related benefits provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine the flows of 
individuals into and out of the claimant count. Previous research has been forced to rely 
on longitudinal data to approximate these flows from the numbers of individuals who are 
observed to have changed labour market status within a given interval (typically a 
quarter).
Although information exists on the destination of those who flow out of the claimant 
count for the last five months of our fourteen year sample period, we have no information 
on the labour market state from which individuals exited to flow into unemployment. 
Therefore, we shall abstract away from the source of inflows and destination of outflows 
from the claimant count and focus simply on the gross flows into and out of 
unemployment each week^\ We follow convention by normalising these flows relative to 
their respective stocks to give us the gross inflow and gross outflow rates. Finally, in 
order to abstract away from the stochastic variation in these gross flows from week to 
week we also calculate a smoothed representation of each series using the Hodrick- 
Prescott filter (1997)^^.
Given that the small number of spells of unemployment which were less than seven days in length were 
dropped from the analysis, we can be certain that no transitions into and out o f the claimant count will be 
censored by focusing on the weekly flows.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter decomposes a series y  t into its trend / / 1 and stationary components y  t - f i t  
by selecting the time series of the trend fj. t which minimises the following expression (Enders (1995));
7  t= \  7  t= 2
The value of X defines the extent to which the trend in the series is smoothed: when X equals zero the trend 
is equal to the series itself, when X tends to infinity the trend will approach linearity.
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On average, about 45,000 working age men flow in and out of claimant unemployment 
each week, but the net flow from the claimant count over the period averages just over a 
thousand men each week. In terms of the underlying stocks, about a third of a per cent of 
the stock of working age men who are not claimant unemployed become unemployed 
each week and about three per cent of the stock of claimant count flow out of
Given the size o f  the underlying data, information on the weekly gross flows presented in the following  
figures is not recorded in the tables in the Appendix.
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unemployment each week (see Figures 3.13 and 3.14 above). It is transparently clear that 
both the inflow to and outflow from the claimant count each week are noisy series -  they 
both have a standard deviation of about 10,000. Nonetheless, the weekly gross flows are 
unusually low in the final week of the year and unusually high in the first week of the 
year.
The variation in the flows off the claimant count at different spell durations will be 
crucial in determining the final shape of the distribution of unemployment. We can 
investigate this issue by focusing on the gross flows out of unemployment normalising by 
the appropriate stock at various spell durations (which will approximate very crudely the 
diserete-time hazard function). Given the noise in our gross flows data we focus only on 
the trend in each of the underlying weekly series obtained from a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Unsurprisingly we find that the outflow rate from very short term unemployment (defined 
here as less than a month) is far higher than that from longer spells (see Figure 3.15). 
Nevertheless, even at long durations between one and two per cent of the stock of long 
term unemployed men exit unemployment each week.
F ig u r e  3 .15  : W ee k l y  O u t f l o w  r a t e s  a t  v a r y in g  s p e l l  d u r a t io n s  [%]
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Finally, if we focus on the gross flows among different age groups in the population we 
find that the flows both into and out of the claimant count are far larger among youths. 
On average about two and a half thousand eighteen and twenty one year old men flow in
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and out of the claimant count each week, whereas only about five hundred men aged 
forty five do likewise (see Figures 3.16 -  3.17). This reflects our findings that a larger 
proportion of the youth population flow into unemployment each period, but on average 
they tend to suffer shorter spells, and thus flow out of unemployment more rapidly.
F ig u r e  3 .16  : W e e k l y  In f l o w  r a t e s  by  a g e  [%]
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To conclude, we have found that in any given year, a significant fraction of the male 
labour force have some experience of unemployment. Relative to their share of the 
working age population, young men are over represented in the JUVOS panel, although
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this gap has closed considerably over time reflecting the demographic shift in the 
composition of the population away from the young. Among those who are unemployed 
at some point in any period, experiences of unemployment differ greatly: while many 
suffer only very brief spells, a sizeable fraction of those who have some experience of 
unemployment are permanently unemployed throughout the period (although the size of 
this spike in the distribution of unemployment varies inversely with age and the length of 
the period over which we estimate the distribution). Over the course of a year, recurrent 
unemployment is not a significant phenomenon: about three quarters of a million working 
age men suffer more than one spell of unemployment in any given year; however, over a 
longer period of time recurrent unemployment becomes more pervasive. When we 
aggregate across spells, it appears that those youths who have some experience of 
unemployment will suffer less days of unemployment in total than older members of the 
labour force. Therefore, it seems that youths have higher unemployment rates simply 
because they flow into unemployment in larger numbers (although not more often) than 
adults, rather than because those youths who do enter unemployment remain there for a 
longer period of time. The gross flows into and out of the claimant count dwarf the net 
changes in the stock -  each week approaching fifty thousand men become unemployed, 
and a similar number leave the claimant count.
4. T h e  I n c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t
In the previous section we detailed how unemployment is distributed across individuals 
in the labour force over a given period of time when we aggregate across each o f the 
spells they suffer. In particular we noted the fraction of those who have an experience of 
unemployment in a given year who are unemployed throughout that year. However, if  we 
want to focus more generally on those who suffer long accumulated durations of 
unemployment in a given year -  whom we define here as the chronically unemployed'^ -  
we need a slightly more inclusive definition than this. The definition of chronic
This is by no means the first use of the expression 'chronically unemployed'', indeed the term appears to 
have been almost ever-present in the vocabulary of those concerned with the rise in unemployment since 
the 1970’s. However, we believe that this is perhaps the first practical definition of who actually is
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unemployment we use here is based on the proportion of a given period that an individual 
is unemployed'^ so that an individual who spends more than half of any period on 
unemployment benefit we label as chronically unemployed.
We argued in Section 1 that there are (at least) three reasons why the concentration of 
unemployment on a number of chronically unemployed individuals matters: because their 
existence may help us understand the persistence in the aggregate unemployment rate; 
because through lagged duration dependence effects, prolonged exposure to 
unemployment may scar the individual having long-term consequences for their 
prospects; and because chronic exposure to unemployment is likely to be heavily 
correlated with the incidence of poverty. We therefore believe that these unfortunate 
individuals are worthy of special attention. In this section of the Chapter we therefore 
briefly discuss four issues: how many chronically unemployed individuals are there in the 
labour force at any one time; how much of the total duration of unemployment do they 
account for; are the chronically unemployed and the long term unemployed one in the 
same; and finally, are the chronically unemployed representative of the labour force as a 
whole. To conclude this section we offer an alternative definition of chronic 
unemployment based on the relative experiences of those who suffer unemployment in 
any given period.
4.1  T h e  I n c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t
In Section 3 we described how between two and four million prime age males have some 
experience o f unemployment each year between 1983 and 1996. Of these, about one to 
two million are chronically unemployed ! The fraction of all those who have some 
experience of unemployment in a given year who are chronically unemployed varies anti­
cyclically (see Figure 4.1). Yet, even in 1989 when the labour market was over-heating it 
remains true that two out of every five men who were ever unemployed in that year spent 
six months or more unemployed. When we investigate whether the chronically
chronically unemployed, and in particular, the first definition which encompasses both the recurrent and the 
long term unemployed.
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unemployed are growing in size across the economic cycles, we find tentative evidence 
that this is indeed the case . There were almost two hundred thousand more chronically 
unemployed males in 1994 than in 1986 (when the unemployment rate was 
approximately the same).
Finally, when we estimate the distribution of unemployment over a longer period of time, 
we find that the chronically unemployed are far fewer in number; over the average four 
year period about one million men are unemployed for two years or more. As a 
proportion, the chronically unemployed now comprise between one in seven to one in 
four of all those who are ever unemployed during that four year period.
F ig u r e  4.1 : T h e  C h r o n ic a l l y  u n e m p l o y e d  : t h e ir  t o t a l  [m il l io n s ] a n d  a s  a 
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4.2 How I m p o r t a n t  a r e  t h e  C h r o n ic a l l y  u n e m p l o y e d  ?
We have established that about a half of all those who have some experience of 
unemployment in any year spend a half of that year unemployed. We might then ask how 
much of the total days lost to unemployment in any given year is accounted for by the 
chronically unemployed. It transpires that on average the chronically unemployed 
account for about three quarters of the total number of days of unemployment suffered
^^See Section 4.4 for an alternative definition.
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over the course of a given year (see Figure 4.2). When we estimate the distribution of 
unemployment over a longer time period we know that the chronically unemployed are a 
far smaller fraction of those who ever experience unemployment -  nonetheless, they now 
account for a disproportionate fraction of the total number of days of unemployment 
suffered over that period. For example, between 1993 and 1996 the quarter of those who 
have some experience of unemployment who were chronically unemployed accounted for 
almost three fifths of the total days of unemployment experienced in that period.
The aggregate unemployment rate is typically thought of as a ‘worker discipline device’. 
If workers understand that the majority of the unemployment they observe in the labour 
market is suffered by outsiders then they are unlikely to be constrained in their wage 
setting behaviour by the presence of this reserve army of workers, because their levels of 
skill (or demographic characteristics given the presence of discriminating employers) 
makes it unlikely they will ever join the ranks of the outsiders.
F i g u r e  4.2 : T h e  F r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  d a y s  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  a c c o u n t e d
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4.3 L o n g  t e r m  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  C h r o n i c  U n e m p l o y m e n t .
Despite the distinctions we have already drawn between the distributions of 
unemployment across individuals and spells in the previous section the sceptical reader
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may still question whether in fact the chronically unemployed and the long term 
unemployed are simply one in the same. It is certainly true that when the distribution of 
unemployment is defined over a one year interval something like three quarters o f the 
chronically unemployed suffer only one spell of unemployment in that year (see Figure
4.3) -  in other words they are long term unemployed. However, there remains the final 
quarter of those who spend more than half a given year unemployed who are recurrent 
unemployed -  some half a million men. It seems reasonable to assume that the typical 
chronically unemployed male will have a low exit rate from unemployment, and 
therefore on average when they enter unemployment we would expect them to have to 
endure a significant spell out of work. We might therefore expect then that the probability 
of observing a chronically unemployed individual who suffers more than a couple of 
spells of unemployment in any given year is likely to be low. Nonetheless, there are 
something of the order of ten thousand working age men who over the course of four or 
more spells of unemployment in a year spend more than six months of that year 
unemployed. So, although long term unemployment is the prime cause of chronic 
unemployment, it is by no means the only cause, and policy initiatives aimed at those 
excluded from the workplace which focus on long term spells alone may do so at the 
expense of the many thousands of men who suffer recurrent unemployment.
When we estimate the distribution of unemployment over a longer time period the 
recurrent unemployed are now the majority of the chronically unemployed (see Figure
4.4). Only about three out of every ten of those who suffer more than two years of 
unemployment over a four year period suffer a single long term spell of unemployment. 
Conversely, about one in eight of the chronically unemployed suffer five or more spells.
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F ig u r e  4.3 : T h e  n u m b e r  o f  s p e l l s  e x p e r ie n c e d  b y  t h e  c h r o n i c a l l y
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F ig u r e  4 .4 : T h e  n u m b e r  o f  s p e l l s  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  t h e  c h r o n i c a l l y
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4.4 W h o  a r e  t h e  C h r o n i c a l l y  u n e m p l o y e d  ?
We know that youths are over represented among those who have some experience of 
unemployment; however, we also know that on average their spells of unemployment 
seem to be shorter. In fact there are more youths who are chronically unemployed than 
adults (see Figure 4.5). As the following figures demonstrate, relative to their share of the 
working age population, youths are over represented among the chronically unemployed;
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however, relative to their share of those who have some experience of unemployment 
they are under represented (see Figure 4.6).
F ig u r e  4 .5  : T he  In c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t  by  A g e  [T h o u s a n d s ]
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Blanchard’s hypothesis hinges upon whether the chronically unemployed are over­
whelmingly young. The evidence we have presented above casts doubt on this conjecture. 
It is still the case that the younger members of the labour force are more likely to be 
chronically unemployed than their elders. However, about 70% of the chronically
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unemployed are above 25 years of age, and about 40% are above 35 years of age. 
Although we believe that youth unemployment may not act as a restraint upon adult 
insiders who set wages, we do not believe there is any evidence that chronic 
unemployment is heavily concentrated upon the young, and therefore, by itself youth 
unemployment will not be able to explain the persistence in the unemployment rate.
4 .5  A  R e l a t iv e  D e f in it io n  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t
In the analysis above the chronically unemployed are defined on an absolute basis, i.e. 
according to the total duration of unemployment they suffer over a given period. Finally, 
in this section we briefly explore an alternative definition of chronic unemployment 
based on the experience of individuals relative to others in the population. A natural 
choice for such a relative measure is to define the chronically unemployed as those 
individuals whose accumulated experiences of unemployment place them among the 
highest (arbitrarily defined) quantile of the distribution of unemployment^^.
The number of chronically unemployed men is then defined straightforwardly by the total 
number of individuals who have some experience of unemployment in a period. For 
example, if  we define the chronically unemployed as those in the highest quartile of the 
distribution of unemployment in any given year, then by definition, one in four of all 
those who have some experience of unemployment are chronically unemployed. A 
natural question to ask is how much unemployment would one have to suffer in order to 
be defined chronically unemployed using this alternative definition. Of course, given that 
our definition is now relative the answer will vary from year to year, and it can be read 
off from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (see later) since these percentile plots define the lower 
bound on the experiences of unemployment of the chronically unemployed according to 
the corresponding definition.
In this section of the chapter we offer only the briefest description of the distribution using concentration 
ratios. However, for a more in depth analysis of the inequalities in the distribution of unemployment based 
on this approach see Dickens et. al. (2000).
2 0 2
The advantage of this relative definition is that it lends itself to answering the question: 
how much of the total duration of unemployment suffered by the population is accounted 
for by the chronically unemployed ? If we define the chronically unemployed in relative 
terms then the answer to this question is given by the concentration ratio which measures 
the fraction of the total duration of unemployment accounted for by the subset of the 
panel which contains those who experienced the most unemployment. So, for example, 
CRIO and CR50 indicate the fraction of the total number of days of unemployment 
suffered by the tenth and the half of the sample which suffered the most unemployment 
in a given year respectively.
The results indicate that the degree of concentration of unemployment is anti-cyclical -  
by 1993 the degree of concentration of unemployment had fallen back to between 77 and 
94% of its level in 1990 (see Figure 4.7) depending on the particular ratio. In quantitative 
terms, the degree of concentration of unemployment on the chronically unemployed is 
quite severe. About 10% of the total duration of unemployment suffered by all 
individuals in the panel can be attributed to the 5% of the sample with the longest 
cumulative durations, and the half of the sample who suffer the most unemployment can 
always account for more than three quarters of the total days of unemployment suffered 
in any year. It is also the case, that all the concentration ratios are lower in 1994 than in 
1986 for both the distribution of unemployment across individuals and spells -  indicating 
that the burden of the chronically unemployed may have fallen over time.
When estimated over a longer period of time, the degree of concentration on the 
chronically unemployed appears, if  anything, to increase (see Figure 4.8). The 
experiences of the quarter of the population who suffer the most unemployment now 
account for over three fifths of the total duration of unemployment. This should not 
come as any great surprise -  while the identity of those suffering only brief experiences 
of unemployment changes from year to year (which leads to growth in the size of the 
sample over which we estimate the distribution of unemployment), the identity of those 
who suffer the most unemployment is often the same from year to year. Inevitably then, 
the chronically unemployed end up accounting for an increasing share of the total
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duration of unemployment suffered as the lengthen the period over which we define the 
distribution of unemployment.
F ig u r e  4 .7  : C o n c e n t r a t io n  R a t io s  f o r  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  [1 y e a r ]
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5. I n e q u a l it y  in  th e  D ist r ib u t io n  a n d  W a g e  P r e ssu r e
In the Section 3, we outlined the disparity in experiences of unemployment among those 
who are unemployed at some point in a given period. In Section 1 we argued that this 
disparity in experiences may have implications for wage setting behaviour, because 
insiders should respond to their own individual probability of being unemployed. 
However, this observation takes us no closer to an understanding of exactly which 
features of the distribution of unemployment wage setters do respond to. In effect, we do 
not know the extent to which wage setters can and do differentiate themselves from those 
in the unemployment pool in order to identify their individual risk of becoming 
unemployed. In the absence of any clear evidence on this issue in the final two sections 
of this Chapter we adopt two alternative conceptual approaches to quantifying the 
disparity in the distribution of unemployment to inform our understanding of how shifts 
in the distribution of unemployment may have influenced wage setting behaviour over 
the period.
5.1 M e a s u r in g  In e q u a l it y
Our first approach to quantifying the variation in experiences of unemployment draws 
upon the well known inequality literature. Our general strategy is as follows. First we 
quantify the degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment, and then assess 
whether the distribution is becoming more unequal over time. Finally, we will investigate 
whether the change in the age composition of the labour force we highlighted earlier, will 
have had any bearing on the degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment. It 
should be stressed at the outset that our intention is to measure the degree of inequality in 
the distribution of unemployment among those who have some experience of 
unemployment in that given period. In particular we are not going to describe the degree 
of inequality in the distribution of unemployment across the labour force. Typically, in 
any given year, only something of the order of a sixth o f the labour force have some 
experience of unemployment (although as we have shown this figure is sensitive to the 
cycle). It seems there are two separate issues : the proportion of the labour force who
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have any experience of unemployment, and among those who are unemployed at some 
point, the degree of inequality in its distribution across that group. It is not clear that 
attempting to investigate these two issues using a single measure is particularly
informative^^.
Unfortunately it is not readily apparent exactly which inequality measure provides the 
closest approximation to the perceptions of wage setters of their relative risk of becoming 
unemployed. We therefore employ a more general approach to measuring the degree of 
inequality in the distribution, surveying the broad trends in inequality from two separate 
perspectives. The first approach to measuring inequality involves the percentiles of the 
distribution which we can use to isolate relative shifts in the distribution of 
unemployment at specific points in that distribution. The second approach draws upon 
two established inequality measures: the Gini and Theil indices, which condense all the 
information on the distribution of unemployment into a single statistic to describe the 
degree of inequality in that distribution. Although these indices are more conducive to 
definitive conclusions they do not lend themselves to any easy interpretation of the cause 
of any change in inequality. We therefore believe our two approaches are natural 
complements.
Consider comparing the relative position of the percentiles of the distribution over time. 
If these percentiles move apart then there is evidence that experiences of unemployment 
are becoming more disperse, or unequal. For example, an oft-quoted statistic is the ratio 
of the and the 10* percentiles of a given distribution, which measures the relative 
experiences of unemployment of those at either extremes of the distribution. If this 
statistic increases over time then there is evidence that the distribution of unemployment
For example, consider a situation where the proportion o f people who have some experience of 
unemployment in a given year falls, but that among those who suffer some experience of unemployment, 
the total number of days lost to unemployment are distributed more equally. On the one hand, the 
distribution of unemployment could be said to have become more unequal, since the experience of 
unemployment is now concentrated among a smaller minority o f the labour force; yet on the other hand, 
within that small minority, unemployment is distributed is more equally. A single statistic measuring the 
degree of inequality across the whole labour force cannot illustrate both of these opposing forces, only their 
net effect, and in all probability, any interesting change in the inequality of the distribution of 
unemployment among the tenth of the population who have some experience o f unemployment will be 
dominated by fluctuations in the fraction of the labour force who suffer no unemployment whatsoever.
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has become more unequal, since either those who experience very little unemployment 
are suffering even less, or those who experience a lot of unemployment are suffering 
even more, or some combination of the two. There are two obvious problems with such 
an approach. Firstly, it is not often clear why the quantile ratios have changed (i.e. which 
of the above explanations is the correct one). Secondly, and potentially of more concern, 
is that these statistics only speak of what is happening at specific (and arbitrary) points in 
the distribution, and one can easily construct examples where the movement of a 
particular percentile ratio can be particularly misleading as to overall changes in the 
dispersion of observations. The obvious solution is to calculate a number of percentile 
ratios for a number of different pairs of points through the distribution of unemployment 
-  and that is what we have done in the following figures. However, there is a drawback to 
this approach, and that is there is nothing which guarantees that all the percentile ratios 
will move in the same direction.
The Gini coefficient is perhaps the most well known inequality measure, and is defined 
as the average difference between all possible pairs of durations of unemployment in the 
population as a fraction of the total duration of unemployment experienced i.e. :
[5.1]
where Uf is the duration of unemployment of each individual, and u is the mean duration 
of unemployment across the sample of n individuals^^.
C ow ell(1 9 9 5 ),p.23.
Of course, the Gini coefficient is also equal to exactly twice the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical Lorenz curve defined for a population where the distribution of unemployment is absolutely 
equal (all individuals have an identical experience of unemployment). Therefore, perhaps a more appealing 
method o f comparing the degree of inequality in two identically sized populations might be to plot their 
respective Lorenz curves. If one lies completely inside the other, then that population must certainly suffer 
less inequality than its rival. However, the fact that our samples are often over a hundred thousand 
individuals in size will typically mitigate against the occurrence of this event; instead the Lorenz curves 
will generally intersect, so we must use the Gini coefficient instead to differentiate between the samples. 
For an example of such an approach see Disney (1979) who uses the Lorenz curve of the distribution of 
unemployment to estimate the concentration of unemployment, and how that distribution is affected by 
recurrent unemployment.
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The other inequality measure we employ is the Theil index, which is a specific member 
o f the family of modified information theoretic measures. The Theil index is defined as 
follows :
[5.2]
The reader might reasonably ask what value this extra inequality measure adds to the 
analysis over and above the familiar Gini coefficient. The answer to this question will 
depend on the properties we require of our inequality index. Cowell (1995) considers five 
properties that a desirable index of inequality might satisfy. Both the Theil index and 
Gini coefficient satisfy the weak principle of transfers (where, for a given total duration 
o f unemployment, if the Lorenz curve of one sample lies entirely inside that of another, 
then the measure ranks inequality as being higher in the latter than the former) and 
independence of the measure both to the total duration of unemployment, and the number 
o f individuals in the sample (change all durations by the same proportion, and inequality 
should remain unchanged). However, the Theil index exhibits two further properties that 
favour it as a measure of inequality. Firstly, we cannot decompose the Gini coefficient to 
provide an explanation of changes in inequality in the sample as a whole in terms of the 
degree o f inequality between, say, different age groups in the sample, and that to 
inequality within each of those age groups*^. Conversely, for the Theil index, total 
inequality is exactly equal to the sum of within and between group inequality. Secondly, 
with the Theil index, the effect of a transfer of a small amount of unemployment [Au] 
from one individual to another on total inequality depends only on a function 
(specifically, their quotient) of their relative shares of the total duration of unemployment 
(the strong principle of transfers). With the Gini coefficient, the effect of such a transfer 
depends on the relative location of the individuals, not the amount of unemployment they 
each experience, nor their share of total unemployment- so that transfers happen to have a
Unless, each age group can be strictly ordered in terms of their experience of unemployment (Cowell 
(1995), p. 150), which will, of course, never be the case.
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much larger effect on measured inequality if that transfer is between individuals near the 
median of the cumulative distribution function [F(u)]^\ Consequently, if  we rely on 
either one of these measures to describe changes in inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment over time then our conclusions may be very sensitive to where changes in 
the density of observations occur across the range of all possible durations of 
unemployment. We now turn to an analysis of the extent of any inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment over time, initially in the full sample, and then for 
particular age groups, in order to explain how changes in the age composition of the 
labour force might have impacted upon the level of inequality in the sample as a whole.
5 .2  In e q u a l it y  in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  a c r o s s  t h e  w h o l e
SAMPLE
The percentile plots overleaf (Figures 5.1-5.2) indicate that, above all, inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment appears to be greater when the economy is in a boom, and 
this fact is most strikingly illustrated by the ratio of the 90^  ^ to the 10^ *^  percentile, which 
falls by almost two fifths (38%) in value between 1990 and 1993. If we turn to the ratio 
of the percentiles to the median (see Figure 5.3), then we find a similar picture -  the ratio 
of the 90*^  percentile to the median falls proportionately even further (40%) between 
1990 and 1993 (the ratio of the 10**^ percentile to the median fell only by about 3% in the 
same period). The explanation of this dramatic increase in inequality, as measured by the 
ratio of 90^  ^ to the 10* percentile, seems to lie almost exclusively in the (lack of) 
movement of the 90* percentile. In fact at least one in ten of those who are unemployed 
in every year are unemployed throughout that year -  so the 90* percentile is equal to 
unity throughout the period. However, when the labour market begins to tighten 
experiences of unemployment tend to fall so the ratio inevitably increases, indicating 
greater inequality. The same outcome is observed with the other percentile ratios, 
although in quantitative terms the changes in inequality are less pronounced, and that is 
because the other percentiles at the upper end of the distribution (the 80*, 75* and 66*) 
respond to the change in the labour market and also track downwards.
Cowell (1995), p.23.
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The underlying message remains the same -  the fortunes of those at the upper end of the 
unemployment distribution are less responsive in proportional terms to improvements in 
the aggregate labour market^^; even the least volatile ratio presented below, that of the
As we noted in the previous section, in absolute terms the opposite is the case -  between 1990 and 1993, 
the 25th percentile increased by just over a month, but by a staggering 75%, while the 75th percentile 
increased by nearly three months but increased by only a third.
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66^  ^ to the 33"^  ^percentile, falls by a sixth between 1990 and 1993. It is also the case that 
each of the percentile ratios we calculated were lower in 1994 than in 1986 when the 
unemployment rate was all but identical which suggests that over time the distribution of 
unemployment might have become less unequal.
If anything, the distribution of unemployment appears to be even more unequal across 
spells (see figure 5.3) -  the ratio of the 90‘^  and the 10‘^  percentiles approached twice the 
corresponding value for the distribution of unemployment across individuals. This result 
follows directly from the fact that while the 90^  ^ percentiles of both distributions are 
equal (to 100%), the total duration of unemployment experienced by those who suffer the 
least still exceeds the length of the shortest spells. The obvious inference is that those 
who suffer the shortest spells over the course of a year typically suffer more than one 
spell in that year^ ,^ which will tend to equalise experiences of unemployment across 
individuals, compared to across spells.
F i g u r e  5.3 : R a t i o s  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t i l e s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  [1 y e a r  p e r i o d ]
20
16
12
8
4
0
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
30 1
25 -
20 -
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
• 90/10 -------  80/20 - 75/25
I n d i v i d u a l s
-66/33 ■ 90/10' •80/20-------- 75/25
S p e l l s
■66/33
As we widen the period over which we estimate the distribution of unemployment, it 
appears that the distribution becomes even more unequal. Over the period 1983 to 1986, 
the ratio of the 90‘^  and 10^  ^percentiles is more than two and a half times the average of 
the same ratio calculated on an annual basis. However, when we turn to the ratio of the
O f course, if  the period over which we measure experiences is too short, this result is almost inevitable, 
since i f  an individual is to suffer multiple spells in a short space o f  time, each constituent spell must by 
definition be short (OECD (1985)).
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and 33'^  ^percentiles calculated on the basis of the distribution estimated over one and 
four year periods, we find that they are approximately equal. Therefore, we find evidence 
that around the median of the distribution of unemployment, the degree of inequality is 
largely unchanged as we widen the period over which we estimate the distribution. 
However, at the extremes of the distribution, we do find evidence that the distribution has 
become more extreme as the window of estimation widens.
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As we extend the period over which we estimate the distribution of unemployment, an 
increasing number of individuals are included. Now many of these individuals (whom we 
could conveniently label the frictionally unemployed) will typically suffer a very brief 
spell of unemployment. As a result the numerical value of the 10^  ^ percentile of the
212
distribution will rise only marginally as we extend the length o f the period '^^ (see Figure 
5.5). Furthermore, as we extend the period over which we estimate the distribution of 
unemployment, the extent to which we censor the number of spells suffered by the 
recurrent unemployed and the length of spells suffered by the long term unemployed will 
diminish, so unsurprisingly, the experiences of these unfortunate few diverge from those 
of the many. Indeed, in the four year period 1983-6, the ratio o f the 90* percentile to the 
median was approximately 3.8; in any of the component years, this ratio calculated on the 
basis of the distribution of unemployment in a single year was only about 2.1.
When we turn to those measures which condense all the information about the degree of 
inequality in the population into a single statistic we find once again the clear link 
between the cycle and the degree of inequality in the distribution -  both measures are 
clearly pro-cyclical (see Figure 5.6). Furthermore, our findings appear unambiguous -  the 
Gini coefficient and the Theil index both give identical rankings of the fourteen years in 
the sample period in terms of the inequality in the distribution o f unemployment. There is 
therefore very strong evidence to suggest that inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment across the unemployed varies procyclically*^. When we compare the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment across cycles we find that for all 
the inequality measures we have used inequality in the distribution of unemployment is 
found to be lower in 1994 than in 1986 both across individuals and spells
The tenth percentile of the distribution of unemployment over the four year period: 1983-1986 is 1.2 
months; the average of the tenth percentile of the distribution when estimated separately over each o f those 
four years is 0.9 months.
Given that the proportion of the labour force who have some experience of unemployment in a given 
year varies pro-cyclically, we might expect that the degree o f inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment will also be procyclical -  since both ‘forces’ are working in the same direction -  in a boom, 
unemployment becomes more concentrated among a smaller proportion of the labour force, among whom 
the distribution of unemployment becomes more unequal.
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When we turn to an analysis of the degree of inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment over a longer time-scale then we find that once again our measures are 
consistent with our findings using the percentile ratios -  that measured inequality is 
higher in the distribution of unemployment when it is estimated over a longer time period 
(see Figure 5.7).
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5.3 I n e q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  A g e .
As we highlighted in Sections 3 and 4, there are significant differences in the distribution 
of unemployment across different age groups (see Figures 5.8 - 5.9). When we turn to the 
analyze the degree of inequality in these age-specific distributions we find two striking 
facts -  first, that inequality in the distribution of unemployment varies significantly by 
age, with the young typically suffering a more unequal distribution o f unemployment; but 
second, that there has been a significant convergence in this variation in inequality by 
age.
Experiences of unemployment are most unequal among youths when we compare the 90^ 
and 10^  ^percentiles of the distribution -  although this pattern was reversed through the 
recession in the early 1990’s. This result is a consequence of the fact that relative to 
adults, those youths who experience the least unemployment over the period suffer very 
little unemployment indeed. However, we find the opposite result when we turn to the 
distribution of unemployment across spells -  where, for example, there is less inequality 
in the length of spells suffered by those in their teens compared to those in their twenties, 
because so few of the former suffer long spells. The figures illustrate graphically the 
significant differences in the degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment for 
those at different points in their working life. However, they also reveal that the pattern 
of inequality in the distribution of unemployment evolves in broadly the same fashion for 
each of the age groups.
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F ig u r e  5 .9  : R a t io  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t i l e s  o f  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  [1 y e a r ]
Individuals
20
15
10
5
0
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
18 YEARS
15 -
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
25 YEARS
20
15
10
5
0
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
45 YEARS
-90/10
S pells
20 -
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
18 YEARS
15
10
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
25 YEARS
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
45 YEARS
•80/20 ■75/25 •66/33
Casual inspection of Figure 5.10 below also reveals the extent of the convergence in the 
inequality in the distribution of unemployment within different age groups. In 1984, the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment among 45 year olds was almost 
exactly two thirds of that in the distribution of 18 year olds, as measured by the Theil
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index; by 1996, any gap had all but disappeared. Unfortunately, these figures do not 
allow us to directly investigate the extent to which inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment across the labour force is driven by this inequality between the 
experiences of the different age groups. Ideally, we would like to divide the entire 
population into several distinct sub-groups and decompose measured inequality into that 
explained by the degree of inequality between the typical experience of each of these 
separate groups, and that within each of these groups. The Theil index (as a member of 
the family of modified information theoretic measures) allows just such a decomposition 
for [k] separate mutually exclusive groups as follows*^:
AuJ [5.3]
where for the representative group, their mean duration of unemployment is u
their share of the total sample and Ij is the degree of inequality within that sub-group. The 
first term in this decomposition captures the degree of inequality within each group -  and 
is the weighted sum of the Theil index calculated for each sub group; the second term 
captures the degree of inequality between the separate groups in the sample, and is 
simply a hypothetical Theil index calculated over the entire sample under the assumption 
that all members of each group have an identical experience of unemployment (equal to 
the mean experience of their group).
In the following analysis we perform just such a decomposition, dividing the sample of 
males who had some experience of unemployment in a given year into five separate age- 
groups - those under 22 years of age, those between 22 and 29, 30 and 39, 40 and 49 
years, and those over 49 years of age. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.11, with the 
inequality between groups graphed on a separate axis for greater clarity:
Cowell (1995), p.151.
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The decomposition highlights that inequality in the experience of unemployment is 
driven almost exclusively by the degree of inequality within each of the age-groups -  or, 
in other words, we gain very little by decomposing the panel into separate groups when
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trying to explain inequality in the distribution of unemployment. Between 1983 and 1996, 
inequality between these age groups never explains more than 3.5% of total measured 
inequality in the whole sample. This result is robust to alternative age decompositions -  
for example, between youths and adults (i.e. between those aged under 25 years, and 
those aged 25 years and above).
The other striking result is that in a very short period of time -  between 1986 and 1990 -  
the proportion of total inequality explained by inequality between the experiences of 
these separate age groups falls from this peak to 0.1% - which underscores the 
convergence in the inequality measures we graphed in the previous figures. When we 
repeat the decomposition for the distribution of unemployment across spells, we find 
broadly the same picture -  that differences in the degree of inequality in the distribution 
of unemployment between age groups are not significant. Simply put, different age 
groups in the labour force never were that different in terms of the inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment among them, and any differences that did exist almost 
disappeared over the period.
To conclude then, we have established five key results. First, that the degree of inequality 
in the distribution of unemployment among those males who have some experience of it 
varies pro-cyclically (i.e. increases in a boom when unemployment falls), and therefore 
since the number of people who have some experience of unemployment also falls in a 
boom, we expect that inequality in the distribution of unemployment across the entire 
labour force will also vary pro-cyclically. Second, that as we widen the period over which 
we estimate the distribution of unemployment, the degree of inequality in that 
distribution increases. Third, that the distribution of unemployment is even more unequal 
across spells than individuals so that recurrent unemployment appears if  anything to 
equalise experiences of unemployment across individuals. Fourth, that over time, there is 
at least some circumstantial evidence to suggest that the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment has fallen. Fifth, that although the degree of inequality in 
the distribution of unemployment differs for separate age groups in the sample, these
2 2 0
differences explain a small and decreasing fraction of the overall level of inequality in the 
sample.
In terms of the implications of the above for wage setting behaviour results one and four 
deserve particular attention; the fact that the distribution of unemployment becomes more 
unequal in a recovery is likely to increase the elasticity o f the wage setting function with 
respect to the unemployment rate, since as the aggregate unemployment rate falls 
experiences of unemployment become increasingly concentrated on the chronically 
unemployed. However, if  the distribution of unemployment has become more equal over 
time than this might suggest that insiders will show increasing restraint in future when 
they set wages.
6. P o l a r is a t io n  in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  a n d  W a g e  P r e s s u r e
In the previous section we analyzed the degree of inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment, arguing that an unequal distribution may lead to lower wage restraint on 
the part of insiders than we would otherwise expect at a given unemployment rate. 
However, recent work by Esteban and Ray (1994) argues that the axioms that underpin 
the inequality literature may not be wholly appropriate as a logical framework to analyze 
a situation of social conflict*^ which, at least in a metaphorical sense, seems an apt 
description of the ‘leapfrogging’ behaviour which characterizes decentralized wage 
setting. Instead, they argue that conflict is most likely to occur within a polarised (rather 
than an unequal) population, which they define as one in which there are a relatively 
small number of distinct clusters, in which experiences are relatively similar, but between 
which experiences differ sharply. In other words, a polarised population exhibits both 
intra-group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity.
For example, a survey by Amiel and Cowell (1992) found that most non-economists do not even rank 
income distributions according to how unequal they are in a manner consistent with the Lorenz ordering -  
that is if  at every level of income, a smaller proportion of population A than population B have that income 
or less, then income is distributed more unequally among population A than among B (Esteban and Ray 
(1994)).
2 2 1
Although similar concepts, Esteban and Ray argue that polarisation and inequality are 
fundamentally different phenomena, and therefore focusing on the degree of polarisation 
in the distribution of unemployment might offer us an alternative insight into the 
determinants of aggregate wage setting. They argue inequality measures fail to 
differentiate between shifts in a distribution that could be loosely thought of as 
convergence to the global mean and those shifts which entail convergence towards a local 
mean, or ‘clustering’*^ . In either case the level of inequality in the distribution of 
unemployment may fall which we might argue should lead to greater wage restraint; 
however in the latter case, the degree of polarisation in the population has clearly 
increased*^. It may well be that it is only where individuals are able to clearly distinguish 
between different groups in the labour market each of whom suffer different experiences 
of unemployment that they can distinguish between their own individual risk of 
becoming and remaining unemployed from the average risk across the labour force. 
Indeed the stylized argument we presented in Section 1 in terms of a society inhabited by 
insiders who control wage setting (in their own interests) and outsiders who bear the 
brunt of unemployment is couched in terms of a polarised society. Since any conclusions 
we might draw regarding the behaviour of wage setters will be predicated on the 
assumption of what matters when insiders assess their risk of becoming (and remaining) 
unemployed, we now focus on the degree o f polarisation in the distribution of 
unemployment in order to examine whether or not this alternative approach produces 
broadly consistent conclusions regarding wage setting behaviour to those developed in 
Section 5.
So that, for example, while in the economic growth literature, conditional convergence -  the convergence 
in the per capita growth rates of the developed and developing nations to separate means -  will lead 
eventually to a sharp polarisation in standards of living around the world, on any measure o f inequality 
based on growth rates, inequality will be found to have fallen (Esteban and Ray (1994)),
The distinction here is quite subtle -  since the degree to which the distribution of unemployment is 
polarised into distinct cluster points will certainly affect the level of inequality in that distribution. 
Nonetheless, polarisation and inequality are conceptually distinct from each other. As a case in point 
consider two alternative unemployment distributions: a uniform distribution over the domain of all possible 
durations, and a bimodal distribution, where all individuals spend either one third or two thirds of any 
period unemployed. The former distribution is very unequal, but unpolarised; the latter is highly polarised
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6.1 D e fin in g  th e  D e g r e e  o f  P o l a r isa t io n  in  a  P o p u l a t io n
In their seminal paper, Esteban and Ray (1994) give an axiomatic derivation of a class of 
polarisation measures o f the general form:
[6.1]
i j
SO that for a distribution (7r,u) °^, polarisation is dependent on the sum of all 'effective 
antagonisms ’ between each individual and all others in the sample, according to some 
function T (i("),a( ) )  where the degree of antagonism between any pair of individuals, is
in turn defined by the distance between their experiences. Antagonism can take one of 
two forms: individuals who have similar experiences of unemployment are said to 
identify with each other according to some function: /(•); conversely, individuals whose 
experiences of unemployment differ are said to be alienated from each other according to 
some function a Q . The degree of polarisation in a distribution is thus defined by the 
extent to which individuals both identify with certain individuals in the distribution 
(capturing the existence of clusters of individuals who share common experiences) and 
distinguish themselves from others (capturing the degree to which the experiences of 
individuals in a particular cluster are distinct from those in other clusters).
In order to make this generalised polarisation measure operational we need to specify the 
particular form of the identification and alienation functions. Following Esteban and Ray 
(1994), we assume that identification occurs over an interval, so that individuals identify 
with not only those who have identical experiences of unemployment, but also with those 
who share ‘similar’ experiences to their own. The limit of identification can then be 
defined by some (arbitrary) constant D, so that a cluster is now defined as interval of 
width 2D. Within that cluster, total identification for individual i is defined as:
but not very unequal. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between these two concepts see Esteban 
and Ray (1994).
Where u = {ul,u2, ,un} is the set o f all possible durations of unemployment, over which individuals
are distributed across the range of [n] cluster points with frequency Tti, where Tci >0 V n.
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h =  [6.2]
y:| Wy-w^ |<D
where the function w(m. ,My] defines the level of identification between individuals i 
and j  which depends on their respective experiences of unemployment. It then remains to
define a particular functional form for our identification function. Once again, following 
Esteban and Ray, we argue that any reasonable choice of identification function should 
satisfy three properties: first, that it should be symmetric so that the i ’s identification 
with j  should equal j  ’s identification with i ; second, that, identification should depend
only on the difference between their experiences of unemployment; and finally, third, that 
the level of identification should be monotonically decreasing in the difference between 
their experiences, below the limit of identification. A suitable candidate for the 
identification function is therefore:
h =
j-\u^-uA <D
U- — Uj
D
[6.3]
which ensures that identification is linearly decreasing in the difference between 
individuals’ experience o f unemployment, and is bounded between zero and one.
Of course, by the same token, any reasonable alienation function should also satisfy the 
same three criteria we applied to the identification function above, except that our third 
condition would now require that alienation is monotonically increasing in the difference 
between the experiences of i and j , beyond the limit of identification. Therefore, for
those individuals whose experiences of unemployment differ by more than D, the degree 
of alienation felt by individual i is defined as :
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ü; =
J' u ^ -u j\>D
M ■ — U . - D( J
l - D
[6.4]
so that alienation, beyond the threshold [D], is linearly increasing in the distance between 
two individuals. For the sake of consistency, we have also normalised the degree of 
alienation so that it too is bounded between zero and one. Given these functional forms, 
we can specify our polarisation measure^^ so that across a population, containing 
k  distinct cluster points, polarisation is defined as :
=^1 i=i
' d - Uik~Uj \
D
, I ,
U^k - U j D
l - D
[6.5]
An intuitive explanation for the polarisation measure is as follows -  for any pair of 
individuals, the measure will return the greatest numerical value where their experiences 
are either very similar, or very different from each other.
Of course, in the measure above the parameter [D], which determines the point at which 
individuals cease to identify and begin to feel animosity, remains to be specified. If this
By way of comparison, Esteban and Ray define the level o f polarisation across i cluster groups as 
follows:
/=! j=\
where K is simply a multiplicative constant, and OC captures the degree of ‘polarisation sensitivity’. In 
equation [6.5] we have set the constant: K and CC equal to one (although we will go on to define K as the 
inverse of the cube of the sample size to normalize our polarisation measure). If, alternatively, CC\s set 
equal to zero our polarisation measure is equivalent to the Gini index.
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parameter is relatively large then the measure will be dominated by the extent of 
identification in the sample - in other words, the degree of homogeneity within clusters; if 
it is relatively small, the measure is dominated by the degree of animosity in the sample -  
i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between clusters^^. We therefore calculate this particular 
polarisation measure for a range o f possible values for this parameter, to examine the 
sensitivity of our results. However, as the figures below demonstrate, irrespective of 
whether we define the point at which individuals with different experiences of 
unemployment cease to identify with each other as a number of days equivalent to 0.02, 
0.05 or 0.1 percent of the period^^ our results are not materially affected.
However, the polarisation measure we have defined here is not independent of the size of 
the sample, and ceteris paribus, polarisation is lower among a small population than a 
large one (Esteban and Ray (1994) p.847). However, the measure may be normalised in 
population size by dividing by the cube of the sample size '^ ,^ and to illuminate ‘genuine’ 
changes in the degree of polarisation in the data, over and above any change in 
population size, both the standard and normalised measures will be considered.
Clearly, our results may be highly dependent on the particular functional form we have 
chosen for the identification and alienation functions. We have argued that it is logical to 
assume that identification must monotonically decrease (and alienation monotonically 
increase) as the difference between individuals’ experiences increase. In [6.3] and [6.4] 
we have assumed that the rate of change of identification and alienation with the 
difference between individuals’ experiences is constant. However, it is not clear that any 
restriction ought to be placed on the second derivative of the identification or alienation 
functions. In order to illustrate the sensitivity of our results to the specification of these
Specifically, as D increases each individual will identify with a larger fraction of the population, and 
among the remainder of the population from whom he is alienated, he will feel a lower level o f alienation 
than he previously did.
When calculating the degree of polarization in the distribution of unemployment estimated over a single 
year, these alternative choices of the value of the parameter D imply that individuals identify with each 
other if  the total duration of unemployment they suffer differs by less than approximately a week, a 
fortnight or a month respectively.
Which is effectively equivalent to re-defining the population weights as population frequencies 
(Esteban and Ray (1994)).
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functions, we therefore consider two alternative functional forms for the identification 
and alienation functions: where both the identification and alienation functions are either 
convex or concave respectively. Simple concave and convex transformations of the 
identification function [6.3] are respectively:
y:| <D
^ D - Wj. — Uj \
D
[6.6]
i’=
y: M J- < D
D - u, -  u .1 J
D
[6.7]
The intuitive interpretation of these identification functions is that the individual 
identifies strongly with all those but at the extremes of the cluster in the case of concave 
identification [6.6]; conversely, given convex identification [6.7] identification is only 
significant within a small fraction of the total width of the cluster. Consequently, it is 
clear that measured identification is higher in the former case than in the latter. Similarly, 
for our alienation function [6.4], we now have:
J- u I -u  j \> D
U; -- U ■ - DI J
V A
l - D
[6.8]
J- -u  j \> D
U; — U ■- DI J
l - D
[6.9]
In the former case (concave alienation [6.8]), an individual feels considerable alienation 
towards a large section of the population, whereas in the latter case (convex identification
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[6.9]), individuals feel alienated only from those whose experiences are utterly different 
to their own. Once again, measured alienation is greater in the former case than in the 
latter. The resulting polarisation functions are respectively:
k=l i=l
D - Uik -  Uj
D
X
Uik - U j - D
l - D
/ i
[6.10]
t=l i=\
J-
 ^D - Uik -  Uj \
D
X
, I ,
Uik ~ - D
l - D
[6.11]
In Figure 6.1 below we give a simple graphical illustration of our three generic 
polarisation measures; in the particular example we consider an individual who spends 
40% of a given period unemployed, where the limit of identification is considered to be a 
number of days of unemployment equivalent to 10% of the whole period [D=0.1].
Therefore, given concave identification and alienation functions, we will always measure 
a higher level of polarisation in a given distribution than if we had used convex functions 
instead. The issue we investigate is the extent to which varying the form o f what are 
ultimately arbitrary functions affects the time series profile of polarisation in our sample.
228
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6 .2  P o l a r is a t io n  in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t
If we first consider the standard polarisation measure we observe that the distribution of 
unemployment becomes markedly more polarised when the labour market enters a slump 
-  between 1990 and 1993 there was a four fold increase in polarisation, as measured by 
our standard measure where identification occurs over a range equivalent to just over a 
fortnight [D=0.05]. The results obtained are remarkably similar for the distribution of 
unemployment across spells. In short, polarisation in the distribution of unemployment 
appears to be highly anti-cyclical (see Figure 6.2).
Of course more people have some experience of unemployment during a slump and this 
will increase measured polarisation. Nonetheless, when we turn to the polarisation 
measure which is normalised by the size of the sample, our results are qualitatively, if  not 
quantitatively, unchanged. Polarisation is now weakly anti-cyclical -  between 1990 and 
1993 polarisation in the distribution of unemployment now increases by between a fifth 
to two thirds depending on the measure we use. We see a very similar pattern when we 
turn to the distribution of unemployment across spells (see Figure 6.3), where the rate at 
which polarisation increases during a slump is muted once we control for the increase in 
the number of spells that results from a downturn in the labour market. Before 
normalisation, the distribution of unemployment appears more polarised across spells
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than individuals, but inevitably this is a result of the fact that there are more spells of 
unemployment in any period than people who suffer them. After controlling for this, we 
find the distribution of unemployment is less polarised across spells than individuals. 
Finally, when we focus on the extent to which the degree of polarisation in the 
distribution has changed over time we find that before controlling for the size of the 
sample in those two years, polarisation is higher in 1994 than in 1986, yet after 
normalisation, polarisation is lower in 1994.
As Figures 6.4 - 6.5 show our results are robust to alternative specification of the 
polarisation measure -  although polarisation is increasing in the range of identification, 
and greater when both identification and alienation are concave rather than convex -  the 
underlying trend in polarisation remains the same.
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F i g u r e  6 .6  : P o l a r i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  a c r o s s  I n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  S p e l l s
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After controlling for changes in the size of our sample it appears that polarisation is 
driven by the relative size of the spike in the distribution of unemployment -  in a slump a
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larger proportion of those who experience unemployment are permanently unemployed 
which will not only increase identification among those who are unfortunate enough to 
suffer such long durations but also increase alienation as a greater proportion of the 
sample move to one extreme of the distribution. This process can be “eye-balled” from 
either the percentile plots of the distribution given in figure 3.6, or from the estimates of 
the distribution itself given in Appendix 1. When we turn to consider how the degree of 
polarisation in the distribution of unemployment has changed over time, we find that both 
across individuals and spells, there has been a marginal fall in polarisation, once we 
control for the fact that more people now have some experience of unemployment than 
they did a decade ago.
Finally, when we estimate the distribution of unemployment over a longer period of time, 
the degree of polarisation in that distribution is higher^^ before we control for the fact that 
more people have some experience of unemployment over a longer time period (see 
Figure 6.6). However, once we control for the fact that a far larger number of people have 
some experience of unemployment over a four year period, we find that the distribution 
of unemployed is far less polarised when estimated over a longer period. This is due in no 
small part to the fact that when the distribution of unemployment is defined over a longer 
time period, the relative importance of the ‘spike’ at the far extreme of the distribution 
diminishes and as a result the distribution appears less polarised.
6 .3  P o l a r is a t io n  in  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  A g e
We have already established in the previous section that the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment does not vary significantly by age. When we turn to detail 
the variation in the degree of polarisation in the distribution of unemployment by age, we 
find a broadly similar picture (see Figures 6.7 -  6.8). Before normalising by the number 
of each of the respective age groups in the sample, the distribution of unemployment
When the distribution of unemployment is estimated over the four year period 1983-1986 we measure 
polarisation as 1.68 xl014 when identification occurs in an interval of 2% of the period either side o f the 
individual. When estimated separately over each of those years, the highest value of polarisation we record 
using the same choice of the parameter D is 1.17 xlO'*(see Appendix tables A.6.2 and A.6.6).
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appears most polarised among the young but to a decreasing extent over the course of the 
period. However, as we detailed in Section 3 there are a disproportionately large number 
of youths among those who have some experience of unemployment and this is likely to 
have increased our measure of polarisation. Furthermore, we also know that the age- 
composition of the sample has changed dramatically over time -  in particular, the number 
of youths who have some experience of unemployment in a given period has fallen 
relative to adults; ceteris paribus, this will have reduced the degree of polarisation in the 
distribution of unemployment among the young.
F igure  6.7 : Polarisation  of  the  D istribution  a c ro ss  Individu a ls  by A ge
[D=0.05]
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Once we control for the relative numbers of each group who have some experience of 
unemployment, we find that the distribution of unemployment is least polarised among 
the young, and once again there is clear evidence of convergence in experiences across 
age groups. Increasing polarisation in the distribution of unemployment by age appears to 
be a direct consequence of the fact that the proportion of the age group who are 
permanently unemployed throughout the period also increases with age.
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F i g u r e  6 .8  : P o l a r i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  a c r o s s  S p e l l s  b y  A g e  [D=0.05]
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This section has focused upon a specific feature of the distribution of unemployment -  
the extent of the polarisation in that distribution, arguing that this, rather than the overall 
level of inequality in the distribution, may be a factor taken into account by wage setters. 
At first glance, it appears our results here are in direct contrast to those we obtained in the 
previous section (the degree of inequality in the distribution of unemployment is pro­
cyclical, and the distribution is most unequal among the young). We now find that the 
degree of polarisation in the distribution of unemployment is anti-cyclical, since during a 
boom there are relatively fewer people who experience very high durations of 
unemployment so the importance of this key cluster group diminishes in size. We also 
find that the distribution of unemployment is least polarised among the young, although 
once again this differential is small and has diminished markedly over time. These results 
suggest that if the degree of polarisation of the distribution of unemployment is taken into 
account by wage setters, then during a recession wage setters will not moderate their 
claims in the face of a high aggregate unemployment rate.
It must be remembered that the polarisation measures we have adopted is defined in 
terms of the absolute distance (or difference) between individuals’ experiences of 
unemployment; whereas, the inequality measures we adopted in the previous section are 
typically defined in terms of one individual’s experience as a fraction of another’s. This
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distinction proves crucial: in a boom the gap between those suffering the most and the 
least unemployment narrows in absolute terms and polarisation falls; but in proportionate 
terms the opposite is the case, the gap widens and inequality increases. Whether insiders 
view their exposure to unemployment relative to those of outsiders in proportionate or 
absolute terms is unclear. However, if insiders take their relative risk of becoming 
unemployed into consideration when setting wages, this distinction may matter over the 
course of the economic cycle.
7. C o n c l u s io n s
This chapter has analyzed how experiences of unemployment vary across the labour force 
in the long run -  an issue which, until recently, has not been the subject of much research, 
due in large part to the lack of data. The JUVOS cohort dataset, upon which this research 
is based, includes exhaustive information on the spell histories of a random five percent 
sample of all those who have some experience of unemployment since October 1982. By 
aggregating across these spells we have been able to construct a detailed account of the 
total duration of unemployment suffered by those individuals in the panel over the long 
run.
In any given year, between two to four million men of prime working age have some 
experience of unemployment over the course o f three to five million separate spells. 
Across a four year period, something of the order of five million men make at least one 
claim for unemployment related benefits over the course of nearly ten million spells. 
However, experiences of unemployment are far from uniform among these men. O f those 
who have some experience of unemployment in any given year, about one in ten will 
spend less than four weeks in unemployment over the course of a year, yet one in five 
will spend the entire year unemployed. Over the course of a year, recurrent 
unemployment is rare -  about one in five of those men who will claim unemployment 
related benefits in a given year will suffer more than one spell of unemployment in that 
year, and less than one in a hundred will suffer four or more spells. Over a four year 
period, recurrent unemployment becomes a much more pervasive phenomenon -  the
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majority of individuals who experience unemployment during the period will suffer more 
than one spell, and one in ten will suffer four or more spells. Spells suffered by youths 
are over-represented in the JUVOS panel. However, the data establishes that youths 
suffer higher unemployment rates because a larger fraction of their cohort in the labour 
force flow into unemployment each year, rather than because those youths who do 
experience unemployment suffer more or longer spells than adults do. Given that the 
level of the claimant count varies little from week we might expect that the distribution of 
unemployment is quite static in the sense that it is the same individuals who are 
unemployed from week to week. However, this is not the case -  the gross flows onto and 
off of the claimant count dwarf the net changes in the stock; while the claimant count 
changes by an average of a thousand men each week, some forty five thousand men will 
enter and exit unemployment each week.
The chronically unemployed -  those who spend the majority of any period claiming 
unemployment benefit -  account for about a half of all those who ever enter 
unemployment in the space of a year and about three quarters of the total days lost to 
unemployment in that year. Over a four year period, they represent a smaller fraction of 
all those who experience unemployment, but still account for a large fraction of the total 
duration of unemployment suffered. It is not the case that long term unemployment and 
chronic unemployment are one in the same; over a one year period the recurrent 
unemployed make up about a quarter of the chronically unemployed, and over a four year 
period they are in the majority. Policy initiatives which focus on the long term 
unemployed alone may therefore do so at the expense of the hundreds of thousands of 
recurrent unemployed individuals who over the course of a number of spells spend the 
majority of their time unemployed. Relative to their share of the labour force youths are 
over represented among the chronically unemployed, although nothing like to the extent 
that they are among the pool of all those who have some experience of unemployment.
It is a fact of life that certain individuals -  typically the more skilled and productive 
members of the workforce -  are always going to be at a lower risk o f becoming 
unemployed and enjoy a higher probability of escaping unemployment than others. It
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seems plausible that the more disproportionately that the total burden of unemployment 
falls upon the chronically unemployed the less restrained wage setters will feel in pushing 
for higher wages. Blanchard (2000) has voiced a particular form of this argument: that 
adult wage setters will not be concerned with a high unemployment rate which is 
concentrated on the young. Given the evidence presented above we do not feel there is 
overwhelming support for this proposition in the data. It is more plausible to believe that 
it is the incidence of chronic unemployment per se that might be the root cause of this 
persistence mechanism. Unfortunately our data does not allow us to directly investigate 
this alternative hypothesis since we have no information on the distribution of 
unemployment before the sharp rise in unemployment in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
However, we can analyze the degree of imbalance in the distribution of unemployment 
across individuals since the depths of the recession in the mid 1980’s and this potentially 
offers us new insights into wage-setting behaviour. We have focused on two alternative 
frameworks which attempt to measure this variation in experiences of unemployment 
across the labour force: the first draws upon the established inequality literature, the 
second from the work of, among others, Esteban and Ray (1994) who have pioneered the 
concept of polarisation. Unfortunately, these two frameworks offer different 
interpretations on the degree of imbalance in the distribution of unemployment -  over the 
cycle: the distribution is most polarised during a slump and yet most unequal in a boom. 
This contradiction results from alternative interpretations of the same phenomenon: that 
in a boom the gap between those suffering the most and the least unemployment narrows 
in absolute terms, but widens in proportionate terms. Understanding whether wage 
setters consider their relative risk of becoming and remaining unemployed relative to 
outsiders in absolute or proportionate terms is therefore of cmcial importance, and could 
at least potentially be decided on the basis of empirical research -  perhaps through 
survey. Certainly putting some flesh on the bones of the hypothesis that we have outlined 
here -  that wage setters respond to certain features of the distribution of unemployment- 
is clearly necessary. However, there is at least one point of consensus between our 
measures: between the cycles of the 1980’s and 1990’s the degree of both inequality and 
polarisation in the distribution of unemployment has fallen and so other things equal, we
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might expect greater restraint on the part of wage setters who can now expect to suffer a 
greater (if not equal) share of the burden of unemployment.
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A ppendix  1 : T he D istr ibu tio n  of U n e m pl o y m e n t  :
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[B] K e r n e l  D e n s i t y  P l o t s  [X  a x i s  -  F r a c t i o n  o f  P e r i o d ]
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96 I would like to thank Sandra Bulli for making available the GAUSS programmes which were used to 
generated the kernel density functions presented here.
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A p p e n d ix  2 : T a b l e s  f o r  F ig u r e s  in  th e  C h a p t e r
T a b l e  3 .1  : In c id e n c e  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  in  a  y e a r  (m il l io n s )
Rate (%) individuals spells
1983 12.3 3.21 4.12
1984 12.2 3.19 4.08
1985 12.4 3.25 4.13
1986 12.8 3.30 4.17
1987 11.7 3.12 3.93
1988 9.4 2.70 3.41
1989 7.4 2.36 3.01
1990 6.9 2.46 3.14
1991 10.4 3.11 3.91
1992 12.7 3.62 4.55
1993 13.8 3.70 4.68
1994 12.6 3.47 4.44
1995 10.8 3.14 4.04
1996 10 2.88 3.70
T a b l e  3 .2  : In c id e n c e  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b y
Individuals Spells
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs. 18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 179.3 162.2 99.4 69.8 45.5 232.4 228.1 132.3 89.0 55.9
1984 180.6 172.7 100.7 66.6 47.4 233.0 236.6 133.3 83.8 58.6
1985 175.5 175.7 105.4 62.9 45.0 229.5 238.6 138.1 79.4 54.5
1986 170.7 182.9 111.2 65.1 46.2 220.6 247.8 143.9 80.8 56.4
1987 151.7 167.6 108.9 61.6 42.7 194.7 218.9 141.3 75.7 52.5
1988 123.8 139.4 97.6 53.4 39.7 160.9 181.9 127.6 66.6 47.8
1989 110.0 120.1 88.3 46.0 34.2 0.0 160.9 114.4 58.4 42.2
1990 118.7 126.3 95.8 48.9 36.6 158.2 169.3 123.7 61.0 44.7
1991 128.2 146.7 123.2 62.9 47.0 171.1 192.6 158.0 77.9 56.4
1992 132.0 161.8 134.9 76.0 61.4 176.1 213.9 172.8 94.1 74.4
1993 126.7 168.0 135.1 81.7 68.2 171.2 223.5 176.1 102.9 83.2
1994 114.4 147.5 126.1 77.0 57.3 155.2 199.7 165.3 95.8 72.2
1995 105.1 133.2 113.2 71.2 47.9 143.3 180.0 148.0 90.5 59.8
1996 91.7 118.1 103.7 66.6 45.9 125.2 161.2 138.0 84.1 57.6
2 4 8
T a b l e  3 .3 : A g e -C o m p o sit io n  o f  t h e  P o p u l a t io n  (h u n d r e d s  o f  t h o u sa n d s )
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 4.56 4.58 4.09 4.02 3.07
1984 4.53 4.71 4.14 3.93 3.25
1985 4.48 4.63 4.31 3.76 2.98
1986 4.33 4.51 4.29 3.69 3.00
1987 4.37 4.60 4.40 3.75 3.40
1988 4.22 4.50 4.72 3.62 3.38
1989 4.19 4.52 4.46 3.84 3.64
1990 3.85 4.36 4.66 3.70 3.34
1991 3.69 4.11 4.58 4.06 4.07
1992 3.48 4.18 4.45 4.05 4.48
1993 3.39 4.02 4.32 4.15 3.81
1994 3.21 3.88 4.37 4.26 3.79
1995 3.25 3.49 4.35 4.63 3.78
1996 3.34 3.50 4.23 4.77 3.79
T a b l e  3 .4  :F r a c t io n  o f  e a c h  A g e  G r o u p  w h o  h a v e  s o m e  e x p e r ie n c e
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 39.35 35.38 24.32 17.35 14.81
1984 39.84 36.70 24.33 16.98 14.60
1985 39.20 37.97 24.42 16.71 15.08
1986 39.41 40.58 25.91 17.63 15.44
1987 34.74 36.46 24.73 16.42 12.57
1988 J  29.36 31.00 20.66 14.76 11.74
1989 26.28 26.56 19.82 11.97 9.41
1990 30.82 29.01 20.59 13.22 10.95
1991 34.72 35.70 26.93 15.50 11.54
1992 37.88 38.70 30.32 18.75 13.71
1993 37.41 41.82 31.31 19.69 17.88
1994 1 35.62 38.04 28.82 18.08 15.12
1995 32.34 38.17 26.01 15.36 12.70
1996 27.47 33.73 24.53 13.96 12.12
TABLE 3 .5  : THE DISTRIBUTION OF SPELLS OF UNEMPLOYMENT -  1 YEAR PERIOD (% ]
1983 1986 1990 1993 1996
1 77.61 78.61 77.31 78.11 76.81
2 17.74 17.23 18.71 18.17 18.94
3 3.67 3.32 3.27 3.00 3.40
4+ 0.99 0.84 0.72 0.73 0.86
TABLE 3 .6  : T h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  S p e l l s  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  a g e  [1986] p e r io d  (%
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1 76.17 71.65 76.54 80.89 82.83
2 19.39 22.37 18.53 15.42 13.88
3 3.62 4.94 4.08 2.89 2.38
4+ 0.82 1.04 0.85 0.80 0.91
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1 9 8 3 /6 1 9 8 8 /9 1 1 9 9 3 /6  1
1 5 3 .0 1 5 1 .5 1 5 0 .6 9
2 2 2 .7 0 2 4 .3 7 2 4 .9 5
3 1 1 .7 3 1 2 .7 0 1 2 .6 6
4 6 .1 4 6 .0 8 6 .1 0
5 3 .2 0 2 .8 7 2 .8 8
6 + 3 .2 2 2 .4 6 2 .7 3
TABLE 3 .8  ; THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN MONTHS 1 YEAR PERIOD (% )
1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6
individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells
<  1 1 0 .5 7 1 9 .81 1 1 .1 2 1 9 .4 5 1 6 .2 5 2 3 .6 4 9 .3 9 1 6 .8 0 1 1 .5 5 1 9 .7 0
1 - 4 2 7 .7 2 3 4 .3 7 2 8 .3 3 3 4 .9 9 3 3 .7 8 4 0 .0 9 2 4 .7 1 3 3 .1 9 2 7 .4 3 3 5 .1 1
4 - 8 2 3 .7 7 2 0 .0 8 2 3 .0 6 1 9 .6 0 2 2 .3 0 1 8 .1 7 2 3 .4 5 2 0 .8 8 2 3 .3 5 2 0 .1 7
> 8 3 7 .9 4 2 5 .7 3 3 7 .4 8 2 5 .9 7 2 7 .6 8 1 8 .1 1 4 2 .4 5 2 9 .1 3 3 7 .6 7 2 5 .0 2
TABLE 3 .9  : T h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  a g e  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d  (% )
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells
< 1 16.33 25.30 12.18 23.56 10.13 18.67 8.63 16.18 9.17 16.19
1-4 40.71 44.36 33.58 39.25 25.13 33.96 22.95 30.66 21.37 28.07
4 -8 25.40 19.83 25.63 19.95 23.19 19.27 21.26 18.81 18.30 17.26
> 8 17.55 10.51 28.61 17.24 41.55 28.10 47.16 34.35 51.17 38.48
TABLE 3 .1 0 : THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN YEARS -  4  YEAR PERIOD (% )
1 9 8 3 /6 1 9 8 8 /9 1 1 9 9 3 /6  1
individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells
< 0 . 2 5 2 2 .2 0 4 5 .2 8 2 8 .7 2 4 8 .3 8 2 2 .0 5 4 2 .2 9
0 .2 5 - 0 .5 1 4 .1 9 1 8 .6 4 1 6 .1 8 1 9 .2 9 14 .11 1 9 .0 7
0 .5 - 1 1 8 .5 4 1 6 .7 8 2 0 .0 1 1 8 .2 8 1 8 .2 3 1 8 .5 6
1 - 3 3 3 .0 6 1 5 .5 1 2 8 .0 2 1 2 .41 3 3 .6 2 1 6 .9 8
> 3 1 2 .0 2 3 .8 0 7 .0 8 1 .6 4 1 1 .9 9 3 .1 0
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T a b l e  3.11: T h e  I n c h ) e n c e  o f  C h r o n i c  U n e m p l o y m e n t  (1 y e a r  p e r i o d )
1983
Per cent 
1^74
1984 20.77
1985 21.14
1986 20.49
1987 18.10
1988 15.35
1989 13.43
1990 13.29
1991 17.18
1992 21.76
1993 23.17
1994 20.74
1995 19.91
1996 18.27 1
T a b l e  3 .12  : T h e  In c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  A g e
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 7.32 17.34 23.98 26.86 31.34
1984 6.86 16.63 24.60 29.35 35.34
1985 5.30 15.66 24.51 30.37 34.46
1986 4.85 12.95 23.46 31.15 34.60
1987 3.49 10.30 19.67 26.95 30.44
1988 2.97 8.47 15.62 23.56 27.18
1989 4.29 8.14 12.45 18.93 20.05
1990 5.61 7.66 12.17 15.78 18.21
1991 8.58 13.42 16.73 20.74 18.53
1992 12.30 16.95 22.03 23.79 24.38
1993 13.36 17.49 22.57 25.56 26.12
1994 11.30 13.76 21.49 24.35 23.95
1995 9.04 12.32 19.17 21.83 24.66
1996 7.96 11.01 16.48 22.17 21.24
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T a b l e  4.1 : In c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t
1 Year 4 Years
Total Fraction Total Fraction
1983 1.56 48.43
1.14 22.29
1984 1.52 47.60
1985 1.55 47.85
1986 1.58 47.91
1987 1.44 45.93
1988 1.15 42.53
0.75 16.03
1989 0.93 39.20
1990 0.92 37.51
1991 1.46 46.80
1992 1.83 50.68
1993 1.98 53.47
1.30 24.01
1994 1.77 51.17
1995 1.55 49.45
1996 1.39 48.23
(MILLIONS)
T a b l e  4 .2  : F r a c t io n  o f  t o t a l  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a c c o u n t e d  f o r
BY CHRONIC UNEMPLOYMENT
1 Rate Fraction I
1 1983 12.30 77.96
1984 12.20 77.89
1985 12.40 78.33
1986 12.80 78.11
1987 11.70 76.71
1988 9.40 74.32
1989 7.40 72.42
1990 6.90 71.20
1991 10.40 77.08
1992 12.70 79.62
1993 13.80 81.18
1994 12.60 79.70
1995 10.80 79.01
1996 1 10.00 78.12
TABLE 4 .3  : THE DISTRIBUTION OF SPELLS AMONG THE CHRONICALLY UNEMPLOYED
1 YEAR PERIOD (% ]
1983 1986 1990 1993 1996
1 76.34 77.60 71.36 76.55 73.66
2 18.95 18.15 23.42 19.65 21.66
3 3.82 3.42 4.29 3.09 3.78
4+ 0.89 0.83 0.94 0.71 0.90
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TABLE 4 .4  T h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  SPELLS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG THE 
CHRONICALLY UNEMPLOYED -  4  YEAR PERIOD (Vo)
1983/6 1988/91 1993/6
1 37.41 23.97 31.87
2 26.75 29.09 28.47
3 16.91 22.38 19.63
4 9.21 12.29 10.33
5+ 9.70 12.27 9.70
T a b l e  4 .5  ; T h e  I n c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  a g e  [‘0 0 0 s ]
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 60.54 72.6 52.76 38.1 25.86
1984 56.84 73.58 52.14 35.34 28.24
1985 53.72 73.5 55.22 34.78 25.34
1986 48.4 72.68 58.56 37.42 27.44
1987 40.28 62.58 53.42 32.08 23.9
1988 32.6 47.08 42.54 27.52 20.5
1989 29.64 39.16 35.74 21.24 15.68
1990 33.04 40.5 37.64 19.92 14.48
1991 51.66 63.46 58.86 30.74 21.32
1992 60.86 76.68 69.36 39.34 30.46
1993 59.92 83 74.22 45.06 35.9
1994 50.02 66.78 67.18 41.44 29.4
1995 41.82 57.04 56.3 37.12 24.8
1996 36.7 50.14 49.96 34.12 22.64
T a b l e  4 .6  : T h e  R e l a t iv e  In c id e n c e  o f  C h r o n ic  U n e m p l o y m e n t  b y  a g e
% OF POPULATION % OF UNEMPLOYED
18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs. 18 yrs. 21 yrs. 25 yrs. 35 yrs. 45 yrs.
1983 13.29 15.84 12.91 9.47 8.42 33.77 44.77 53.07 54.55 56.84
1984 12.54 15.64 12.60 9.00 8.70 31.47 42.60 51.80 53.03 59.55
1985 12.00 15.89 12.80 9.24 8.50 30.61 41.83 52.41 55.29 56.34
1986 11.17 16.13 13.65 10.13 9.16 28.35 39.75 52.67 57.48 59.34
1987 9.23 13.61 12.13 8.55 7.04 26.56 37.33 49.06 52.08 55.97
1988 7.73 10.47 9.01 7.60 6.07 26.32 33.78 43.59 51.54 51.69
1989 7.08 8.66 8.02 5.53 4.31 26.95 32.61 40.47 46.21 45.82
1990 8.58 9.30 8.08 5.38 4.33 27.83 32.06 39.27 40.72 39.58
1991 13.99 15.44 12.86 7.58 5.24 40.30 43.26 47.76 48.89 45.40
1992 17.46 18.34 15.59 9.71 6.81 46.10 47.39 51.42 51.76 49.64
1993 17.70 20.67 17.20 10.86 9.42 47.31 49.42 54.93 55.15 52.67
1994 15.58 17.22 15.36 9.74 7.76 43.74 45.26 53.28 53.85 51.33
1995 12.87 16.34 12.94 8.01 6.57 39.80 42.81 49.74 52.13 51.73
1996 10.99 14.32 11.82 7.15 5.98 40.01 42.46 48.20 51.25 49.37 1
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Ta b l e  4 .7  : C o n c e n t r a t io n  r a t io s  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d
CR5 CRIO CR25 CR50
individuals Spells individuals spells individuals spells individuals spells
1983 9.53 12.23 19.06 24.46 47.13 57.04 79.42 84.75
1984 9.61 12.27 19.23 24.55 47.69 57.63 80.14 85.12
1985 9.65 12.28 19.29 24.56 47.87 57.71 80.34 85.27
1986 9.65 12.22 19.30 24.44 47.76 57.25 80.07 84.93
1987 10.00 12.58 20.00 25.17 48.88 57.48 80.56 84.88
1988 10.60 13.39 21.21 26.78 50.64 58.66 81.46 85.08
1989 11.27 14.37 22.54 28.73 1 52.67 60.24 82.76 85.66
1990 11.58 14.78 23.16 29.56 53.73 60.88 83.18 85.59
1991 9.92 12.46 19.84 24.92 48.34 56.85 80.11 84.5
1992 9.26 11.66 18.51 23.31 46.05 55.57 78.98 84.11
1993 8.93 11.3 17.86 22.61 44.57 54.47 77.94 83.86
1994 9.26 11.87 1 18.52 23.75 45.92 55.79 78.60 84.17
1995 9.50 12.24 19.00 24.47 1 46.93 56.84 79.53 84.71
1996 9.68 12.45 1 19.36 24.91 1 47.50 57.07 79.80 84.82
T a b l e  4 .8  : C o n c e n t r a t io n  r a t io s  -  4  y e a r  p e r io d
CR5 1 CRIO CR25 1 CR50
individuals Spells 1 individuals spells individuals spells 1 individuals spells
89.881983/6 16.33 28.31 30.95 44.02 61.02 70.02 86.17
1988/91 19.19 26.89 34.20 41.23 63.60 67.37 87.68 88.53
1993/6 15.84 26.10 29.77 41.16 60.01 67.94 1 86.39 88.94
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TABLE 5.1
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
spells 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
80% individuals 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.4 10.6 10.1 9.9 11.2 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.5
spells 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.0 9.3 8.6 7.7 7.4 9.3 10.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.4
75% individuals 10.8 10.9 10.9 10.7 10.2 9.4 8.9 8.6 10.2 11.1 11.5 10.9 10.7 10.5
spells 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.8 7.0 6.4 6.0 7.9 8.8 9.1 8.4 8.1 8.0
66% individuals 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.2 7.5 7.0 6.7 8.3 9.2 9.6 9.1 8.9 8.7
spells 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.2 4.6 4.3 5.8 6.4 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.8
50% individuals 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 4.8 4.2 4.0 5.5 6.1 6.6 6.1 6.0 5.7
spells 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.6 3.4 3.7 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4
33% individuals 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.2
spells 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8
25% individuals 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.3
spells 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3
20% individuals 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8
spells 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
10% individuals 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
spells 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
T a b l e  5 .2  : P e r c e n t i l e s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  -  4  y e a r  p e r io d  ( m o n t h s )
1983/6 1988/91 1993/6
90% individuals 38.9 31.4 38.5
spells 18.2 14.7 18.9
80% individuals 26.2 20.4 27.4
spells 11.7 9.2 12.1
75% individuals 21.6 16.8 23.1
spells 9.3 7.7 9.6
66% individuals 15.5 12.4 17.1
spells 6.5 5.7 7.0
50% individuals 10.2 7.2 10.2
spells 3.5 3.2 3.9
33% individuals 5.2 3.6 5.2
spells 1.9 1.7 2.1
25% individuals 3.5 2.5 3.5
spells 1.3 1.2 1.5
20% individuals 2.6 1.9 2.7
spells 1.0 1.0 1.2
10% individuals 1.2 0.9 1.2
1 spells 0.6 0.6 0.7
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T a b l e  5.3 : R a t i o s  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t i l e s  - 1 y e a r  p e r i o d
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 90/10 individuals 12.6 13.1 13.5 13.5 14.0 15.9 17.4 18.3 13.5 11.8 11.4 11.8 13.0 13.6
spells 22.8 22.9 22.8 21.5 21.5 22.9 26.1 24.3 21.5 19.3 19.2 20.3 21.5 22.9
80/20 individuals 6.2 6.5 6.8 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.8 7.9 6.6 6.1 5.6 6.0 6.5 6.4
spells 9.7 10.2 10.2 9.8 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.3 8.6 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.3
75/25 individuals 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.5 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.6
spells 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.5 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.0
66/33 individuals 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7
spells 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.2
T a b l e  5 .4  : R a t i o s  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t i l e s  -  4  y e a r  p e r io d
1983/6 1988/91 1993/6
90/10 individuals 32.4 34.9 32.1
spells 30.8 26.2 28.8
80/20 individuals 10.1 10.7 10.1
spells 11.5 9.3 10.2
75/25 individuals 6.2 6.7 6.6
spells 7.1 6.4 6.5
66/33 individuals 3.0 3.4 3.3
spells 3.5 3.3 3.3
T a b l e  5 .5  ; R a t i o s  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t i l e s  t o  t h e  m e d ia n
1983
2.1
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90/10 1 year 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.1
4 year 3.8 4.4 3.8 1
80/20 1 year 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
4 year 2.6 2.8 2.7
75/25 1 year 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
4 year 2.1 2.3 2.3 1
66/33 1 year 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1
4 year 1.5 1.7 1.7 1
T a b l e  5 .6  : I n e q u a l i t y  M e a s u r e s  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
gini individuals 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.38
spells 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.47
theil individuals 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25
spells 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36
T a b l e  5 .7  : I n e q u a l i t y  M e a s u r e s  -  4  Y e a r  P e r i o d
1983/6 1988/1 1993/6
gini Individuals 0.51 0.54 0.50
Spells 0.60 0.58 0.58
theil Individuals 0.43 0.48 0.42
Spells 0.64 0.59 0.59 1
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T a bl e  5.8 : P er c en tiles  o f  t h e  D ist r ib u t io n  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d  (m o n t h s)
18 YEAR OLDS:
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90% individuals 11.1 10.9 10.2 9.8 9.2 9.4 9.9 10.2 11.6 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.5
spells 9.6 9.1 8.5 8.2 7.8 7.8 7.8 8.0 10.1 11.6 11.9 11.0 10.1 9.6
80% individuals 8.7 8.3 7.9 7.5 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.6 9.3 10.4 10.7 10.2 9.6 9.3
spells 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.2 6.9 7.9 8.1 7.5 6.8 6.7
75% individuals 7.7 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.5 8.4 9.3 9.6 9.3 8.5 8.5
spells 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.3 6.0 6.7 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.8
66% individuals 6.0 5.7 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 6.9 7.9 8.1 7.6 7.0 7.0
spells 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.2 4.6 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.4
50% individuals 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 4.7 5.5 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.7
spells 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.8
33% individuals 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.8
spells 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6
25% individuals 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1
spells 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
20% individuals 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6
spells 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
10% individuals 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
spells 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
25  YEAR OLDS
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
spells 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
80% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.9 10.8 10.0 9.7 11.2 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.3
spells 10.6 11.0 11.1 10.9 9.5 8.3 7.6 7.3 9.2 10.6 10.7 10.3 9.5 8.9
75% individuals 11.7 11.9 11.8 11.6 10.7 9.6 8.9 8.5 10.2 11.3 11.5 11.2 10.7 10.2
spells 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.4 6.2 7.7 8.8 8.9 8.6 7.9 7.4
66% individuals 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.8 7.1 6.8 8.4 9.3 9.8 9.5 8.9 8.6
spells 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.0 4.7 4.6 5.8 6.3 6.6 6.3 5.8 5.5
50% individuals 6.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.0 4.5 4.3 5.6 6.3 6.9 6.5 6.0 5.7
spells 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.3
33% individuals 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.5 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.3
spells 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
25% individuals 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.4
spells 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2
20% individuals 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.9
spells 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
10% individuals 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9
spells 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
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45  YEAR OLDS
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
12.0
1989
12.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
spells 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
80% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.3 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
spells 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.0 9.2 9.9 12.0 12.0 11.3 11.7 10.4
75% individuals 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.6 9.7 10.1 11.8 12.0 11.6 11.7 11.0
spells 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.8 10.5 8.1 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.0 9.1 9.7 8.9
66% individuals 11.4 12.0 12.0 12.0 11.0 10.2 8.5 7.2 8.3 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.7 9.1
spells 8.3 9.3 9.2 9.6 8.0 7.5 5.9 5.1 6.1 7.0 7.1 6.6 6.9 6.3
50% individuals 7.6 8.3 7.6 8.2 7.2 6.4 5.1 4.2 5.1 6.0 6.4 6.1 6.3 5.9
spells 4.5 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.3 4.0 3.3 2.9 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.6
33% individuals 4.0 4.6 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.3
spells 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9
25% individuals 2.9 3.3 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4
spells 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
20% individuals 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9
spells 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
10% individuals 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
spells 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
T a b l e  5 .9  : R a t io s  o f  t h e  P e r c e n t il e s  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d
18 YEAR OLDS
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
14.7
1988
14.3
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90/10 individuals 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.9 17.7 17.2 13.5 11.8 12.2 13.0 14.2 14.6
spells 19.4 18.6 17.3 17.8 16.9 18.4 18.2 18.8 19.1 19.7 19.1 19.7 19.1 18.4
80/20 individuals 6.2 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.4 8.2 7.2 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.8
spells 7.2 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0 7.3 6.9 7.3 7.1 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.3
75/25 individuals 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 5.3 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.1
spells 5.2 4.9 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.9 4.9
66/33 individuals 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
spells 1 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1
2 5  YEAR OLDS
111 983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90/10 individuals 12.6 12.2 12.2 12.2 13.5 15.2 17.4 16.6 13.5 11.8 11.1 11.4 13.0 13.6
spells 22.8 22.9 22.8 21.5 22.8 22.9 23.8 23.4 21.5 19.3 19.2 19.2 21.5 22.9
80/20 individuals 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.6 6.7 7.4 7.0 6.7 6.1 5.4 5.6 6.4 6.0
spells 11.1 10.9 10.9 10.1 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.0 9.3 9.0 8.8 9.2 9.1 9.1
75/25 individuals 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.3
spells 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9
66/33 individuals 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.6
spells 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
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45 YEAR OLDS
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
90/10 individuals 11.4 9.9 12.6 11.1 11.8 12.2 17.4 17.4 15.9 13.1 13.5 12.2 13.5 13.6
spells 19.2 16.6 21.5 20.3 19.2 20.3 24.3 26.1 22.8 20.3 19.2 21.5 21.5 22.9
80/20 individuals 5.5 4.8 5.9 5.1 5.7 6.3 8.7 8.4 7.3 6.7 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.4
spells 9.9 8.9 10.4 9.6 9.9 10.8 10.5 10.3 10.1 10.5 10.7 10.1 11.2 9.9
75/25 individuals 4.2 3.6 4.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.7 5.4 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7
spells 1 7.6 6.9 8.3 7.2 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.6 7.0 6.6
66/33 individuals | 2,8 2.6 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8
spells 1 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.2 1
T a b le  5.10 : I n e q u a l i t y  M e a s u r e s  b y  a g e  - 1 y e a r  p e r io d
Individuals spells
18 21 25 35 45 18 21 25 35 45
1 1983 Gini 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.43
Theil 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.33
1984 Gini 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.42
Theil 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.31
1985 Gini 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.43
Theil 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.34
1986 Gini 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.42
Theil 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.32
1987 Gini 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.44
Theil 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34
1988 Gini 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.45
Theil 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.35
1989 Gini 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48
Theil 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.38
1990 Gini 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49
Theil 1 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41
1991 Gini 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47
Theil 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37
1992 Gini 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45
Theil 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35
1993 Gini 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45
Theil 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34
1994 Gini 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.46
Theil 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.35
1995 Gini 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46
Theil 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35
1996 Gini 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.46
Theil 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.36
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Ta bl e  5.11 ; In eq u a lit y  w it h in  a n d  b e t w e e n  a g e  g r o u p s
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
■§
Total 0.247 0.257 0.261 0.257 0.267 0.285 0.310 0.320 0.260 0.240 0.225 0.236 0.250 0.255
1 Between 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.0011 Within 0.242 0.250 0.252 0.248 0.258 0.277 0.306 0.318 0.260 0.240 0.225 0.235 0.249 0.254
Total 0.363 0.371 0.374 0.366 0.367 0.381 0.403 0.409 0.358 0.343 0.334 0.346 0.360 0.364
1 Between 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
Within 0.356 0.362 0.363 0.354 0.356 0.370 0.395 0.404 0.356 0.342 0.332 0.344 0.357 0.360
T a b l e  6 .2  : P o l a r is a t io n  a c r o s s  in d iv id u a l s  -
D 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
standard 0.1 1.83 1.89 2.01 2.03 1.62 0.97 0.64 0.73 1.55 2.72 2.96 2.29 1.69 1.25
lxlO'4 0.05 1.36 1.43 1.53 1.53 1.18 0.68 0.44 0.50 1.11 2.08 2.31 1.72 1.26 0.91
0.02 1.02 1.10 1.17 1.17 0.86 0.47 0.28 0.32 0.79 1.62 1.84 1.32 0.95 0.66
normalised 0.1 4.41 4.64 4.69 4.54 4.25 3.96 3.90 3.93 4.10 4.61 4.68 4.39 4.39 4.20
IxlO" 0.05 3.28 3.51 3.57 3.43 3.10 2.77 2.66 2.68 2.94 3.53 3.65 3.31 3.27 3.05
0.02 2.46 2.69 2.75 2.61 2.26 1.90 1.72 1.72 2.09 2.74 2.90 2.54 2.47 2.22
YEAR PERIOD
T a b l e  6 .3: P o l a r is a t io n  a c r o s s  s p e l l s  - 1  y e a r  p e r io d
D 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
standard 0.1 3.91 3.94 4.14 4.14 3.25 1.96 1.32 1.48 3.09 5.44 6.05 4.85 3.63 2.68
lxlO'4 0.05 2.81 2.87 3.04 3.01 2.30 1.35 0.89 1.00 2.16 3.99 4.50 3.52 2.61 1.88
0.02 1.93 2.02 2.14 2.11 1.54 0.85 0.54 0.60 1.41 2.87 3.32 2.48 1.80 1.26
normalised 0.1 4.46 4.65 4.70 4.56 4.27 3.96 3.86 3.83 4.13 4.61 4.71 4.42 4.40 4.21
1x10'^ 0.05 3.20 3.39 3.44 3.31 3.03 2.73 2.62 2.59 2.88 3.38 3.51 3.20 3.16 2.96
0.02 2.20 2.38 2.43 2.32 2.03 1.73 1.58 1.55 1.89 2.43 2.58 2.26 2.19 1.98
T a b l e  6 .4  : P o l a r is a t io n  a c r o s s  in d iv id u a l s  -  v a r y in g  t h e  f u n c t io n a l
FORM OF ALIENATION AND IDENTIFICATION- 1 YEAR PERIOD
form 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
lxlO'4 linear 1.36 1.43 1.53 1.53 1.18 0.68 0.44 0.50 1.11 2.08 2.31 1.72 1.26 0.91
lxlO'4 concave 2.10 2.17 2.30 2.33 1.85 1.11 0.73 0.83 1.77 3.15 3.47 2.65 1.94 1.43
1x10" convex 1.99 2.15 2.31 2.29 1.71 0.94 0.59 0.67 1.57 3.11 3.47 2.53 1.85 1.30
1x10’^ linear 3.28 3.51 3.57 3.43 3.10 2.77 2.66 2.68 2.94 3.53 3.65 3.31 3.27 3.05
1x10'^ concave 5.07 5.32 5.38 5.21 4.86 4.52 4.44 4.49 4.68 5.33 5.48 5.09 5.03 4.79
IxlO'S convex 4.79 5.27 5.40 5.11 4.48 3.84 3.58 3.60 4.14 5.27 5.47 4.86 4.80 4.37
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T able  6.5 : P o lar isa tio n  a c r o ss  spells  -  v a r y in g  t h e  f u n c t io n a l
FORM OF a l ie n a t io n  AND IDENTIFICATION-
form 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996]
1x10" linear 2.81 2.87 3.04 3.01 2.30 1.35 0.89 1.00 2.16 3.99 4.50 3.52 2.61 1.88
IxlO" concave 4.49 4.51 4.74 4.74 3.76 2.32 1.60 1.81 3.58 6.21 6.89 5.57 4.17 3.09
1x10" convex 4.10 4.30 4.58 4.48 3.28 1.82 1.15 1.29 3.01 6.00 6.87 5.18 3.81 2.67
1x10'^ linear 3.20 3.39 3.44 3.31 3.03 2.73 2.62 2.59 2.88 3.38 3.51 3.20 3.16 2.96
1x10'^ concave 5.12 5.33 5.38 5.22 4.95 4.70 4.68 4.68 4.78 5.26 5.36 5.08 5.06 4.86
1x10'^ convex 4.68 5.08 5.19 4.93 4.32 3.67 3.38 3.33 4.02 5.09 5.35 4.72 4.62 4.20
YEAR PERIOD
T a b l e  6 .6  : P o l a r i s a t i o n  -  4  y e a r  p e r i o d
1983/6 1988/1 1993/61
individuals standard
1x10* 2.39 16.40 24.60
normalised 
1x10'7 1.41 12.50 12.30
spells standard
1x10* 22.30 47.50 70.70
normalised
1x10'’ 1.73 4.96 4.63
T a b l e  6 .7  : P o l a r i s a t i o n  b y  a g e  a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l s
r ^ g e 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
standard 18 1.38 1.38 1.17 1.07 0.73 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.51 0.64 0.59 0.41 0.29 0.18
1x10* 21 1.60 1.89 1.92 1.87 1.29 0.70 0.46 0.52 0.96 1.48 1.68 0.97 0.68 0.45
25 0.47 0.51 0.58 0.65 0.53 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.68 1.10 1.09 0.84 0.57 0.39
35 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.16 0.13
45 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.04
normalised 18 1.92 1.87 1.74 1.71 1.67 1.67 1.90 1.92 1.93 2.21 2.33 2.17 1.99 1.88
1x10'^ 21 3.00 2.93 2.83 2.45 2.19 2.07 2.14 2.07 2.44 2.80 2.84 2.41 2.30 2.20
25 3.85 3.99 3.98 3.77 3.26 2.75 2.50 2.42 2.90 3.58 3.53 3.34 3.15 2.77
35 4.38 4.95 5.06 5.03 4.56 3.90 3.35 3.01 3.44 3.89 4.02 3.84 3.55 3.60
45 5.22 5.72 5.87 5.60 5.03 4.58 3.66 3.38 3.25 4.08 4.29 3.89 4.03 3.48
T a b l e  6 .8  : P o l a r i s a t i o n  b y  a g e  a c r o s s  S p e l l s
Age 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 18 31.40 30.60 27.50 24.00 16.10 9.12 7.55 9.37 12.50 15.00 14.50 10.10 7.44 4.74
21 43.70 47.60 46.60 46.60 28.80 15.50 11.00 12.30 21.50 32.70 38.00 23.40 16.50 11.50
25 10.70 11.20 12.40 13.50 11.10 6.98 4.63 5.63 14.00 21.80 22.90 18.30 12.30 8.93
3 - 35 3.67 3.44 3.04 3.21 2.34 1.39 0.81 0.82 1.97 3.92 5.29 4.10 3.16 2.55
45 1.09 1.40 1.16 1.24 0.88 0.60 0.32 0.37 0.72 2.02 3.00 1.77 1.05 0.81
18 20.03 19.36 18.21 17.86 17.45 17.54 18.76 18.91 19.95 21.98 23.06 21.61 20.21 19.32
Jcs 21 29.48 28.76 27.43 24.49 21.97 20.63 21.15 20.24 24.03 26.75 27.24 23.51 22.62 21.88
25 36.84 37.74 37.69 36.12 31.37 26.86 24.77 23.78 28.32 33.82 33.51 32.31 30.23 27.20
o 35 41.76 46.74 48.65 48.61 43.19 37.57 32.56 28.85 33.32 37.61 38.84 37.26 34.17 34.38
45 49.66 55.77 57.15 55.29 48.72 44.11 34.55 32.92 32.14 39.10 41.60 37.62 39.25 34.01
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C h a p t e r  5
D o e s  t h e  P a s t  C o m e  B a c k  t o  H a u n t  Y o u  ? 
I d e n t if y in g  L a g g e d  D u r a t io n  D e p e n d e n c e  
E f f e c t s  in  U n e m p l o y m e n t  A m o n g  a  S a m p l e  o f  
B r it is h  M e n
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
In any given year, between two to four million men of prime working age have some 
experience of unemployment, and over a four year period, something o f the order of five 
million men will make a claim for unemployment benefit, yet their experiences of 
unemployment are far from uniform. But should we care whether the experience of 
unemployment is heavily concentrated on relatively few chronically unemployed 
individuals ?
One obvious response is that on welfare grounds alone the incidence of chronic 
unemployment is a cause for concern; as Machin and Manning (1999) observe prolonged 
experiences of unemployment and the incidence of poverty are likely to be highly 
correlated across individuals. However, chronic unemployment may also be 
economically inefficient; Blanchard (2000) argues that if in the long run, unemployment 
is chronically concentrated on a small fraction of the population -  the 'outsiders^ -  then 
the unemployment rate will have to rise in order to constrain wage setters -  or 'insiders'.
This Chapter focuses on another reason why accumulated exposure to unemployment 
may be of concern -  if in some way previous spells of unemployment scar individuals 
increasing the likelihood of them suffering future spells then they may become trapped in 
a vicious cycle, repeatedly unemployed and increasingly unemployable. The scar may be
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either direct, in the sense that exposure to unemployment erodes an individual’s stock of 
human capital, or indirect, in that a history of unemployment will act as a signal, making 
him appear less attractive to firms than otherwise identical individuals searching for 
work. In a statistical sense, these scarring effects are assumed to change individuals’ 
transitions probabilities between labour market states with the net result o f increasing 
their exposure to unemployment -  either increasing the probability that they will lose 
their job when they have one, or making them less likely to escape once unemployed. Of 
course, the precise mechanism through which this scarring takes place is not known, and 
neither are the particular transitions which are affected -  it is conceivable that scarring 
may increase the probability of becoming unemployed and/or reduce the probability of 
becoming employed once unemployed. Heckman and Boijas (1980) identify two specific 
forms of scarring effect: occurrence dependence, where it is the event o f previous spells 
of unemployment in an individual’s past that effects him, and lagged duration 
dependence, where it is the duration of those previous spells that matter. In keeping with 
the literature on the causes of long term unemployment, which argues that through true 
duration dependence, continued exposure to unemployment reduces the conditional 
probability of exiting unemployment, it is natural to think of scarring working through a 
similar mechanism, so that past spells of unemployment will scar the individual through 
their effect on his probability of leaving unemployment, and it is upon this particular 
form of scarring which we will primarily concentrate.
Of course, there are a number of other explanations why over an extended period of time 
the same individuals should suffer chronic unemployment. Principal among these is the 
idea that repeated experience of unemployment is likely to reflect the fact that an 
individual is unemployable, i.e. that the least skilled or motivated members o f the labour 
force will always be relatively unattractive to firms when they choose who to hire. 
Webster (2000) offers an alternative explanation -  that given that job creation appears to 
be negligible in certain local labour markets (such as the former coal fields or depressed 
inner city areas) then the fact that migration out of these areas is relatively weak ensures 
that those individuals who remain will likely suffer chronic unemployment^^.
Although one might still be interested as to why ]oh creation or emigration is so weak in these regions.
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Alternatively, the persistently unemployed may be caught in ‘unemployment traps’, 
where through perverse incentives in the benefit system, work is made unattractive, 
implying that given the incentives they face, their recurrent unemployment is in some 
sense voluntary^^.
Our research proceeds as follows, we implement a survival analysis approach pioneered 
by (among others) Lancaster (1979) to test for the presence of lagged duration 
dependence effects ' -  whether the length of previous spells of unemployment reduces the 
conditional probability of escaping a current spell o f unemployment. This question of 
whether spells of unemployment have the potential to scar individuals has already 
received considerable attention in the literature; however, we argue that the data on which 
this research is based -  the matched JUVOS-NESPD dataset -  allows a new opportunity 
to investigate these scarring effect. We have access to data on all the spells of 
unemployment suffered by a huge sample of individuals over a number of years, together 
with a wealth of information collected from their workplace when they were previously 
employed.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data on which this analysis 
is based: the matched JUVOS-NESPD dataset. In Section 3 we review the literature on 
survival analysis and discuss the problems associated with identifying lagged duration 
dependence effects. Section 4 details the results. Section 5 investigates whether these 
scarring effects vary with age and Section 6 concludes.
2 . D a t a
The matched JUVOS-NESPD dataset draws together information from two separate 
datasets: a subsample of the JUVOS cohort (which we discussed in Chapter 4) and the 
New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD). The NESPD contains information in 
panel form on the earnings and employment conditions of an approximate one percent
Of course understanding the role each of these factors plays is generating chronic unemployment is a 
prime concern for policy markers when designing measures to ameliorate its incidence -  for example, 
either through investments in human capital, encouraging migration o f factors of production (to bring the 
workers to the jobs or the jobs to the workers) or reforms of the tax and benefit system.
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sample of the workforce since 1975. The data is collected through an annual survey of 
employers, who are legally obliged to provide information from their payroll records on 
pay, hours worked and related workplace data for a specified week in April for all 
selected workers^^. Of course, inclusion in the panel in a given year is conditional on an 
individual being employed at the point in which the survey is carried out. However, 
selection according to a given National Insurance number ensures that those individuals 
(and only those individuals) will be included in future years of the panel, subject to their 
being employed at the same point in time in subsequent years. It should be noted that 
previous research has revealed that the response rate in the NESPD, as with all datasets, 
is not perfect -  typically, non response occurs either where an individual has recently 
moved job, where they are employed in a small firm or where their earnings are beneath 
the threshold for paying National Insurance Contributions^^®. This may have implications 
for our results to the extent that our data under-samples the very low paid, whom we 
might expect to have a (significantly) higher unemployment rates than the average 
member of the workforce.
The matched JUVOS-NESPD dataset contains information on the unemployment and 
employment histories of a large sample of individuals who are randomly sampled 
according to their National Insurance n u m b e r s T h i s  new dataset thus enables a much 
richer analysis of the determinants of individual’s transitions between labour market 
states, since we can combine information on the individual, and in particular factors 
which reflect their employability (how much they work, what they are paid, whether they 
have more than one job etc.) garnered from the NESPD, together with information on 
their complete history of unemployment spells since 1983, taken from JUVOS. It is this 
wealth of information that will allow us to identify the scarring effect of unemployment 
with greater confidence.
Gregory and Kalwij (2000) p.5 
*°°See ONS (2000) pp. 1-3, and Stuttard and Jenkins (2001).
One out of every five individuals who are selected into the JUVOS dataset on the basis o f their National 
Insurance number will be randomly selected into the JUVOS-NESPD dataset.
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For the purposes of this analysis, we have chosen to exclude certain individuals from the 
dataset. Given that the claimant count is known to give a misleading representation of the 
incidence o f female unemployment we restrict attention to the persistence o f male 
unemployment. Similarly, we have excluded those who are not of working age. Given the 
lack of available data we have also excluded those from Northern Ireland, Moreover, we 
restrict attention only to those individuals who appear in the JUVOS panel for whom we 
have a prior observation in employment (in other words, those for whom we also have 
an observation in the NESPD). Finally, we select only those individuals for whom we can 
observe the destination to which they leave the claimant count (information on which is 
only available from August 1996 onwards); and in order to avoid stock-sampling 
problems we restrict attention to those individuals who enter the claimant count from this 
point onwards.
We are left with a sample of over 15,000 working age men, and in excess o f 26,000 spells 
of claimant unemployment. In Table 2.1 below we list simple sample statistics for the key 
va r i ab l eswhich  we will use in our analysis (for a comprehensive description of our full 
set of variables see Appendix 1). As we might expect given our source, our data are fairly 
representative of the male working age population -  the average member of our sample is 
(just) in his forties, and about forty percent of our sample are married. In terms of their 
workplace characteristics: overtime pay typically forms a fairly minor fraction of real 
weekly take-home pay, about a third of the sample have their pay covered by a collective 
agreement, about one in two hundred work more than one job in a week, and a little over 
one in ten are classified by their employer as a part-time worker. Finally, using a 
measure of skill, derived by Elias (1995) from an individual’s occupational classification, 
which ranges from 1 (lowest skilled) to 4 (most skilled), we find that the majority of 
individuals in our sample fall in the intermediary skill categories. On average, their most 
recent completed spell o f unemployment lasted a little under nine months, though the 
majority of individuals had not suffered a spell of unemployment in the last year.
For each spell in our data, all variables are measured either at the point in time at which the spell began 
(e.g. age, number of spells experienced in last year etc.) or at the most recent observation in the NESPD.
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Ta bl e  2.1 : D a ta  Su m m a r y
VARIABLES MEANS STANDARDDEVIATIONS
Demographic Characteristics
Start Age 40.8 11.5
Married [%] 40.7 48.7
Cohabit [%] 4.5 19.7
Workplace Characteristics
Rbpay 168.3 117.4
Ropay 14.0 30.5
Union [%] 33.4 46.0
Dbj [%1 0.6 7.3
Part [%1 11.4 30.9
Skill 1 [%] 11.2 31.2
Skill2 [%] 39.9 48.2
Skills [%] 34.4 46.8
Skill4 [%] 14.5 34.7
Previous Experiences of Unemployment
Ltdurm 8.7 17.9
_______ Nspy1_______ _______ ^ 3 ________ 0.6
Finally, before we turn to the analysis proper we offer a simple illustration of the 
variation in individual’s experiences of unemployment through time that we observe in 
our data. If past experiences of unemployment leave a scar, then we might expect that 
those individuals who spend a large fraction of a given year unemployed may be likely to 
suffer a similarly high fraction of the following year unemployed, since if they return to 
the unemployment pool their probability of escape will have been reduced. Consider the 
transition matrix below (Table 2.2), where individuals are collected into cells according 
to the fraction of 1997 and 1998 they spent unemployed, when we aggregate across all 
their s p e l l s W e  take at least as circumstantial evidence of possible scarring effects the 
large number of observations on, and to the right of, the leading diagonal of the transition
So, those individuals collected in the first cell were never unemployed in that year; those in the second 
spell were unemployed for 10% or less of the year; those in the third cell were unemployed for more than 
10, but less than 20% of the year, and so on.
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matrix below (Table 2.2) -  particularly for those who spent the majority of the first year 
unemployed (the bottom right hand quadrant of the matrix). So for example, of those men 
who spent between 70 to 80 percent of 1997 unemployed more than a third were 
unemployed for at least as high a fraction of 1998 (when we aggregate across all their 
spells), and more than a fifth spent a considerably higher fraction of the period (90 
percent or more) unemployed.
T a b le  2 .2  T r a n s i t i o n s  b e t w e e n  1997  a n d  1998 f o r  M e n  A g e d  1 8 -6 4  in  1997
[PERCENTAGE OF THE YEAR UNEMPLOYED]
0 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
0 42.4 15.5 12.7 7.5 5.3 4.4 4.2 2.9 2.2 1.6 1.3
0-10 47.0 12.6 9.7 7.5 4.8 5.2 2.5 2.0 1.6 2.5 4.6
10-20 40.0 11.1 7.3 7.6 8.2 4.1 3.9 5.1 2.7 2.9 7.1
20-30 34.9 10.6 9.6 9.5 6.0 4.5 5.8 3.9 4.6 3.0 7.6
30-40 26.4 10.6 10.4 8.9 7.8 7.5 4.9 4.5 3.7 4.6 10.8
40-50 24.7 9.1 8.9 10.7 6.4 7.2 6.6 5.7 5.3 3.8 11.7
50-60 21.5 7.0 8.0 7.4 8.6 6.4 8.4 9.3 6.8 4.2 12.4
60-70 14.4 7.5 9.2 7.7 10.0 6.4 8.1 7.6 7.3 6.6 15.1
70-80 11.3 8.6 6.2 7.8 8.0 6.3 10.7 5.5 8.0 6.5 21.0
80-90 13.0 6.4 6.3 8.1 9.1 3.9 9.1 7.1 5.6 8.1 23.3
90-100 2.0 5.2 4.2 7.7 6.9 5.9 6.9 6.7 8.6 11.2 34.8
Of course, not all the observations on, and to the right of, the leading diagonal of the 
transition matrix will reflect scarring. We know that the exit rate from unemployment 
declines at long durations, so some of these observations will reflect long continuous 
spells of unemployment that span both years. In the matrix below (Table 2.3) we 
therefore compare the experiences of unemployment in 1997 and 1999 of only those 
individuals who were not unemployed throughout 1998. It remains the case that even 
among these individuals those who spent the majority of 1997 unemployed and claiming 
benefit also spent the majority of 1999 unemployed. So, for example, o f those men who 
spent between 80 to 90 percent of 1997 unemployed one in five went on to spend at least
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as high a fraction of the 1999 unemployed, and three quarters of those individuals spent a 
higher fraction of 1999 unemployed.
Of course, all these transition matrices illustrate is the apparent tendency for individuals 
who spend a large proportion of a given year unemployed to spend at least as high a 
proportion of the years that follow unemployed too which are consistent with the scarring 
hypothesis. What we cannot do with these raw correlations is positively identify the 
presence of scarring effects from previous experiences of unemployment -  for that we 
require the more formal econometric techniques that follow.
T a b l e  2 .3  ; T r a n s i t io n s  b e t w e e n  1997  a n d  1999  f o r  M e n  A g e d  18 -6 3  in  1 9 9 7
[PERCENTAGE OF THE YEAR UNEMPLOYED]
0 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
0 24.5 15.4 13.9 9.8 7.7 6.4 5.9 4.3 3.6 2.5 6.1
0-10 61.2 8.7 8.2 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.7 1.6 1.7 1.2 3.6
10-20 52.6 8.6 8.7 6.7 5.1 5.8 2.8 1.9 2.0 1.8 4.0
20-30 53.8 5.4 8.3 6.8 6.0 2.8 6.1 2.9 2.3 1.0 4.5
30-40 46.0 7.0 8.6 9.0 2.1 5.0 4.8 3.9 3.3 2.5 7.7
40-50 49.1 5.5 6.6 7.8 6.9 6.1 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.4 6.6
50-60 38.9 6.9 6.8 8.2 7.2 5.9 8.3 3.6 4.2 2.6 7.4
60-70 43.8 3.5 6.4 4.8 7.6 5.4 4.0 7.0 2.3 6.4 8.9
70-80 38.9 5.7 8.0 3.5 5.4 5.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 3.8 8.9
80-90 39.1 2.0 7.9 4.3 4.3 7.9 3.4 7.1 4.0 6.9 13.0
90-100 33.1 6.3 4.5 5.7 4.5 6.1 3.3 3.5 9.6 8.1 15.3
3 . T e s t in g  f o r  t h e  Sc a r r in g  E f f e c t  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t
The scarring effect of unemployment is an example of the concept that current outcomes 
in the labour market reflect past experiences -  in other words, you are what life made 
you. Those who believe in the scarring effect argue that past experiences of 
unemployment actually increase the likelihood that you will be unemployed today. Of 
course, because of the inevitable heterogeneity between individuals in terms of their
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motivation and productivity, some individuals will be more likely than others to 
experience unemployment in the past, present and future, but this is not scarring 
(although erroneous econometrics might make it appear so). Scarring occurs where 
previous experiences of labour market states still have a causal effect on the individual 
today -  or, in other words -  where past experiences affect, rather than simply reflect, 
these differences between individuals.
This concept of scarring remains however very abstract -  in order to understand how this 
process occurs we need to know when and how an individual is materially affected by an 
experience of unemployment. Despite a renewed interest in this topic, which has spawned 
a growing literature, these questions remain to some extent unanswered. Economic theory 
and commonsense have suggested possible explanations for the mechanism through 
which scarring may occur. Experiences of long term unemployment have long been 
thought to damage an individual’s stock of human capital, his mental well-being and his 
level of motivation -  all of which may contribute to the reduced exit rates from 
unemployment which plague those with long durations of unemployment. If any of these 
effects persist beyond exit from the spell (i.e. any damage to human capital, mental health 
or motivation is not instantly wiped clean) then if an individual returns to unemployment 
his exit rate might be lower than we would otherwise expect, given his observable 
characteristics: his level of educational attainment, gender, age and so on. Furthermore, if 
it is the case that firms use an individual’s current duration of unemployment as a signal 
of their quality when considering whom they want to interview when trying to fill 
vacancies then the long term unemployed may have low exit rates from 
unemployment because they are unable to match with many (or most) o f the vacancies 
that exist in the labour market. It is therefore plausible that past experiences of 
unemployment may continue to affect you today if firms also view a past history of 
considerable unemployment as a signal of your potential quality. Finally, if  firms have 
any degree of flexibility over whom they lay-off when hit by an adverse demand shock
See, Phelps (1972) and Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
270
they may well choose to fire the least productive members of their workforce^®^, so that 
any erosion of productivity in a past spell of unemployment may also increase the current 
probability of becoming unemployed. Therefore, it is plausible to assume scarring could 
effect individuals not only when they are unemployed, but also when they are employed. 
Certainly, there is considerable evidence^^^ that past experiences of unemployment have 
an effect on individual when they are employed -  in that individuals who re-enter 
employment after a spell of unemployment appear to suffer a wage penalty.
Furthermore, it is not exactly clear when this scarring takes place. Heckman and Boijas 
(1980) provide a framework to help analyse this question by articulating two separate 
forms of scarring effect from unemployment: occurrence dependence, where the event of 
a past spell of unemployment has an effect on the individual, and lagged duration 
dependence, where it is the accumulated duration of unemployment which affects the 
individual. Of course in many ways our inability to identify how and when scarring takes 
place reflects an underlying data problem. In order to test conclusively for the presence of 
scarring we would like to be able to first measure those variables -  such as motivation -  
which are affected by the spell, and then demonstrate how an experience of 
unemployment causes a fall in, say, motivation which is not reversed upon exit from the 
spell.
The empirical evidence on the scarring effect of unemployment originated largely in 
North America. In their seminal contribution, Heckman and Boijas (1980) investigated 
whether there was any evidence that past experiences of unemployment had any causal 
impact on the future outcomes of a sample of U.S. high school graduates. They found that 
once unobserved differences between graduates in their propensity to be unemployed 
were controlled for there was no evidence that either the event, or the duration, of 
previous spells had any significant affect on the members of their panel. Ellwood (1982) 
finds that past experience in the labour market does have a scarring effect on the 
performance of young men in the U.S.; however, his estimate of the scarring effect is
In a study of firms, Oswald and Turnbull (1985) report that almost a half o f all establishments cited 
‘competence or the level of skills’ of employees as a criteria for selecting whom to lay-off.
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relatively small. In a study of the durations of claims for Canadian unemployment 
insurance, Corak (1993) reports evidence of occurrence dependence -  ceteris paribus^ 
successive spells were found to increase in length. In the U.K., there has been somewhat 
of a resurgence in interest in identifying the scarring effect of past experiences of 
unemployment in recent years. Arulampalam et. a l  (2000) find “strong evidence o f state 
dependence consistent with the ‘scarring’ theory of unemployment” in a panel of British 
men. In a study concentrating on the consequences in later life of early experiences of 
unemployment, Gregg (2001) finds that scarring predominantly affects males and that an 
extra two months of unemployment before the age of 23 appears to cause an extra month 
of unemployment for men between the ages of 24 and 33.
Finally over and above establishing the existence of lagged duration, and occurrence, 
dependence effects in unemployment, there is one further area we will focus on in the 
research -  and that is the extent to which a given experience of unemployment may scar 
different individuals to different degrees. In particular, we examine whether the scarring 
effect of unemployment predominantly affects older members of the workforce. To date 
the existing literature has focused to a great extent on the scarring effects from 
individual’s first experiences in the labour market (i.e. among youths). Arulampalam et. 
a l (2000) find evidence the scarring effect, measured in terms of the proportion o f the 
observed persistence in experiences that can be explained by state dependence, is found 
to be almost twice as great for those aged 25 and above compared to those aged 24 or 
less. Furthermore, Gregory and Jukes (2001) show that the scarring effect of 
unemployment on wages is far more pronounced for older workers. Economic theory 
offers a partial explanation of these findings; unemployment rates are always higher 
among youths than adults, and therefore firms may place less faith in past experiences as 
a signal of youth’s quality than adults. Furthermore, it is often argued^®  ^that particularly 
for youths, unemployment is a necessary part of a job shopping process through which 
they can find a secure, stable “lifetime” job by a process of trial and error. If frequent 
experiences of unemployment now are likely to lead to a well paid stable job -  and
See, for example, Gregory and Jukes (2001).
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therefore little chance of unemployment -  in the future, we would not expect to find 
evidence of a negative scar from unemployment.
3.1 E s t im a t in g  t h e  S c a r r in g  E f f e c t  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t
In order to identify the scarring effect of unemployment we adopt the survival analysis 
methodology, which essentially uses information from the length of time agents remain 
within a given labour market state (or the duration of their spell) in order to gain an 
understanding of how a defined set of explanatory variables affect the likelihood of an 
individual flowing out of that state. Typically, the functional form which describes the 
relationship between the duration of spells of unemployment and the set of explanatory 
variables will prove to be highly non-linear. Estimation then proceeds via maximum 
likelihood estimation which, given our data, selects the values of the coefficients in our 
model which would be most likely to reproduce the pattern of spell durations we observe. 
Before we can implement our estimation strategy there are four methodological issues we 
must first address: how do we specify the functional form of the hazard (the conditional 
probability of escape); how do we control for unobservable differences between 
individuals which affect their probability of escaping unemployment; how do we specify 
the underlying dependence of the hazard on the duration o f the current spell; and, how do 
we allow for the fact that individuals leave the claimant count for a number of different 
labour market states, and that the determinants of each of these flows may vary 
accordingly. We shall discuss each of these issues below.
3.2 S p e c i f y in g  t h e  F u n c t i o n a l  F o r m  o f  t h e  H a z a r d
The fundamental choice that confronts any analysis of this kind is to select a particular 
functional form for the hazard function which specifies the potentially highly non-linear 
relationships between the conditional probability of escape from unemployment and both 
a set of explanatory variables and the duration of the spell itself. There is a burgeoning
See Jovanovic (1979) for an exposition of this theory and Topel and Ward (1992) for empirical evidence 
to support it.
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literature (see, among many others, Kiefer (1988) and Van den Berg (2001)) which offers 
a large number of possible specifications of the hazard and the potential pitfalls each 
i n v o l v e s W e  adopt the most common specification of the hazard -  the proportional 
hazard model -  which is based on the assumption that the proportional effect of an 
explanatory variable on the hazard does not depend on the duration of the spell. The 
continuous time hazard function can then be written
X {t)= e xp {x p ).À ^{ f)  [5.1]
where À,q defines the ‘baseline hazard’ -  the underlying shape of the hazard function for
all individuals, save only for a vertical shift due to individual heterogeneity, so that for 
any two individuals, their hazards are proportional at all durations (Lancaster (1979)). If 
survival times are continuous, but we observe only the interval in which the spell ends, 
then the discrete time representation of the hazard can be written:
^  = 1- exp  ( -  exp {xP  +  )) [5.2]
where Yi represents the log of the integrated baseline hazard over the interval (Jenkins 
(2003)). Given a specification of the hazard we now need to address two further issues: 
first, how do we control for possible omitted variable bias in ^(-), and second what
functional form should we choose for Ag . We now turn to discuss each of these issues in 
turn.
3.3  S p e c if y in g  t h e  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n o b s e r v e d  H e t e r o g e n e it y
In reality, it is seldom (if ever) likely to be the case that all the factors which have an 
effect upon an individual’s exit rate out of unemployment are known and observable to
In reality, any choice of functional form for the hazard will at best only approximate the true data 
generating process. The issue then is how good is the approximation, or alternatively, how bad is the mis- 
specification bias.
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the econometrician^®^. Of course, we hope that through inclusion of both demographic 
information taken from the JUVOS dataset, and workplace based information taken from 
the NESPD we can control for much of the differences between individuals in our 
sample. Nevertheless, failure to allow for unobserved heterogeneity can have serious 
implications for our results, yielding erroneous parameter estimates (Van den Berg 
(2000)). The standard approach^ to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is to 
assume that a single random variable: U can act as a proxy for all the explanatory 
variables omitted from the systematic component of the hazard and furthermore that this 
random variable is independent of the included covariates x and the duration of the 
spell:  ^ (Narendranathan et. a l (1985)). Since we will include the duration of past spells 
of unemployment suffered by the individual among our covariates this unobserved 
component must be independently distributed across the different spells an individual 
suffers -  i.e., it proxies all unobservable factors which affect the individual’s hazard out 
o f unemployment in a specific spell, rather than those which affect his hazard out of all 
s p e l l s ' S o  in our discrete time proportional hazards representation we have (Jenkins 
(2003)):
= 1 -  exp{- exp{xP  + ln{y)+ y^)) [5.3]
Broadly speaking there are two approaches to modelling this unobserved component in 
the literature. The parametric approach has typically assumed that V  is drawn from the 
Gamma distribution since this produces a closed form for our likelihood function and is 
thus computationally convenient. Given that under mild regularity conditions, if  V  is 
instead modelled non-parametrically -  assumed to be a random variable whose 
distribution has zero as the lower bound for its support but is otherwise unknown -  then 
that distribution nonetheless approximates the Gamma distribution at high durations'
Factors such as the intensity of an individual’s job search which will prove crucial in determining their 
probability of escaping unemployment are almost impossible to measure accurately.
* See Lancaster ( 1979).
" * If this component is common across all spells, it necessarily follows that V  will be correlated with these 
lagged durations -  those who always have difficulty escaping unemployment will tend to have long past 
spells of unemployment ! - yielding inconsistent estimators.
Van den Berg (2000).
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this particular parametric choice appears to have a sound practical foundation. Moreover, 
in practice, efforts to identify more than a couple of mass points in the distribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity have typically proved fruitless (Van den Berg (2000)). Finally, 
since the consensus in the literature is that given a flexible specification of the baseline 
hazard, parameter estimates are not particularly sensitive to assumptions on the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (Ridder (1986), Van den Berg (2000)) we 
assume that this unobserved component is drawn from the Gamma distribution^
3.4 Sp e c if y in g  t h e  B a s e l in e  H a z a r d
A survey of the survival analysis literature reveals that a large number of parametric 
families have been employed to specify the baseline hazard, some of which impose 
monotonicity in the rate of change of the baseline hazard with duration, some o f which do 
not. However, it is now understood that the restrictions that such parametric assumptions 
impose on the model can have serious implication for our estimates -  Ridder (1986) 
demonstrates that misspecification of the baseline hazard results in inconsistent 
estimators of the impact of the explanatory variables on the hazard. We therefore pursue 
a semi-parametric approach to estimating the scarring effect of unemployment pioneered 
by Prentice and Gloecker (1978) and Meyer (1990) where a fully flexible baseline hazard 
is estimated.
3.5 C o n t r o l l in g  f o r  t h e  D e s t in a t io n  f o r  w h ic h  t h e  I n d iv id u a l  l e a v e s  
THE C l a im a n t  C o u n t : A  C o m p e t in g  R is k s  A n a l y s is
As was discussed in Section 2, the JUVOS dataset delineates between those periods of 
unemployment and either inactivity or employment in an individual’s working lifetime. It 
is inevitable then that the exits out of unemployment we record in our data will mark 
transitions both into employment and inactivity. However, we might expect the economic 
variables we have included in our estimation to have quite different effects on the
' It might be interesting to examine how sensitive our results are to an alternative specification of the 
distribution function of spell-specific unobserved heterogeneity; unfortunate this was not possible within
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probability of exiting into inactivity or alternatively into employment. For example, a 
past history of chronic unemployment might decrease the conditional probability of 
escape from unemployment into employment, but increase the conditional probability of 
escape into inactivity, at all durations. Treating all exits as identical -  i.e. ignoring the 
state into which the unemployed flow -  could therefore potentially bias our results. The 
inclusion in our data of information which indicates whether individuals exited into 
employment or inactivity from August 1996 onwards offers a solution to the problem. 
Following Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) we treat all those spells where exit occurs 
into states other than the one of interest (employment) as censored at the point of exit, 
which is essentially a simplified competing risks analysis.
In fact in our dataset, only thirty per cent of our sample are observed to exit into 
employment, which means that we treat seventy percent of the spells in our sample as 
censored upon the point of exit. Of those who did not enter employment, the largest 
group of exits were those did not state a reason for terminating their claim, or simply 
failed to sign off, who account for almost a third of all exits, with the remainder of those 
who left the claimant count leaving for a state other than employment. Although the 
JUVOS dataset provides an excellent source of information on the time at which 
individuals start and finish their spells, this deficiency in our data might lead us to 
conclude that other data sources -  for example, household surveys (such as the BHPS or 
LFS) -  may in fact give a more reliable estimate of the baseline hazard function out of 
unemployment into particular states. Certainly, our failure to identify the nature o f the 
exit from unemployment for a third of those who leave the claimant count in our sample 
is problematic, and ultimately, our results should be judged in this context.
3 .6  T h e  L ik e l ih o o d  F u n c t io n s
Following Meyer (1990) the likelihood function for a non-parametric specification of the 
baseline hazard function, where the unobserved heterogeneity component: V  is assumed 
to be drawn from a Gamma distribution is as follows:
the routine used to derive our results.
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lo g  L{p,y,cr'^)=Y}og 1 +  x ^  exp {x, (()'/? +  / ( ( ) }
/=i l^ V t= \
1 \
1 + (7  ^ X £ |e x p {x .(z .y y 0  +  / ( z . ) }
1=1
[5.4]
4 . R e s u l t s
Our basic estimation strategy is as follows: we include the length of previous spells of 
unemployment suffered by the individual (and their square) in the set of explanatory 
variables in the systematic component of the hazard^ and if after having controlled for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the data, the coefficient on these lagged 
durations is still significant -  and negative -  then we argue that there is evidence of 
scarring effects from unemployment. All the results presented below have been generated 
using Stephen Jenkins’ pgmhaz STATA routine.
In Table 4.1 overleaf we present the results from our baseline model. In column I we 
present the estimated coefficients, standard errors and corresponding p -  values for our 
full set of explanatory variables when we do not allow for the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity; in column II we do likewise under the assumption of gamma distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, in the last row of the table we report the likelihood 
ratio test statistic of whether the gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity term is 
equal to zero, and the corresponding p -  value of the test.
114 The explanatory variables used in the estimation are described in Appendix 1.
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Ta b l e  4.1 ; R eg r e ssio n  R esu lts
Model I 1 Model II
Coef. StdError
0.006
p value Coef. StdError p value
uratem -0.068 0.000 -0.092 0.010 0.000
mac -0.119 0.005 0.000 -0.189 0.010 0.000
tight -0.899 0.159 0.000 -1.003 0.213 0.000
Mdurm -0.048 0.002 0.000 -0.066 0.004 0.000
I1durm2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
yUdurm -0.024 0.005 0.000 -0.040 0.007 0.000
yl1durm2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
nspy1 0.150 0.015 0.000 0.273 0.027 0.000
ynspyl -0.105 0.026 0.000 -0.199 0.044 0.000
start_age -0.103 0.007 0.000 -0.171 0.013 0.000
1 start_age2 0.001 0.000 0.000 1 0.002 0.000 0.000
skill 0.071 0.015 0.000 0.100 0.025 0.000
1 married 0.356 0.028 0.000 0.619 0.051 0.000
1 cohabit 0.169 0.059 0.004 0.274 0.097 0.005
repay 0.000 0.000 0.542 1 0.000 0.001 0.631
1 rbpay 0.000 0.000 0.179 1 0.000 0.000 0.245
union -0.034 0.026 0.192 -0.053 0.042 0.211
dbj 0.267 0.131 0.042 0.575 0.232 0.013
part 0.013 0.037 0.719 0.018 0.061 0.764
qtr_in1 0.112 0.071 0.114 0.133 0.113 0.238
qtr_in2 0.134 0.072 0.062 0.273 0.115 0.018
qtrJnS 0.194 0.070 0.006 0.279 0.114 0.014
qtr_in4 0.297 0.070 0.000 0.427 0.113 0.000
qtrJnS 0.265 0.071 0.000 0.399 0.114 0.000
qtr_in6 0.175 0.072 0.015 0.388 0.118 0.001
qtr_in7 0.119 0.072 0.099 0.228 0.117 0.051
qtrJnS 0.118 0.071 0.097 0.230 0.115 0.046
qtr_in9 0.203 0.070 0.004 0.340 0.114 0.003
qtrJnlO 0.149 0.071 0.036 0.252 0.115 0.028
qtr_in11 -0.108 0.074 0.148 -0.104 0.117 0.374
qtr_in12 -0.008 0.074 0.916 0.021 0.117 0.858
qtr_in13 -0.161 0.084 0.056 -0.107 0.133 0.424
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T a b l e  4.1 : R eg r e ssio n  R esu lts  (c o n t d .)
Model I Model II
Coef. StdError p value Coef.
Std
Error p value
NE 0.425 0.062 0.000 0.724 0.102 0.000
NW -0.002 0.054 0.972 0.034 0.086 0.693
Mersey -0.222 0.092 0.016 -0.196 0.137 0.153
YorksH -0.171 0.053 0.001 -0.242 0.084 0.004
EM -0.131 0.054 0.015 -0.203 0.089 0.022
WM -0.229 0.055 0.000 -0.315 0.089 0.000
EA -0.455 0.056 0.000 -0.728 0.095 0.000
London -0.571 0.055 0.000 -0.794 0.086 0.000
SE -0.613 0.054 0.000 -0.965 0.093 0.000
SW -0.411 0.058 0.000 -0.607 0.095 0.000
Wales 0.296 0.063 0.000 0.528 0.103 0.000
pad1 2.174 0.160 0.000 4.842 0.356 0.000
pad2 1.954 0.160 0.000 4.933 0.375 0.000
pad3 1.794 0.161 0.000 4.961 0.388 0.000
pad4 1.615 0.164 0.000 4.954 0.400 0.000
1 pads 1.559 0.166 0.000 5.041 0.410 0.000
pads 1.530 0.168 0.000 5.099 0.417 0.000
pad7 1.418 0.171 0.000 5.101 0.424 0.000
pads 1.485 0.173 0.000 5.261 0.432 0.000
pad9 1.284 0.180 0.000 5.105 0.438 0.000
pad 10 1.324 0.184 0.000 5.263 0.447 0.000
pad 11 0.923 0.200 0.000 4.884 0.456 0.000
pad 12 0.956 0.205 0.000 4.968 0.462 0.000
pad 13 0.876 0.218 0.000 4.913 0.469 0.000
pad 14 0.943 0.218 0.000 5.022 0.473 0.000
pad 15 0.892 0.248 0.000 4.968 0.489 0.000
pad 16 0.393 0.332 0.236 4.521 0.544 0.000
pad 17 -0.062 0.476 0.897 3.945 0.639 0.000
pad 18 -0.017 0.526 0.975 1 3.952 0.693 0.000
pad 19 0.728 0.600 0.225 1 4.607 0.746 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Statistic for Model I versus Model II 225.445
p value 0.000
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4.1 U n o b s e r v e d  H e t e r o g e n e i t y
We find strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the gamma distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity term has zero variance -  the p -  value of the test is less than 
0.0005 ! The variance of this unobserved heterogeneity term is in fact estimated to be 
3.283 (with a standard error of 0.323). Our results therefore suggest that there is indeed 
statistically significant unobserved heterogeneity across the separate spells of our sample, 
and we shall therefore focus our attention on the results from model II.
4.2 D u r a t i o n  D e p e n d e n c e  -  T h e  S h a p e  o f  t h e  B a s e l i n e  H a z a r d
The baseline hazard is assumed to be piecewise constant, with the segments of the 
baseline captured by a series of dummy variables^ In Figure 4.1 below we graph the 
baseline hazard function implied by our results with its corresponding 95% confidence 
interval.
The baseline hazard function implied by our results is highly non-monotone, but the 
confidence interval around this baseline hazard is daunting in size ! In particular the 
hazard rate out of unemployment into employment is found to increase for the first six 
months, with the standard downward sloping baseline hazard only (semi-) evident for 
those spells at least a year, and probably a year and a half in duration. O f course, this 
may be a function of the fact that for a third of all those who exit unemployment we do 
not know the labour market state for which they leave, so we are forced to treat all these 
observations as censored.
Specifically, we use thirteen intervals of twenty eight days in length, followed by four further intervals 
o f eighty four days in length, one interval of one hundred and sixty eight days in length, and finally the last 
interval of three hundred and eight days.
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Figure 4.1 : The Implied Baseline Hazard Function
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4.3 D e m o g r a p h i c  C o n t r o l s
Unfortunately we have only a limited set of demographic controls, which in part reflects 
our underlying data, but also the fact that we have excluded some groups from the 
analysis. We do not have any information on the ethnicity of the individuals in our panel, 
nor do we have any women in our panel whatsoever. However, we do have data on 
whether the man was the only adult living in his household at the time he became 
unemployed, and we also know his age.
We find that both those men who are married or who are co-habiting have a higher 
hazard rate out of unemployment into employment than other otherwise equivalent men 
(with the magnitude of the effect stronger for the former than for the latter). Of course, 
this does not necessarily imply that becoming married will increase a given man’s exit 
rate out of unemployment, although those men who are either married or cohabit are 
more likely to have young dependents in the household and may therefore be more 
motivated to find work. Nonetheless, it is plausible that that there is a selection issue 
here: those men who have a range of characteristics which enable them to successfully
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match with employers (and leave the claimant count) also have those characteristics 
which enable them to match successfully with partners.
Our results also suggest that as a man ages, ceteris paribus his probability of escaping 
unemployment falls and given the results presented in Chapter 4, this should come as 
no surprise. However, if we include the square of the individual’s age when he starts his 
spell, we find this quadratic term is significant and enters with a positive sign so that this 
effect on the hazard (and therefore the average duration of the spell) declines with age.
4.4 W o r k p l a c e  R e l a t e d  I n d i v i d u a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Data from the New Earnings Survey does provide a rich source of information to control 
for differences in individual characteristics. Since for each individual we have an 
observation in the NESPD for every year that they were in employment at the time o f the 
survey we choose to take data from the most recent observation prior to a given spell of 
unemployment, since this should give the most accurate reflection of the individual at 
that moment in time. Our controls can be divided into two groups: those which refer 
directly to an individual’s level of pay, and those which refer more generally to his 
characteristics.
The NES allows us to collect accurate information on the gross weekly earnings of all 
individuals in our panels, including information both on the real gross overtime and basic 
pay. Theoretically speaking, the effect of the real wage on the expected duration of 
unemployment is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand real wages will be heavily 
correlated with productivity and presumably desirability to potential employers, and 
therefore we would expect the highly paid to be able to re-enter employment with relative
’ There might be some concern that this age differential simply reflects the fact that active labour market 
policies designed to help the unemployed were primarily focused on the young over much of the period -  
most notably, the New Deal for Young People (NDYP). This scheme will have certainly led to a reduction 
in the average length of youth spells of claimant unemployment, since all those who failed to find work of 
their own accord in the Gateway period of that programme would no longer be eligible for benefits. 
However, this should not have had a material affect on our results since all those individuals who had not 
found work by the end of the Gateway, including those who would go on to enter employment through a 
subsidy as part of the scheme, would have been treated as censored at that point.
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ease. On the other hand, high wages in the past are likely to raise a workers reservation 
wage (i.e. the minimum wage offer he is willing to accept) and therefore prolong his 
spell. In practice, these two effects appear to cancel out -  the level of basic and overtime 
pay appear to have an insignificant effect on the hazard (however, these results should be 
viewed alongside those regarding the skill measure -  see below).
The NES also provides information on a number of characteristics of the job in which the 
individual was employed. We can observe whether the individual was working full- or 
part-time, whether his pay was covered by a collective agreement,, and whether at the 
point in which he was last surveyed he was working more than one job. In general our 
workplace controls do not appear to have a significant impact on the hazard. The one 
exception is the double job marker [dbj] where we find that those individuals who were 
working more than one job when last observed in the NES appear to have a higher 
probability of escaping unemployment for employment.
Finally, following Elias (1995) and Elias and Bynner (1997) we can construct a measure 
of an individual’s level of skill based upon his occupation, where an individual is ranked 
in one of four groups in ascending order of skill* In an interesting corollary to the 
insignificance of wages in our regression, being in a higher skill group does appear to 
significantly increase the hazard.
4.5 L o c a l  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  C o n d i t i o n s
In order to control for the state of the individual’s local labour market we exploit two 
kinds of controls**^. The first group are varying measures of labour market tightness in 
that locality: the male claimant count rate, the male inactivity rate and the ratio of 
vacancies to unemployed individuals. The second group of controls are a series of
Clearly, information on the educational attainment of the individual would be a welcome addition to this 
occupation based measure of skill, but no such data is provided in the either the JUVOS or NESPD dataset.
’ Of course, all those individuals in the same locality will share the same value for the various tightness 
measures and the final dummy variable. This clustering of observations implies that care should be taken 
in interpreting the apparent significance of the corresponding coefficients since we were not able to correct 
the standard errors on these coefficients.
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dummy variables to capture both the variation in the state of the local labour market 
which are not captured by the tightness measures and a set of dummies to soak up the 
variation in the state of the aggregate labour market at the point in time in which the 
individual entered unemployment.
The coefficients on our time-varying local labour market controls are largely as expected. 
An increase in the male claimant count and inactivity rate in your region both 
significantly reduce your conditional probability of escaping unemployment. The final 
measure: the ratio of the stock of vacancies to unemployed in the region is significant but 
enters with the wrong sign which may say more about the quality of our vacancy data, 
rather than the dependence of the hazard on the tightness of the local labour market. Our 
set of regional controls suggest that even controlling for the degree of tightness in a local 
labour market (and the characteristics of the unemployed men therein) there remains a 
significant variation in the hazard across regions. Our results would therefore appear to 
lend at least some tentative support to Webster’s (2000) argument that unemployment 
continues to be heavily concentrated in small pockets around the country, such as the 
former coal fields or depressed inner cities, although we have been unable to shed light 
on why this may be.
4 .6  S c a r r i n g  E f f e c t s
In order to test the scarring hypothesis we included the duration of the last spell the 
individual suffered (measured in months) which proved highly significant and entered 
with the right sign: those individuals with longer spells of unemployment in the past have 
a lower probability of escaping unemployment spells today. Once again we also tested for 
the presence of non-linearities in this scarring effect by including the square of the lagged 
duration in our regressions. This quadratic term was found to be positive and significant -  
as the length of a past spell increases, the smaller the differential impact of another extra 
month of unemployment in the past -  although the magnitude of this non-linearity effect 
is small. Furthermore, in order to test for the presence of occurrence dependence effects 
we include the number of spells the individual had suffered in the year before the start of
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the current spell. Our results suggest that in fact frequent experiences of unemployment 
in the past actually increase your conditional probability of escaping unemployment.
Taken together then our results suggest that even when we control for observable and 
unobservable differences between individuals, and the state of the local labour markets in 
which they search, past experiences can still explain current behaviour. While the length 
o f past spells appear to significantly depress the conditional probability of escaping a 
current spell, the number of spells suffered is found to have the opposite effect.
To quantify the magnitude of this scarring effect, consider the impact of an increase in 
the duration of the last spell of unemployment from six to twelve months on the 
probability that the individual will escape unemployment in, say, the first month. For a 
man aged forty when he entered unemployment who otherwise has the mean 
characteristics of his sample, the hazard rate falls from 7.3% to 5.1%; or put another way, 
the probability that he will exit from unemployment for employment within 12 months 
falls from 69.6% to 56.3%. The scarring effect of past experiences of unemployment 
certainly seems far from trivial !
Finally, we also focus on the issue of whether these scarring effects differ with age. In 
order to address this question we test for the significance of interaction terms on the 
hazard, which take the value of the corresponding “scarring variable”: the length o f the 
previous spell, its square and the number of spells suffered in the last year for those aged 
under 35 when they entered the spell, and zero otherwise. In fact, all these interaction 
terms are found to have a significant impact on the hazard.
Somewhat surprisingly, our results suggest that the scarring effect is greater for younger 
men, although this effect is partially offset by the fact that the rate of increase in the 
magnitude of the scar is lower for youths. In the case of the occurrence dependence 
effects, we also find that this positive effect on the hazard is stronger for older men (those 
over the age of 35).
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5. V a r ia t io n  in  Sc a r r in g  E f fe c t s  b y  A ge
In order to examine the variation in scarring effects by age in greater depth we repeat our 
analysis, splitting the sample in two -  into those aged 35 years of age and under, and 
those above the age of 35. In this way we relax the implicit restriction in our previous 
analysis that the impact of each of our covariates on the hazard was common across all 
age groups in the panel. As we shall go on to discuss, splitting the sample in this way 
does indeed reveal some interesting effects that are obscured by estimation over the 
whole sample. We present the results from our analysis on each of our sub-samples in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 overleaf. Again following the convention laid out above, we present 
the estimated coefficients, standard errors and corresponding p -  values for both our 
models -  where we do not allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (Model I) 
and where we do (Model II). We were only able to obtain results on both sub-samples 
using a sub-set of our covariates (specifically, we dropped the double job identifier and 
the quadratic term in the individual’s age when he started the spell, we created a 
composite variable which takes the value one if an individual is either married or 
cohabiting) and where we merged the final three intervals in the baseline hazard.
5 .1  U n o b s e r v e d  H e t e r o g e n e i t y
In each of the separate sub-samples we reject the null hypothesis that the gamma 
distributed unobserved heterogeneity term has zero variance -  the p -  values of the test 
are in both cases again less than 0.0005, with the variance of these unobserved 
heterogeneity terms estimated to be 2.260 and 3.569 for the younger and older sub­
samples respectively (with corresponding standard errors of 0.439 and 0.430). Once again 
we therefore focus our attention on the results from model II in each case.
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T a b le  5.1 : R e g r e s s io n  R e s u l t s  -  M en  a g e d  35 a n d  u n d e r
Model I Model I I
Coef. StdError p value Coef.
Std
Error p value
1 uratem -0.058 0.011 0.000 -0.069 0.015 0.000
inac -0.127 0.008 0.000 -0.183 0.015 0.000
tight -0.192 0.247 0.438 -0.058 0.337 0.864
Mdurm -0.060 0.005 0.000 -0.085 0.008 0.000
Mdurm2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
nspy1 0.092 0.024 0.000 0.123 0.037 0.001
start_age -0.069 0.004 0.000 -0.099 0.008 0.000
skill 0.036 0.027 0.179 0.044 0.040 0.270
married_or_cohabit 0.201 0.054 0.000 0.351 0.085 0.000
repay 1 0.001 0.001 0.503 0.000 0.001 0.660
rbpay -0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.009
union -0.023 0.046 0.614 -0.043 0.067 0.522
part 0.138 0.055 0.013 0.201 0.086 0.020
qtrjn l 0.044 0.114 0.697 -0.002 0.166 0.988
qtr_in2 0.023 0.115 0.840 0.148 0.172 0.389
qtrJnS 0.068 0.113 0.548 -0.016 0.166 0.925
qtr_in4 0.175 0.110 0.113 0.256 0.165 0.121
qtrJnS 0.210 0.115 0.067 0.272 0.169 0.108
qtrJnO 0.076 0.117 0.515 0.232 0.178 0.192
qtr_in7 -0.061 0.119 0.611 -0.063 0.177 0.722
qtrJnS 0.094 0.114 0.408 0.126 0.169 0.456
qtrJnO 0.112 0.117 0.341 0.200 0.174 0.251
qtrJnlO -0.027 0.119 0.820 -0.041 0.176 0.818
q trjn l 1 -0.158 0.118 0.180 1 -0.167 0.173 0.333
q trjn l 2 -0.190 0.118 0.107 -0.250 0.171 0.144
q trjn l 3 -0.212 0.134 0.112 1 -0.189 0.195 0.333
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T a b le  5.1 : R e g r e s s io n  R e s u l t s  (c o n td .)
Model I Model II
Coef. StdError p value Coef.
Std
Error p value
NE 0.435 0.104 0.000 0.713 0.166 0.000
NW -0.048 0.087 0.582 -0.019 0.131 0.884
Mersey -0.185 0.152 0.224 -0.206 0.216 0.339
YorksH -0.306 0.090 0.001 -0.375 0.134 0.005
EM -0.302 0.091 0.001 -0.437 0.141 0.002
WM -0.300 0.090 0.001 -0.363 0.137 0.008
EA -0.514 0.094 0.000 -0.739 0.152 0.000
London -0.595 0.089 0.000 -0.775 0.133 0.000
SE -0.717 0.091 0.000 -1.079 0.154 0.000
SW -0.558 0.096 0.000 -0.769 0.149 0.000
Wales 0.030 0.113 0.791 0.101 0.168 0.546
pad1 2.174 0.178 0.000 4.069 0.427 0.000
pad2 2.068 0.179 0.000 4.224 0.464 0.000
pads 1.815 0.183 0.000 4.136 0.490 0.000
pad4 1.684 0.188 0.000 4.133 0.512 0.000
pad 5 1.548 0.196 0.000 4.118 0.531 0.000
pad6 1.657 0.199 0.000 4.286 0.543 0.000
pad7 1.522 0.208 0.000 4.275 0.560 0.000
pad8 1.534 0.215 0.000 4.318 0.569 0.000
pad9 1.458 0.222 0.000 4.275 0.580 0.000
pad 10 1.519 0.230 0.000 4.452 0.598 0.000
pad 11 1.149 0.269 0.000 4.166 0.628 0.000
pad 12 0.817 0.311 0.009 3.807 0.647 0.000
pad 13 0.487 0.377 0.196 3.470 0.677 0.000
pad 14 0.851 0.338 0.012 3.894 0.668 0.000
pad 15 1.442 0.338 0.000 4.539 0.678 0.000
pad 16 0.705 0.532 0.185 3.749 0.796 0.000
pad 17 1.074 0.608 0.077 4.081 0.856 0.000
Likelihood Ratio Statistic for Model I  versus Model I I 57876.725
p value 0
2 8 9
T a b l e  5.2 : R eg r e ssio n  R esu lts  -  M en  A g ed  o v e r  35  Y ea r s
Model I Model II
Coef. StdError p value Coef.
Std
Error p value
uratem -0.074 0.008 0.000 -0.106 0.012 0.000
inac -0.116 0.006 0.000 -0.188 0.012 0.000
tight -1.324 0.201 0.000 -1.509 0.273 0.000
Mdurm -0.048 0.003 0.000 -0.066 0.004 0.000
Mdurm2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
nspy1 0.144 0.015 0.000 0.269 0.029 0.000
start_age -0.003 0.002 0.223 -0.004 0.004 0.267
skill 0.091 0.019 0.000 0.129 0.032 0.000
married_or_cohabit 0.370 0.032 0.000 0.633 0.059 0.000
repay 0.000 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.001 0.733
rbpay 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
union -0.042 0.032 0.186 -0.057 0.053 0.280
part -0.160 0.052 0.002 -0.223 0.082 0.006
qtrjn l 0.141 0.091 0.122 0.199 0.147 0.177
qtrjn2 0.194 0.093 0.037 0.303 0.150 0.043
qtrJnS 0.253 0.090 0.005 0.433 0.150 0.004
1 qtrjn4 0.343 0.090 0.000 0.457 0.148 0.002
qtrJnS 0.305 0.090 0.001 0.460 0.148 0.002
qtrjnô 0.221 0.092 0.016 0.436 0.151 0.004
qtrjn? 0.198 0.091 0.031 0.339 0.150 0.024
qtrJnS 0.113 0.092 0.218 0.245 0.150 0.103
qtrJnQ 0.249 0.088 0.005 0.412 0.146 0.005
qtrJnlO 0.219 0.090 0.015 0.375 0.147 0.011
q trjn l 1 -0.102 0.096 0.289 -0.104 0.153 0.497
q trjn l 2 0.085 0.096 0.373 0.134 0.155 0.387
q trjn l 3 -0.174 0.109 0.111 -0.127 0.174 0.467
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T a b l e  5.2 : R eg r e ssio n  R esu lts  (c o n t d .)
Model I Model I I
Coef. StdError
0.077
p value Coef. StdError p value
1 n e 0.391 0.000 0.766 0.133 0.000
1 NW 1 -0.025 0.069 0.720 0.020 0.113 0.863
Mersey | -0.216 0.114 0.058 -0.121 0.176 0.493
YorksH -0.103 0.066 0.118 -0.165 0.107 0.125
EM 1 -0.058 0.067 0.386 -0.087 0.115 0.447
WM -0.199 0.069 0.004 -0.315 0.115 0.006
EA -0.475 0.070 0.000 -0.811 0.124 0.000
London -0.595 0.070 0.000 -0.888 0.114 0.000
SE -0.574 0.067 0.000 -0.962 0.122 0.000
SW -0.319 0.073 0.000 -0.487 0.124 0.000
Wales 0.408 0.076 0.000 0.756 0.133 0.000
padi -0.270 0.149 0.069 0.913 0.292 0.002
pad2 -0.558 0.149 0.000 0.943 0.310 0.002
pads -0.662 0.150 0.000 1.029 0.325 0.002
pad4 -0.863 0.154 0.000 1.006 0.340 0.003
pad5 -0.877 0.156 0.000 1.138 0.351 0.001
pads -0.977 0.160 0.000 1.134 0.361 0.002
pad7 -1.075 0.165 0.000 1.138 0.370 0.002
pads 1 -0.980 0.166 0.000 1.355 0.380 0.000
1 pad9 -1.243 0.179 0.000 1.135 0.390 0.004
pad 10 -1.207 0.185 0.000 1.276 0.401 0.001
padll -1.621 0.209 0.000 0.832 0.411 0.043
pad 12 -1.433 0.207 0.000 1.118 0.419 0.008
pad 13 -1.424 0.218 0.000 1.157 0.426 0.007
pad 14 -1.452 0.225 0.000 1.169 0.435 0.007
padi 5 1 -1.800 0.288 0.000 0.759 0.471 0.107
pad 16 -2.151 0.384 0.000 0.528 0.546 0.334
padi 7 1 -3.247 0.721 0.000 -0.771 0.815 0.344
Likelihood Ratio Statistic for Model I  versus Model I I 157.304
p value 0.000
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5.2 D u r a t i o n  D e p e n d e n c e  -  T h e  S h a p e  o f  t h e  B a s e l i n e  H a z a r d
In the Figures 5.1-5.2 we graph the baseline hazards and their corresponding confidence 
intervals for each of our sub-samples. In basic form both of these baselines are similar to 
that estimated using the full sample (see Figure 4.1). Once again the confidence intervals 
around these estimates of the shape of the baseline hazard are wide, and particularly so in 
the case of the younger sub-sample.
Figure 5.1 : The Implied Baseline Hazard Function : Men aged 35 and under
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There are of course differences in the particular shape of the two baseline hazard 
functions -  most strikingly the level of the baseline hazard is lower for the older sample, 
and particularly at long durations -  although these should be put in the context of the 
width of the surrounding confidence intervals. Imposing a common baseline hazard over 
both sample may therefore have had serious implications for our results. Before turning 
to our variables of interest which are intended to cover the scarring effects of 
unemployment, we shall first review our the estimated effects of our controls in each sub 
sample, focusing in particular on points where our results differ significantly either 
between our two sub-samples of from those estimated over the whole sample (presented 
earlier in Table 4.1)
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Figure 5.2 : The Implied Baseline Hazard Function : Men aged over 35
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5.3 D e m o g r a p h ic  C o n t r o l s
For both samples, we recover the result that those men who are either married or 
cohabiting have a significantly higher hazard rate out of unemployment into employment 
than otherwise identical men. However, we find that only in the younger sample of men 
(below the age of 36) does age have a significant effect on the hazard. This result might 
explain the non-linearity we observed in the impact of age on the hazard rate in our 
earlier regression.
5.4 W o r k p l a c e  R el a t e d  I nd iv idu a l  C h a r a c t e r is t ic s
For the younger sample, our results are somewhat surprising, when compared to those 
presented in Table 4.1. First, we find that an individual’s level of skill does not appear to 
have a significant impact on their hazard rate out of unemployment into employment. 
This may be because the occupational measure of skill we have employed does not 
perform so well for younger workers, perhaps because youths are more likely to be 
involved in the process of job shopping where their previous occupation may be a poor
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indicator either of their level of skill or of the type of job they are currently searching for. 
We also find that the higher their level of basic pay in the week in which they were last 
observed in employment the lower their hazard rate out of employment in their current 
spell (this effect is significant yet small in magnitude). This would tend to suggest that for 
younger workers, the reservation wage effect dominates the productivity signal effect -  
those who were on higher pay before might search longer for a better paid job now. 
Finally, those previously in part-time employment are significantly more likely to escape 
unemployment than full-time workers.
For older members of the workforce, we find that their level of skill is now important -  
more skilled workers are significantly more likely to escape unemployment. Moreover, 
the basic pay effect now goes in the opposite direction (although again this effect is small 
in magnitude). Now it appears that base pay may be a good indicator of worker’s 
productivity, and hence employability, and the higher their level of base pay when last 
observed in employment, the higher their chance of escape. It may in fact be that these 
two effects cancel out when we estimate over the whole sample. We also find a similar 
effect with the part-time dummy, which is now negative in sign (and on the borders of 
significance) suggesting older part-time workers are less likely to escape unemployment 
than their previously full-time peers.
5 .5  L o c a l  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  C o n d i t i o n s
We find that the local labour market variables give a fairly consistent impression of the 
impact of the locality upon the individual’s chances of escaping unemployment across 
both sub-samples. In both samples we found that the inactivity rate and unemployment 
rate in the locality were significant and entered with the right sign; however, the vacancy- 
based measure of labour market tightness was (utterly) insignificant in the case of the 
younger workers. We also found that the many of regional dummies were significant and 
of the same sign in both regressions -  controlling for the level of the labour market 
tightness in the locality, those in the North East were more likely to escape than the base
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group (Scotland), those in East Anglia, London and the South East were less likely to do 
so.
5.6 S c a r r i n g  E f f e c t s
Finally we turn to our variables of interest: the duration of the previous spell (and its 
square) and the number of spells suffered in the last year. In our initial results we found 
the surprising result that the scarring effect of a given unemployment spell decreased 
with age, and this result remains when we split the sample by age. We find that the 
magnitude of that scarring effect (-.085) is greater for the younger members of the 
workforce, and this coefficient lies outside the confidence interval around the effect ( - 
.074,-0.058) estimated over the older sample. It is true that the offsetting quadratic term 
(which again implies that the marginal impact of an extra month of unemployment 
diminishes as the length of the spell increases) is more positive in the case of the younger 
sample, however this coefficient does indeed lie within the confidence interval around the 
corresponding coefficient estimated from the older sample; and in any case these effects 
are small. Simply put, on the basis of both our results in this and the previous section of 
this Chapter, we find no evidence that the scarring effect is indeed more serious for older 
workers; in fact if anything we find the contrary to be true.
Moreover, we also find the perverse occurrence dependence effects results we obtained 
for the whole sample -  the more spells you had in the last year, the easier you find it to 
escape unemployment (into employment) is once again weaker for youths, and again 
outside the confidence interval for the coefficient on the same variable in the older 
sample. Of course, having been unemployed a lot in the last year, also means by 
definition that you have escaped unemployment a lot too. Given that youths appear to 
escape unemployment with greater ease than adults, a track record o f being able to 
escape unemployment might be a particularly valuable thing for adults who become 
unemployed.
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6. C o n c l u sio n s
If the experience of unemployment has a detrimental effect on an individual, such that the 
longer he remains unemployed the harder it becomes to escape, it is possible that some of 
the damage caused by unemployment is not undone upon escape; unemployment might 
leave a scar. In this Chapter we investigate whether those individuals whose last 
experience of unemployment was long appear to have a lower probability of escaping 
unemployment than an otherwise identical individual. We find that experiences of 
unemployment do indeed appear to leave a scar.
Our analysis is based on the claimant history of a random sample of working-age men, 
where we are able to control for the impact of both the labour markets in which these 
men search, and observable and unobservable differences between them, on their 
probability of escaping unemployment. We find that the longer the duration of his last 
spell the lower his hazard rate out of unemployment. In the parlance of survival analysis 
we can identify significant lagged duration dependence effects in unemployment. 
Conversely, we find the more spells of unemployment an individual has suffered in the 
year prior to his becoming unemployed, the easier he finds it to escape unemployment, 
other things equal.
This research has focused on the rather narrow question of the scarring effect firom 
experiences of unemployment in the recent past: the length of the most recent spell, the 
number of spells suffered in the last year. It might prove interesting to investigate 
whether the length of spells in the more distant past appear to have an impact on current 
outcomes in the labour market^
Finally, we can find no robust evidence to suggest that experiences of unemployment 
leave a greater scar on older members of the workforce, and if anything our results 
suggest the opposite may be the case -  youths seem to be more affected by their
' Using the pgmhaz routine from which the results in this Chapter were generated it did not prove possible 
to achieve convergence upon inclusion of the durations of additional spells.
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experiences of unemployment in the past, than an otherwise identical adult. O f course 
this result must be put in the context that our results also indicate that youths have a 
higher exit rate out of unemployment for a given duration of unemployment spell.
It may well be that first experiences in the labour market count. Older workers, who in 
their past have been in regular employment, may not be unduly affected by an experience 
of unemployment. For a youth, a significant experience of unemployment may be more 
serious. Moreover, if we believe that part of the explanation for the scarring effect of 
unemployment is that a past history of unemployment acts as a negative signal to 
potential employers, we know from the results in Chapter 4 that even though 
proportionately more youths enter unemployment, a lower proportion of those that do 
become long-term unemployed, so for those unfortunate youths that do become long-term 
unemployed, this might act as a strong signal to firms of their unemployability.
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A p pe n d ix  1: D a t a  D esc r ipt io n
The following section describes the explanatory variables used in the survival analysis
[I] I n d i v i d u a l  D a t a : D e m o g r a p h i c  C o n t r o l s
S t a r t  A G E T h e  in d i v i d u a l ’s a g e  i n  y e a r s  w h e n  h e  s t a r t e d  t h e  c u r r e n t  s p e l l  o f  c l a i m a n t
u n e m p lo y m e n t .
M a r r i e d  Takes the value one if the man is reported as married in the JUVOS
dataset, and zero otherwise.
C o h a b i t  Takes the value one if the man is reported as cohabiting (but not married)
in the JUVOS dataset, and zero otherwise.
M A R R IE D  Takes the value one if the man is either cohabiting or married, and zero
O R  C o h a b i t  o th e r w i s e
[111 I n d i v i d u a l  D a t a : c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  t h e  W o r k p l a c e
S k i l l  Following Elias (1995) and Elias and Bynner (1997), this measure o f the
individual’s level of skill is constructed from his two digit Standard 
Occupational Classification (S.O.C.)^^® -  data on which is contained 
within the NESPD. The variable takes values between 1 and 4 in 
increasing order of skill. It could be argued that a measure of skill based 
on academic attainment might be preferable, but we do not have access to 
this data.
am very grateful to Glenda Quintini for providing me with the programme files which convert the SOC 
codes in the NESPD into Elias’ skill classification.
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P a r t Takes the value one if the individual was working on a part-time basis at 
the point in time he was included in the given wave of the NESPD, and 
zero otherwise.
D b j Takes the value one if the individual held more than one job at the point in 
time he was included in the given wave of the NESPD, and zero otherwise
U n i o n  T a k e s  th e  v a lu e  o n e  i f  t h e  i n d i v id u a l  w a s  c o v e r e d  b y  a  c o l l e c t i v e
a g r e e m e n t  a t  th e  t im e  h e  w a s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  g iv e n  w a v e  o f  t h e  NESPD, 
a n d  z e r o  o th e r w is e .
R o p a y  Real overtime weekly earnings at the time the individual was included in
the given wave of the NESPD.
R e p a y  Real overtime weekly earnings at the time the individual was included in
the given wave of the NESPD.
P a y y r ' t ’ This dummy variable takes the value one if the observation on the
individual’s level of pay is drawn from the t^  ^ year of the N.E.S.. This 
variable is intended to control for productivity growth at the aggregate 
level.
[ I ll] L o c a l  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  D a t a
U r a t e m  Claimant Count Unemployment Rate for Men in the individual’s local 
travel to work area.
INAC Male Inactivity Rate in the individual’s standard statistical region.
T ig h t  Vacancy Rate in the individual’s local travel to work area.
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D g o r ' k ’ a  dummy variable taking the value one if the individual lives in a given 
Government Operating Region:'k’.
Q t r _ i n ' q ’ a  d u m m y  v a r i a b le  ta k in g  th e  v a lu e  o n e  i f  t h e  s p e l l  b e g i n s  a t  s o m e  p o i n t  
d u r i n g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  q u a r t e r ;  t h i s  c a p tu r e s  a n  a g g r e g a t e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  e f f e c t .
[IV] I n d i v i d u a l  D a t a  o n  P r e v i o u s  E x p e r i e n c e s  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t
L d u r m  The duration of the last spell of claimant unemployment measured in
months suffered by the individual (prior to the current spell) as reported in 
the JUVOS dataset.
L d u r m 2  The square of duration of the last spell o f claimant unemployment
measured in months suffered by the individual (prior to the current spell) 
as reported in the JUVOS dataset.
Y l d u r m  The duration of the last spell of claimant unemployment measured in
months suffered by the individual (prior to the current spell) as reported in 
the JUVOS dataset for those below 35 years of age, and zero otherwise.
Y l d u r m 2  The square of duration of the last spell of claimant unemployment
measured in months suffered by the individual (prior to the current spell) 
as reported in the JUVOS dataset for those below 35 years of age, and 
zero otherwise.
NsPVl The number of spells of claimant unemployment suffered by the
individual in the year before the start o f current spell as reported in the 
JUVOS dataset.
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YnspyI The number of spells of claimant unemployment suffered by those below 
35 years of age in the year before the start of current spell as reported in 
the JUVOS dataset, and zero otherwise.
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C h a p t e r  6  
C o n c l u s io n
This thesis has investigated the hypothesis that an appreciation of the age structure of the 
population can improve our understanding of the labour market, and in particular the 
incidence of unemployment. Our conclusions are twofold: that experiences of 
unemployment do indeed differ significantly by age and that shifts in the age composition 
of the population can have an impact on the incidence of unemployment in the economy.
In the first half of this thesis we focus on the macroeconomic implications of 
demographic change. In no way do we suggest that demographics can explain all (or 
indeed most) of the time series variation in the unemployment rate. Indeed, there is an 
extensive (and impressive) literature which has identified the role played by numerous 
factors in determining the unemployment rate (see Bean (1994) for an excellent survey). 
Our intention is simply to examine (or perhaps more humbly re-examine) the part played 
by demographic pressures in addition to, rather than instead of, these other factors.
In the first of two chapters we employ a shift share methodology as an accounting 
framework to identify the role played by shifts in the composition of the labour force in 
determining the behaviour of the unemployment rate. Simply put, if  youths always suffer 
higher unemployment rates than adults then a decline in the youth share of the labour 
force implies that the aggregate unemployment rate may fall.
Our results indicate that the shifts in the age composition of the working-age population 
which followed from the collapse in the birth rate during the ‘baby bust’ were large 
enough to have a small, yet significant impact on the aggregate unemployment rate. Of 
course demographic shocks of this magnitude are by their very nature rare -  so one might 
reasonably ask whether our analysis serves any other purpose than a simple historical 
accounting exercise. However, as with most historical analysis, there are potential 
lessons for the future -  there will continue to be episodes in the future in which the age
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composition of the working-age population undergoes periods of profound change. 
Consider for example the long term implications of the recent high rates of emigration 
among young British men, which have been identified through the process of carrying out 
the latest census of the population of the United Kingdom. If this trend continues, then 
the share of the population accounted for by middle aged men will fall significantly as 
successive cohorts of young men leave for foreign shores.
Of course what matters for monetary policy is not the unemployment rate itself, but the 
unemployment gap -  the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate 
which brings consistency with price- and wage-setters. Although we do not explicitly 
model it in Chapter 2, the entry of the Baby Bust cohort will also have reduced the 
natural rate of unemployment in the economy. For an individual, it is the presence of 
sufficient numbers of individuals in the unemployment pool who are capable of filling 
their job which restrains their demands for higher wages. To be a plausible candidate to 
replace the worker, these unemployed individuals will most probably have similar levels 
of experience and qualifications as the employee. In practice that means they are likely 
to be of a similar age, especially for those jobs filled by younger members of the 
workforce. The age-specific employment or unemployment rates should then act as a 
good proxy for the tightness of the labour market in which the individual operates. Our 
analysis thus cautions against focusing on the weighted average of these age-specific 
employment or unemployment rates as a measure of labour market tightness; monetary 
policy makers should focus on these age-specific rates, and particularly so in periods of 
significant demographic change. The aggregate unemployment rate can fall without any 
shift in the group specific rates given a favourable shift in demographic composition, and 
we would not expect any corresponding increase in wage pressure as a result. This is 
indeed the interpretation we offer for (part of) the apparent fall in the natural rate over the 
1990s.
Demographic change is thus a plausible candidate explanation for why the natural rate 
fell over the period -  and given the meagre estimates of the role played by other more
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celebrated determinants of the shift in the natural rate^^  ^ -  it is one worthy of comment. 
What makes demographic change interesting in this regard is that its impact is transient, 
and may indeed reverse. Unlike other factors, such as the structural reforms in the labour 
market -  which are (rightly or wrongly) perceived to have been permanent, demographic 
change may put upward pressure on the natural rate in the future. Despite its inexorable 
fall in the 1990s, policy makers would be wise to consider factors such as demographic 
change which could lead to a rise as well as a fall in the natural rate of unemployment.
In the Chapter 3 we reassess the role played by demographic change within an 
established theoretical framework which links the mismatch between the relative demand 
and supply of different skilled groups in the workforce to movements in the 
unemployment rate. Typically this literature has focused on a worker’s level of 
educational attainment to measure his level of skill. However, if  individuals accumulate 
human capital through experience in the labour market, then a shift in the age 
composition of the population will involve a shift in the relative supply of skilled labour 
in the economy.
Our analysis indicates that net shifts in the demand for skilled labour can explain a far 
higher fraction of the time series behaviour of the unemployment rate than previously 
assumed. Of course, this result is conditional on the values of certain key parameters of 
our model -  notably, the degree of substitution in production between different skill 
inputs and the nature of wage setting in the economy -  and we would certainly argue that 
further research to pin down these parameters is of great importance. Nonetheless, this 
result is potentially intriguing. Our results suggest that the magnitude o f the 
unemployment effect resulting from a given skill biased shock to demand will be 
determined in part by the size (if any) of the offsetting shift in supply. In an environment 
in which skill biased shocks are common and where high rates o f unemployment among 
the unskilled are economically inefficient (as well as socially divisive) because they
Take for example Nickell and Quintini (2002) who estimate that the incidence o f nominal wage 
rigidities in the UK labour market have a minor role in determining the equilibrium unemployment rate, so 
that an increase in the inflation rate from 2.5% to 5.5% would lead to only a 0.13 pp decline in the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.
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produce no downward pressure on wages elsewhere in the economy, our analysis shows 
that Government interventions to raise the level of skill in the population -  through 
encouraging participation in post compulsory education among youths, and promoting 
training at the workplace for adults -  with which it can mitigate the effects of these 
shocks take on an added importance. The former of these policies (promoting 
participation in post-compulsory education) will both reduce the share of youths with 
little or no qualifications (who we find to be the least skilled members of the workforce) 
and at the same time increase the share of graduates (who go on to become the most 
skilled). The latter policy (encouraging training at the workplace) thought it may not 
deliver an increase in the average level of educational attainment in the workforce -  
except perhaps through lifetime learning policies such as the Open University scheme -  
will still raise average levels of productivity.
O f course, access to the workplace might be thought of as the most basic form of training 
scheme and so in a sense the Government has a final lever on the skill distribution. 
Through active labour market policies such as the New Deal, or financial incentives 
created by the National Minimum Wage or tax credits, the Government can encourage 
those currently in inactivity or unemployment to find work. In this way the worst ravages 
on the human capital of the socially excluded may be avoided by returning these 
individuals to the workplace, and thereby indirectly the average level of skill of the 
workforce is raised.
While the unemployment rate defines the fraction of the labour force who are out of work 
and claiming benefit or seeking employment (depending on one’s definition) it can tell us 
nothing about how the experience of unemployment is distributed across the labour force 
over time -  and the extent to which that experience is concentrated on a relatively small 
number of chronically unemployed individuals. In the second half o f this thesis we focus 
on this variation in the experience of unemployment over the long run, and in particular 
the variation across different age groups in the population.
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Over the last couple o f decades, and in particular since the election of the Labour 
Government in 1997, policy interventions in the labour market have increasingly focused 
on the long-term unemployed. Our results -  that in the long run the experience of 
unemployment is highly concentrated on a relatively small fraction of the workforce -  
certainly do not challenge the expenditure of resources to alleviate the incidence of long 
term unemployment -  we can clearly identify large numbers of individuals in the JUVOS 
panel who are continuously unemployed for years at a time. The focus of Chapter 4 is 
beyond the variation in duration of the claimant spells that are ‘live’ at a given point in 
time; we ask, once we aggregate across all the spells they suffer in a given period, how 
concentrated is the distribution of unemployment across all those who suffer some 
experience of unemployment ? In fact, something of the order of a quarter of those who 
have some experience of unemployment over a four year period can account for about 
three fifths of all the days lost to unemployment over that period. Nor is that to say that 
the long-term unemployed do not contribute to our understanding of this long-run 
concentration of unemployment. Over the space of a year, three quarters of those who 
spend more than six months on benefit, will have done so on account of one spell. But 
over a four year period, this fraction is more like a third.
Of course, our analysis focuses on a random sample of working age British men, so an 
element of caution is required in generalising our results to the workforce at large. 
Nevertheless, our results do suggest that in the long run the experience of unemployment 
is highly concentrated on a relatively small fraction of people who over the course of a 
number of spells account for a large fraction of the total number of days lost to 
unemployment; the frictionally unemployed come and go, the recurrent unemployed 
remain.
The key observation to draw from these results is that if the aim of policy-makers is to 
shift people permanently out of welfare and into work, then they should not view the 
long-term unemployed as the only cause for concern in the unemployment pool. At any 
moment in time there may be a large number of individuals on the unemployment rolls
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with a long history of unemployment for whom the discounted stream of benefit claims 
will be large, even though the length of their current claim might be relatively short.
This observation has potential implications for the design of policy. Within the 
framework of the New Deal, the unemployment are processed through the Gateway and 
into the various schemes according to the duration of their current spell -  the argument 
presumably being that since the hazard is assumed to fall with duration, so individuals 
can be ranked according to the length of their current spell in terms of their relative 
probability of escape, and so assistance can efficiently allocated on the basis of the 
observed duration of claimants. However, the Government also has access to the past 
history of benefit claims of each individual, and our results raise the possibility that 
individuals with a long history of benefit claims should be fast-tracked into the New 
Deal. Essentially this is an argument about the importance of deadweight losses. One of 
the key criticisms levelled at active labour market policies such as the New Deal is that 
they are inefficient because they subsidize flows into employment which would have 
happened in the absence of policy -  in other words they incur a deadweight loss. Our 
analysis suggests that for the chronically unemployed, entry into employment is more 
often than not rapidly followed by job loss and a flow back into unemployment. This is 
not to say that the deadweight loss does not exist, rather that they should be weighed 
against the potential benefit savings to the Exchequer (let alone the benefits to the 
individual) that could be achieved if schemes such as the New Deal can make a 
permanent impression on the individual’s prospects in the labour market. Of course this 
argument rests upon the notion that policy interventions of the kind involved in the 
various schemes of the New Deal actually can have a significant and enduring impact on 
individual’s employability. We would therefore argue that research should be focused on 
identifying which of the various New Deal schemes: entry into paid employment, full­
time education or work for a charitable organisation or environment task force have the 
greatest impact on future outcomes. In practice of course, this may turn out to be an 
argument for investing more resources, not less, on schemes such as the New Deal.
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Finally, there is another motivation for such interventions to reduce the incidence of 
recurrent unemployment in the labour force. The more heavily concentrated the 
experience of unemployment is on relatively few individuals, then the more the aggregate 
unemployment rate will exaggerate insiders risk of being unemployed. As a result 
unemployment is less likely to restrain wage pressure, since insiders will realise there are 
few individuals capable of replacing them in the unemployment pool. Consequently, 
policies which are focused on helping this rump of chronically unemployed individuals 
back into work may also achieve a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment. The 
fact then that the distribution of unemployment has become less concentrated over time 
may perhaps explain the surprising lack of wage growth at current low levels of 
unemployment.
Blanchard (2000) has advanced the hypothesis that it is the concentration of 
unemployment on the young in particular that enables (older) insiders to push for higher 
wages even in the face of a high unemployment rate. This argument suggests that policy 
should be targeted at unemployed youths - if this group offer little or no restraint on 
wages, then therefore their removal from the unemployment pool should not trigger 
higher wage growth. However, although it is certainly the case that youths flow into 
unemployment in larger numbers than older members of the workforce, we do not find 
that youths account for an overwhelming fraction of days of unemployment in the 
JUVOS panel. Our data do not therefore support Blanchard’s hypothesis, and we would 
not argue for targeting of resources on youth unemployment (at the expense of others) on 
the basis that it will achieve a significant reduction in the natural rate.
In the Chapter 5 of the thesis we focus on a possible cause of the concentration of 
unemployment on certain individuals that we observe. If, as many believe, prolonged 
exposure to unemployment damages an individual by stigmatising them in the eyes of 
potential employers, or eroding their human capital or psychological well-being then it 
may be that when an individual escapes unemployment the slate is not wiped clean. Our 
results lend credence to this hypothesis; we find evidence o f significant scarring effects in 
unemployment, so that those individuals who suffered longer spells of unemployment in
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the past tend to have lower hazard rates out of unemployment than otherwise identical 
individuals operating in identical labour markets.
The existence of these significant scarring effects in unemployment provide further 
justification for the type of active labour market policies discussed above, which aim to 
subsidise the long-term unemployed back into work. The premise that underlines 
schemes like the New Deal is that prolonged exposure to unemployment wreaks damage 
on an individual and that without intervention many of the long-term unemployed will 
remain out-of-work indefinitely. Our analysis suggests that once this damage has been 
done, the scar remains, and individuals will continue to be affected by the experience into 
the future. Intervening before erosion to human capital or psychological well-being 
begins therefore takes on added importance in the presence of these scarring effects.
O f course, the Government cannot intervene to subsidise all the unemployed back into 
jobs -  the deadweight losses involved in subsidising the short-term unemployed back into 
work would be catastrophically large. However, it is unlikely that for the majority of 
those who enter unemployment that they are materially affected by the experience of 
unemployment for some time after their spell begins. Our estimates of the baseline hazard 
seem to suggest that the conditional probability of exiting unemployment each month 
does not fall for at least the first year of unemployment, which could be taken as 
circumstantial evidence that the damage inflicted upon the individual is not significant 
over this period. However, we would argue that identifying precisely the period over 
which unemployed individuals become at risk remains a priority for Government, so as to 
better target its policies.
Governments commit considerable resources to improve the employment prospects of 
those on the very margins of the labour market. At present active labour market policies 
such as the New Deal have tended to focus oftentimes on the young. Our results suggest 
that other things equal youths have a higher exit rate out of unemployment than older 
members of the workforce. However, we also find that the experience of unemployment 
leaves a greater scar on youths than older members of the workforce. It may be indeed be
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that early experiences in the labour market are crucial in determining future outcomes. 
Our results are therefore broadly supportive of the discrimination in policy towards the 
young. Resources spent in fighting the worst excesses of youth unemployment may 
indeed yield large benefit savings over the rest of these individual’s lifetimes when the 
scarring effects of unemployment are severe.
Taken in the round then our conclusions are as follows. At the macro level demographic 
change plays a small yet significant role in explaining the fall in the unemployment rate, 
and implicitly the natural rate. Shifts in the age composition of the population drive the 
size of the skill shifts in labour supply, which in turn have affected the degree of wage 
inequality and the level of the aggregate unemployment rate. At the micro level, there are 
indeed significant differences in the distribution of unemployment across age-groups in 
the population: a larger fraction of the youth population will have some experience of 
unemployment, but their spells are typically shorter in duration, and by no means do they 
account for the majority of days lost to unemployment. However, for those youths who 
do have long experiences of unemployment, the scars those experiences leave behind 
may be more serious than for older members of the population.
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